
Appeal Decisions

Hearing held on 20 July 2016

Site visit made on 20 July 2016

by Pete Drew BSc (Hons) DipTP (Dist) MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 22 September 2016

Appeals A & B Ref: APP/D0840/C/16/3143608 and 3143609

Land at Treweege, Penhalvean, Stithians TR3 7DY

- The appeals are made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 [hereinafter 'the Act'] as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991.
 - The appeals are made by Mrs Karin Brennan and Mr Nicholas Brennan, respectively, against an enforcement notice issued by Cornwall Council.
 - The enforcement notice, reference EN14/01053, was issued on 9 December 2015.
 - The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is: *Without planning permission, the material change in the use of the land for the stationing of a caravan used for residential purposes and associated timber sheds.*
 - The requirements of the notice are: 1) cease the use of the land and the caravan on the land for residential purposes; 2) disconnect and remove any services connected to the caravan shown in the approximate position outlined in blue on the attached plan; 3) remove the caravan from the land; 4) disconnect and removal [sic] any services connected to the two timber sheds shown in the approximate positions outlined in green on the attached plan; 5) remove the two timber sheds from the land shown in the approximate position outlined in green on the attached plan; 6) remove all materials and debris from the land resulting from the compliance with (1 - 5) above.
 - The period for compliance with the requirements is 12 months.
 - Appeal A is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2) (e), (f) and (g) of the Act and Appeal B is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2) (c), (f) and (g) of the Act. Since the prescribed fees have not been paid within the specified period, the applications for planning permission deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the Act do not fall to be considered.
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Decision

1. It is directed that the enforcement notice is corrected by the replacement of the words in paragraph 3 of the enforcement notice with the words: *"Without planning permission, the making of a material change in the use of the land by the stationing of a caravan, shown in the approximate position outlined in blue on the plan attached to the notice, used for residential purposes and the use of the timber sheds, shown in the approximate position outlined in green on the plan attached to the notice, in connection with that residential use"*.
2. It is directed that the enforcement notice is varied by: (i) the deletion of requirements 4) and 5) in paragraph 5 of the enforcement notice, the consequential renumbering of requirement 6) as 4) and the replacement of the phrase "(1 - 5)" therein with the phrase "(1 - 3)"; and, (ii) the deletion of the phrase *"For (1) to (6) (inclusive) above,"* in paragraph 6 of the enforcement notice, so that it merely reads *"12 months after this notice takes effect"*.
3. Subject to this correction and these variations, the appeals are dismissed and the enforcement notice is upheld.

Preliminary matters

4. The address at the head of this decision has been taken from the face of the notice, the subject of these appeals, in preference to that stated on the appeal forms. To the extent that this is at issue I deal with the matter further below.
5. Conscious that the Appellants appeared to be unrepresented I circulated my agenda in advance of the Hearing. Appended thereto were relevant excerpts from the Act to enable the Appellants to consider the legislative context for the arguments that were likely to be in issue at the Hearing. Whilst this might not equate to 'equality of arms' it does, I hope, go some way to ensure they have been treated fairly through what has clearly been a stressful experience.
6. During the course of the Hearing an important question of fact emerged which I have decided merits separate consideration. This is whether the use of the timber sheds for residential purposes has taken place as a matter of fact. If an appeal under ground (b) had been lodged the onus of proof would have fallen on the Appellants to show that the breach had not occurred as a matter of fact.

Appeal A: Ground (e)

7. The Appellants agreed at the Hearing that they are the only parties with an interest in the land, as defined in the notice, and that they were served with a copy of the notice by hand in accordance with section 329(1)(a) of the Act. For good measure the Council's claim that it also affixed a copy of the notice to an object on the land, which is an acceptable form of service, was not disputed. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the notice was properly served on everyone with an interest in the land and that this ground of appeal must fail.
8. Notwithstanding the above conclusion two discrete points are raised under this head. The first is that Mrs Brennan's Christian name is wrongly spelt 'Karen' rather than 'Karin' on the notice and no doubt on associated correspondence, such as any covering letter. The Council acknowledge the defective spelling but say it is clear for whom the notice is intended; I agree. Moreover the fact that Mrs Brennan has been able to lodge an appeal on the grounds that she sees fit emphasises that she has not been prejudiced by the admitted error.
9. Whilst the Council is happy for me to correct the error and I can see no basis why there would be injustice if I were to do so, in this case no purpose would be served by such a correction. When one looks at the notice Mrs Brennan's name is not mentioned in the operative parts of the notice, broadly paragraphs 1 to 7, inclusive. These paragraphs contain the key elements of the notice that identify what the recipient has done wrong and what needs to be done in order to remedy the problem. Mrs Brennan's name does appear on what is effectively an annex to the notice which sets out, amongst other things, the mechanics and timescale for appeal, together with a summary of the grounds on which an appeal can be brought. Just as all of that information has now been overtaken by the fact that the appeal was lodged, so the record of service is spent. Even parts of the notice, such as section 4, the reasons for issue, might not merit correction at this stage when the deemed application fee has not been paid. For these reasons, despite the admitted error, I decline to correct the spelling.
10. The second area of dispute is the postcode, which the Appellants say should be TR16 6TQ based on the postcode of the neighbouring site, *The Paddocks*, and the Global Positioning System [GPS]. The Council says that its Geographical Information System [GIS] provokes the postcode and hence it submits that the

postcode it has used on the face of the notice is correct. The Council agreed that the neighbouring property, *The Paddocks*, was in the TR16 6TQ postcode. Unfortunately on site there was no signal to demonstrate the claim about GPS.

11. As I indicated at the Hearing when I did a pre-Hearing site visit, on the evening of 19 July 2016, I used the TR16 6TQ postcode on my car's 'Sat Nav' and I was told that I had arrived at my destination in the vicinity of the telephone kiosk between Penhalurick and Penhalvean. I do however appreciate that 'as the crow flies' this is not far from the appeal site. When I did the post-Hearing site visit I used the TR3 7DY postcode and showed Mr Brennan that my destination was indicated to be in the vicinity of Treweege, slightly to the north-east of the appeal site. This is not a scientific exercise and I acknowledge its limitations, but at the very least it underlines that despite being radically different postcodes, TR16 as opposed to TR3, they do appear to be next to each other. The precise boundary is unclear from the limited information before me.
12. On balance it has not been shown that the postcode used by the Council is clearly wrong and needs to be corrected on the face of the notice. Moreover section 2 of the notice defines the land by reference to a plan on which the Appellants' area of landownership is edged red. There can therefore be no doubt as to the land to which the notice relates and so even if the postcode might be wrong, there being no clear evidence that it is, there is no wider consequence. The notice would be revealed on any local land search that might be conducted by or on behalf of a future purchaser. Although it has been suggested that the incorrect postcode has coloured the judgement as to the site's isolation, in the absence of the deemed application fee this is not a matter on which I need to express a view. In dismissing the s78 appeal [Ref. APP/D0840/W/14/3001033] on the site in September 2015 the Inspector, at paragraph 10, found the site was "*some distance outside Penhalvean*", which might be debateable. However the same sentence continues that the village has only limited facilities and a restricted bus service. That must be a fact sensitive finding and there is no suggestion that the postcode was material to the judgement that she reached. For these reasons I reject the claim that the Council misled anyone for its own gain in identifying the postcode as TR3 7DY.

Appeal B: Hidden ground (b)

13. The grounds of appeal state that the timber sheds are not associated with the "*residential status*" of the caravan. Instead it is claimed they are associated with the development of an agricultural business and used for the storage of tools and materials. At the Hearing the Council's Enforcement Officer said she recalled that they were used for overspill kitchen storage. The Council also drew attention to paragraph 12 of the Inspector's decision in which she records that the Appellant had clarified at the first Hearing that around half of one shed was for the storage of personal possessions related to residential use.
14. At the site inspection it was evident that both sheds are being used to store some items unrelated to agriculture: the Appellant conceded that there was an element of domestic storage in both sheds. This included boxes of magazines and cat crates in one shed, it being admitted that there are no cats on the site, and old kitchen units within which saucepans, casserole dishes and the like are stored, together with a bicycle, in the other shed. Just as parking a car in a garage might be incidental to the enjoyment of a dwelling house, so a bicycle is likely to be ancillary to the residential use of the caravan. A bicycle is not a form of agricultural machinery. Given the Enforcement Officer's recollection,

the Inspector's record of the Appellant's admission at the first Hearing and the condition of the material in the sheds it is likely, on the balance of probability, that this situation has existed for some time. As a matter of fact and degree I conclude that the timber sheds are not exclusively used in connection with the agricultural use of the land but are instead in mixed use, including domestic storage ancillary to the residential use of the caravan. Insofar as the notice appears to allege the making of a material change in the use of the timber sheds that component of the allegation has taken place as a matter of fact.

15. Notwithstanding all of the above I shall correct the allegation to make the allegation more precise by, amongst other things, more accurately reflecting the definition of development, set out below, and making clear what the Council is alleging in relation to the sheds. In particular, noting that section 336(1) of the Act defines land to include buildings, the current phrase "*and associated timber sheds*" should be phrased better to reflect what they are used for. Given that this correction does not alter the thrust of the allegation I can be satisfied that it would not cause injustice to either party.

Appeal B: Ground (c)

16. Section 55 of the Act defines development to mean: "*...the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land*". Noting the grounds of appeal ["*Disregarding the residential aspect...*"] there appears to be no dispute that the residential use comprises the making of a material change in the use of the land. There is no grant of express planning permission and no reliance placed on any Class of permitted development for this use. It follows the residential use is a clear breach of planning control.
17. The caravan, distinct from the residential use thereof, and the timber sheds are claimed to be permitted development by virtue of Article 3 and Class A of Part 4 to Schedule 2 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 ["the GPDO"]. However the Council has explained in its statement that these provisions relate to temporary structures required in connection with the implementation of other development; the simplest example is a portacabin used as an office on a house building site.
18. It is claimed that the operations that are permitted, or deemed to be granted, which justify reliance on this Class are generically agricultural operations. The grounds of appeal say: "*The operations we are undertaking...are all related to the growing of various trees*". At the site inspection reference was made to the growing of crab apple and Cornish apple trees. However the definition of agriculture in section 336(1) of the Act includes horticulture, fruit growing and the use of land for woodlands where that use is ancillary to the farming of land. Crucially section 55(2)(e) of the Act makes it clear that any use of land for agriculture is not to be taken to be development for the purpose of the Act.
19. In these circumstances, whilst this is an ingenious argument, I am unable to accept it. Noting that Class A of Part 4 does not apply to mining operations [see A.1 thereof], building and engineering operations are defined in section 336(1) of the Act. Applying the ejusdem generis [of the same kind or nature] rule, other operations require, at the very least, a physical change to the land. In contrast the agricultural operations described, including "*the operation of pruning*", which is given as an example of an operation in the Oxford English Dictionary, would not comprise a building, engineering or other operation. By

- way of practical example, it would be ludicrous to expect a farmer to apply for planning permission every time he ploughed a field or trimmed a hedgerow and yet that appears to be the logical consequence of the Appellant's argument.
20. Moreover if the caravan and sheds were found to be within the ambit of this Class they would be permitted for the duration of the operations. There would be two ways of looking at it. At one end of the spectrum, given the relatively limited scale of the agricultural enterprise, said to comprise a total of around 250 trees including buckthorn and willow, there must be significant doubt, as a matter of fact and degree, as to whether the caravan and sheds are reasonably required. At the other end of the spectrum, if it were accepted that they are, they might need to be there over the life of the trees, which could conceivably be 100 years. They would not then comprise a temporary building or structure, which is the title to that Class of development. This analysis underlines that this Class of permitted development is simply not relevant to this situation.
21. For these reasons I conclude that the growing of various trees on the appeal site and the undertaking of works thereto, including pruning, comprises a use of the land for the purposes of agriculture, which is not development for the purpose of the Act. In the context of that finding the Appellant admitted that there are no [other] operations taking place on the land that are permitted or deemed to be granted that would justify reliance on this Class. The caravan and timber sheds are not therefore permitted development by virtue of Article 3 and Class A of Part 4 to Schedule 2 of the GPDO.

Appeals A & B: Ground (f)

22. Section 4 of the enforcement notice is relevant to this ground of appeal insofar as it clearly states that: "*The Notice is issued for the purpose of discontinuing the use of the land and to restore the land to its condition before the breach took place in accordance with Section 173(4)(a) of the above Act*". If that was the Council's purpose, or objective, in drafting the requirements of the notice, then the narrow remit of the ground (f) appeals is whether these requirements are excessive in order to achieve those purposes.
23. Dealing with each in turn the Appellants agreed that the first requirement was appropriate in order to achieve the objective of discontinuing the unauthorised residential use. In relation to the second requirement it was agreed that in the absence of a water supply and with the use of a chemical toilet within the caravan, the only services that are connected are the 5 solar panels that are propped up on wood frames which, it was stated, can be "*moved easily*".
24. In relation to the second and third requirements it was claimed that these were excessive because the caravan could be used in future for shelter and, amongst other things, to make a cup of tea and use the toilet, in connection with the agricultural use of the land. Whilst acknowledging the principle there can be no doubt that the caravan has facilitated the residential use and hence its removal is a necessary and reasonable part of ensuring that the use is discontinued. If the caravan was allowed to remain on site the residential use could take place on an intermittent basis, which would be very difficult for the Council to detect. Moreover given the very limited agricultural activity on the land, insofar as it might justify a human presence, it is far from clear that a caravan would be justified in connection with any such activity. It is in prospect that the site could develop into a leisure plot in which the caravan might be the focus for a use that is unrelated to a genuine agricultural enterprise. No sound reason has therefore been given as to why these requirements are excessive.

25. In relation to the fourth and fifth requirements, the key issue is whether it is excessive to require the sheds to be removed. At the Hearing the Council appeared to concede, based on a reply to a Planning Contravention Notice [PCN] that I have not seen, that the sheds were erected in November 2011, which is more than 4-years before the date of issue of the notice. Whilst that may or may not be correct the Council agreed that the sheds were buildings and nothing that I saw during my site inspection suggested otherwise.
26. The Appellants told me that they moved onto the site in May 2012, although I note from paragraph 20 of the Inspector's decision dated September 2015 that it records they have lived there since November 2011. However the Council agreed at the Hearing that the sheds were erected first. It is not clear and has not been shown that the sheds were erected to facilitate the residential use. Whilst the Council referred at the Hearing to the case of *Murfitt v SSE* [1980] JPL 598, it is important to note that in the *Murfitt* case the Appellant: "...agreed that the only purpose of the hardcore on the site was to enable it to be used for the purpose of parking of heavy goods vehicles"¹. The placing of the hardcore was simply part and parcel of the unauthorised use. I am not satisfied that principle can be applied here for 2 reasons. First it is common ground that the buildings were erected first, prior to the making of a material change in the use of the land, possibly in connection with an agricultural use. Second even now the buildings are not used exclusively in connection with the residential use.
27. For these reasons I consider that requirement 5) is excessive in requiring the demolition of both timber sheds. For reasons given previously the use of those sheds for, amongst other things, domestic storage will need to cease because it is unrelated to any agricultural use of the land. However, given that land includes buildings, this is already covered by the wording of requirement 1). Allied to this I consider requirement 4) is both unnecessary and excessive. The only services are the solar panels, which are linked to the caravan, but these are required to be removed by requirement 2). For the avoidance of doubt the solar panels need to be removed from the land and any attempt to retain them but move the supply cable to the buildings would not achieve compliance with the requirements of the notice as proposed to be varied.
28. The Appellants' grounds of appeal do not address the narrow remit of ground (f) as set out above. Instead, taking the Council's claim that the development "...would have a detrimental visual impact upon the character and appearance of the countryside" as the starting point, the grounds seek to show that there are a number of other caravans and sheds in the vicinity which, it is claimed, informs an appraisal of the character and appearance of the area. However, in the absence of the deemed application fee having been paid, that is not a matter that falls to be considered in these appeals. If the fee had been paid section 177(1) of the Act says that planning permission may be granted in relation to the whole or any part of those matters and so even if the residential use was found to be unacceptable it is conceivable that planning permission might have been granted for the caravan and sheds. However the ground (f) is not a backdoor way to achieve this outcome without paying the requisite fee. Accordingly, whilst I acknowledge that a large amount of material has been submitted in pursuit of this ground of appeal, I do not propose to address it.
29. I acknowledge that the Appellants are aggrieved that, as they see it, they have been prevented from making this argument because they cannot afford to pay

¹ Source of quote: *Murfitt v SSE* [1980] JPL at 600.

the fee. However this is not the way that I see it. The fact is that a planning application was made and an appeal was lodged against that decision, which was considered at a Hearing last year. The Appellants doubtless advanced a range of arguments at that time, as they saw fit, but the Inspector dismissed that appeal. The planning merits of the development have been considered. This Council chose to issue an enforcement notice following the receipt of that decision, which has allowed the Appellants to bring further appeals. Another Council might have taken a different approach and issued a notice at the time the planning application was refused, which might have been heard at the same appeal Hearing. I make no observations on the rights or wrongs of that approach but in a practical sense it has worked to the Appellants' advantage because these appeals are being heard the best part of a year after the last.

30. Notwithstanding the above, and the fact that the Appellants did not advance this ground on this basis, the ground (f) appeals will succeed to the limited extent outlined and the requirements will be varied, amongst other things to delete the fourth and fifth requirements in respect of the timber sheds. The Council's apparent concession would not prevent it taking further enforcement action to address the building operations if it held evidence that the timber sheds had been substantially completed within the requisite 4-year period.

Appeals A & B: Ground (g)

31. The planning application that was dismissed at appeal by decision letter dated 9 September 2015 sought a 3-year temporary consent [paragraph 3 thereof]. The Hearing that considered that appeal took place [at the time of writing] almost 12 months ago, but the original application was made on 20 January 2014 and was refused on 9 June 2014. The period for compliance with the notice is 12 months which [at the time of writing] would extend until late July 2017. It is material to note that if the Council had granted a 3-year temporary consent in June 2014, instead of a refusal, that would have expired before the period for compliance with the enforcement notice, as currently projected.
32. Moreover the Council has drawn attention to the power in section 173A (1)(b) of the Act, which allows it to extend the period for compliance. Given the fact that the Council has tolerated the clear breach of planning control over a significant number of years to allow the Appellants every opportunity to pursue appeals and examine alternative accommodation options, there is no reason to think that the Council will take a less considered approach going forwards.
33. The problem that I have with the Appellants' argument under this head is that even if I were to extend the period for compliance by 20 years² there would still come a day where they would have to face moving. There appears to be no realistic prospect of planning permission being granted for residential use on this site whether in relation to any agricultural activity or otherwise. Although the Appellants have drawn attention to how many households are on the Homechoice Register, which I have no reason to dispute, and the Strategic Housing Market Needs Assessment, as to how many new affordable homes are required, it is likely that the need to comply with the notice will result in the Appellants becoming a very high priority for re-housing. The Appellants told the Hearing that re-assessment begins 6 months before the date of eviction. If that date is put off for 6 months, e.g. by extending the period for compliance to 18 months, I do not see how that benefits them. That is not to say that if the

² This is not merely a facetious remark as the grounds of appeal say it could take up to 28 years to house all of the households on the Homechoice Register without taking account of any future needs that might arise.

- 12 months expires and the Appellants are offered no accommodation that it might not be appropriate to exercise a modicum of discretion. However it does strongly suggest that the housing need does have to be met in another way.
34. I have limited information before me about the criteria that are applied to those on the Homechoice Register, but Appendix A to the Strategic Housing Framework *"Our Strategy for Cornwall 2014-2019"* reveals 5 bands, A-E, where A is the highest priority. As at 1 April 2014 there were 162 households in Band A against an average of 2,000 lettings per year. Although I cannot be certain, homelessness is likely to be reflected in the highest banding³. However the quarterly homelessness acceptances are shown in that document to be on a downwards trajectory [Q1 2012 – Q2 2013]. This view is confirmed by the paper entitled *"Cornwall's Full Objectively Assessed Need"*, which concludes⁴: *"...the number of [unintentionally] homeless households in Cornwall...has in fact decreased against the trend of increases elsewhere"* by 58 % from 2012-2014. This suggests that at the point, perhaps within 6 months of actual eviction, that the Appellants are categorised to be unintentionally homeless that they would have a very high chance of being offered a suitable letting.
35. I acknowledge this might be a blunt, unwelcome message but the Appellants' business activities do not appear to be sustainable in their present form. Based on the information before me, which I have no reason to set down in a public document, they are working for significantly less than the national living wage⁵ even before paying over a third of their gross income on rent for the business premises. I greatly respect their commitment to a strong work ethic and their desire not to be a burden on the welfare state but, noting the admitted impact on their physical and mental health, this situation does need to be brought to a head. Putting off the day is just going to perpetuate the existing unsatisfactory position which, amongst other things, is acknowledged to be harming their creativity in trying to do what they have done successfully for nearly 30 years.
36. The Appellants describe themselves to be *"frozen like rabbits in the headlights"* and that might explain why there appears to have been little progress with the agricultural enterprise despite what will have been 3-years to progress it. The uncertainty in relation to the planning situation does not explain that inaction because such an agricultural activity does not require planning permission. Whether growing willow or an orchard and wood crop, the start-up costs are likely to be minimal for reasons explored in paragraph 22 of the first appeal. It is clear that the Appellants' plan at that time was to generate additional income with the aim of securing sufficient income to rent a dwelling [paragraph 27]. In other words it was never envisaged that there was a functional need to live on site [confirmed in paragraph 18 of the first appeal] and this understanding is underlined by the acknowledgement at the Hearing that the Appellants' area of search extends anywhere within 10 miles of Falmouth. The acknowledged threat to their home does not explain the lack of progress with this enterprise.
37. The grounds of appeal refer to what appears to have been a crass suggestion that a realistic option for the Appellants might be to live in their car. That is not an acceptable option as far as I am concerned and anything less palatable, such as *"on-the-street homelessness"*, would be completely unacceptable. Although the Appellants said they knew of others who were living in cars and

³ By way of contrast Appendix A to the Strategic Housing Framework indicates that almost 15,000 households on the Register at that point in time were in Band E which "...is generally classed as 'adequately housed'".

⁴ See pages 12 and 13 of that document, which was submitted as part of the bundle with Appeal A.

⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates>

had not been offered accommodation it appeared to be conceded that those persons were not registered on the Homechoice Register. Whilst that is their choice a clear distinction must be drawn in those circumstances. However the Appellants need to be realistic and might have to seriously consider transient accommodation, in the first instance, such as bed and breakfast. If they chose to turn down an option in a safe, warm and dry environment then the Council might be justified, if necessary, in refusing to extend the period for compliance or otherwise seeking compliance with the requirements of the notice.

38. In reaching the view that it would not be appropriate to extend the period for compliance I have noted all of the other matters raised under the ground (g) head by both Appellants. In particular reference is made to the comments of the Inspector in paragraph 35 of the appeal decision, which appear to conflate Article 8 with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Human Rights Act 1998. That notwithstanding, the Council's statement has eloquently dealt with this matter⁶. These are qualified rights and whilst I recognise that dismissal of these appeals would interfere with the Appellants' home and family life, such interference must be balanced against the public interest in pursuing the legitimate aims stated in Article 8. These include public safety and the economic well-being of the country, which includes the preservation of the environment.
39. This balancing exercise would normally be achieved when considering the merits of the development under ground (a). However in its absence, noting that the previous Inspector found the harm and conflict with policy to be such that even a temporary planning permission was objectionable, I consider the interference is permissible because: (i) the enforcement action has a basis in law; (ii) the reasons for issue of the enforcement notice, as set out in section 4 thereof, are in pursuit of an aim set out in Article 8; and, (iii) it pursues a legitimate objective and is proportionate to the objective being pursued.
40. For these reasons dismissal of these appeals would not have a disproportionate effect on the Appellants, particularly where a reasonable period for compliance is established and I have given some indication of the parameters that should be taken into account as to whether that period should be extended, in the scenario that it might be necessary to do so. For the same reasons given in respect of Article 8, I consider the interference with the Appellants' peaceful enjoyment of their property is proportionate and strikes a fair balance in compliance with the requirements of Article 1 of the First Protocol.

Conclusion

41. For the reasons given, and having regard to all other matters raised, I conclude that the appeals should be dismissed and I shall uphold the corrected and varied enforcement notice.

Pete Drew
INSPECTOR

⁶ In paragraphs 5.23-5.26 thereof.

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANTS:

Karin Brennan	Appellant.
Nicholas Brennan	Appellant.

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Peter Blackshaw BA (Hons)	Planning Officer, Cornwall Council.
MRTPI	
Jo Patient	Enforcement Officer, Cornwall Council.
George Shirley	Planning Officer, Cornwall Council.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED AT THE HEARING

Document	1	Letter of notification dated 22 June 2016.
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