The Planning Inspectorate

Appeal Decision

Hearing held on 2 August 2016.

Site visit made on 2 August 2016.

by Stephen Brown MA(Cantab) DipArch RIBA

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 23 November 2016

Appeal Ref: APP/L2630/X/16/3142008
Grove Farm, Middle Road, Denton IP20 0AH

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 against a failure to give notice within the prescribed period of a decision on an application for a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
- The appeal is made by Stuart Hardwick Carruthers against South Norfolk District Council.
- The application ref. 2015/2552 is dated 9 November 2015.
- The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
- The uses for which a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development is sought are:
  i. Proposed light industrial use for the manufacture, repair and storage of goods used to provide services at festivals.
  ii. The proposed residential use of a lawful dwelling.
  iii. The proposed residential use of a former dwelling.
  iv. The proposed equine use of land.
  v. The proposed storage of caravans, mobile homes et cetera on land used to provide residential services.

Decision

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Applications for costs

2. At the Hearing applications for costs were made by the appellant against the Council, and by the Council against the appellant. These applications are the subject of separate Decisions.

Preliminary matters

3. For the avoidance of doubt, I should explain that the planning merits of the existing or proposed uses are not relevant, and they are not therefore an issue for me to consider in the context of an appeal under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended (the Act), which relates to an application for a lawful development certificate. My decision rests on the facts of the case, and on relevant planning law and judicial authority.

4. In various statements the appellant makes allegations of misconduct and dishonesty against the Council and specific officers. These are not matters for consideration at a planning Hearing, and if they are to be pursued it must be in another forum. I have given these matters no further consideration.

5. The application is ostensibly to establish whether the various proposed uses of the site would be lawful under the provisions of s.192 of the Act. However, it is also argued that the light industrial use applied for is subsisting rather than proposed. It was accepted at the Hearing that this fell to be considered under s.191(1)(a) of the Act – that is whether an existing use of buildings or other land is lawful.

Background matters

6. The Grove Farm site lies to the southern side of Middle Road, somewhat outside the village of Denton. It is L-shaped, with the south-eastern leg of the 'L' wrapping around part of the Kingsland Farm site to the east. To the south and west of the appeal site there are open agricultural fields. Set back from the road by an area of hardstanding is a substantial corrugated sheet clad shed, which I shall call the Barn for the purposes of this decision. Close to the eastern site boundary is another substantial corrugated sheet clad shed. Along the major part of the western boundary is a range of stable type buildings - which I shall refer to as the Stables - with a larger shed attached at the southern end. There is a pond just to the south of the Barn, and to the south of that are some animal pens, where a single pig is kept. I understand that dogs were kept here at one time.

Enforcement history

7. There have been numerous enforcement notices issued against various forms of development on the appeal site, including residential uses of parts of the Barn and the Stables, and the standing of residential caravans and a mobile home. The appellant has sought to challenge these and other enforcement notices relating to the appeal site on the basis that the Council are unable to prove that the notices were issued or served. He claims that the relevant notices are nullities, and do not in effect exist, because their issue or service is not properly recorded in the register of enforcement notices the Council is required to keep under s.188(1) of the Act.

8. Section 285(1) of the Act states that subject to the provisions of that section, the validity of an enforcement notice shall not, except by way of an appeal under Part VII, be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds on which such an appeal may be brought. S.285(2) then excludes from this provision any proceedings brought under s.179 against a person who, amongst other things, did not have a copy of an enforcement notice served on him, and satisfies the court first, that he did not know an enforcement notice had been served; second, that he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the enforcement notice had been issued; and third, that his interests have been substantially prejudiced by the failure to serve him with a copy. This makes apparent that in any court proceedings relating to offences where enforcement notices have not been complied with, it would be open for an appellant to attempt to satisfy the court on these matters - which are effectively those that are argued in this appeal.

9. The relevant enforcement notices relating to the dwelling in the Barn and the dwelling in the Stables were both prosecuted under s.179, but there is nothing before me to indicate the appellants defended their cases under s.285(2). Nevertheless, that would be a matter for the courts, and not one that can be considered at a s.195 Hearing.

10. The appellant has put forward a High Court determination[1] in which the main consideration was the legal consequence of the failure of a local planning authority to serve enforcement notices on the owner and occupier of the land to which the notice related within the prescribed period. The judge concluded that s.285 did not prevent the claimant from challenging the validity of those notices on the ground that the notices were not served within the time limit required by s.172(3) of the Act, and that the notices should be quashed. That case was determined around the operation of the Act and the very specific dates of issue of the notices and submission of the appeal. It was concluded the appellant had been substantially prejudiced to the extent that he had been deprived of his right to appeal under s.174. There is nothing in the case before me to suggest that those with an interest in the land or relevant occupiers have been deprived of their rights to appeal against any of the relevant notices.

11. Overall, I consider it must be a matter of fact as to whether an enforcement notice was issued and served, in the light of the relevant evidence as a whole. It is not a matter that is determined solely by whether or not an entry contained in the s.188 register is complete in every detail.

12. I deal with the notices of particular relevance to the uses applied for in my considerations of each of those uses below.

The main issue

13. From my inspection of the appeal site and its surroundings and from all that I have heard and read I consider the main issue to be whether, if the Council had refused the grant of a LDC – which is deemed to be the case - their decision would have been well-founded. In that regard the principal question is whether the existing and proposed future uses are, or would be lawful.

Reasons

14. In a s.195 appeal it is for the appellant to show that on the balance of probabilities a proposed use or operation would be lawful. An existing or proposed use can be lawful if at the time of application for a LDC there can be no enforcement action taken against it, and it does not constitute a contravention of any of the requirements of any enforcement notice then in force. There is a variety of circumstances in which no enforcement action may be taken, such as that the use does not fall within the definition of development, it benefits from an extant grant of planning permission, is permitted development under the provisions of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015 as amended, or that the time for taking enforcement action has expired. Determination of whether a use may be lawful is not solely a matter of the existence – or otherwise - of enforcement notices.

15. The Government's Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) advises at paragraph 006 of the section 'Who is responsible for providing sufficient information to support an application?' that the applicant is responsible for providing sufficient information to support an application. Furthermore, in the case of applications for proposed development, an applicant needs to describe the proposal with sufficient clarity and precision to enable a local planning authority to understand exactly what is involved.

[1] *Regina oao Stern v Horsham District Council* [2013] EWHC 1460 (Admin).

Light industrial use

16. The argument regarding the claimed existing light industrial use is that it has become lawful as a result of subsisting continuously for a period of 10 years or more before the application was made, and has become immune from enforcement action.

17. The claimed existing use in question is for a firm operated by Paul Wassell that provides such equipment as marquees, big-tops, chairs, stage equipment, sound systems and bungee jumping facilities for festivals and other events. It is claimed the firm's vehicles are also repaired and maintained on the site.

18. The appellant and the site owners claim various dates for the start of this enterprise. Mr Carruthers says it started on a formal basis on 1 May 2005 and was subsequently continuous, but had previously been slightly more haphazard. Mr Elliott says this use has subsisted continuously since 1 July 2005, and Mrs Chamberlain that the use started in late 2004. On this basis it is argued it has become immune from enforcement action under the 10-year rule. Interested parties at the Hearing said they were aware of the use, but considered it had not become noticeable until about 2009.

19. It is claimed that the firm makes use of the two buildings in the north eastern part of the appeal site, together with the areas of hardstanding to the front and to the east of the Barn and pond, and that they also occupy the asbestos-cement sheeted shed near the south western corner of the appeal site,

20. Mr Wassell did not attend the Hearing, and has not provided any statement to support the claimed use. From extensive correspondence in 2008 – mainly concerning the LDC application and subsequent appeal – it is apparent that he lived on the appeal site from late 2006. However, I am not aware of any mention of his business activities in that correspondence. No documentary evidence of use by Mr Wassell's firm has been put forward – notably there is no material showing the name and address of the firm, nor any to show the existence of his business at Grove Farm, such as invoices and payments for goods and services, or bank statements. I was also told that Mr Wassell's firm advertises that it is based in Halesworth, a town some 20 kilometres away from Denton.

21. It is claimed that about 3 people have been permanently employed in the firm's activities. None of those people were named or appeared at the Hearing, nor was any documentary evidence put forward of their employment. I can give very little weight to this claim.

22. Furthermore, there is no documentary material at all from the site owners' side, such as a tenancy agreement, rent payments and receipts, or photographs. Given the very precise dates given for the start of the enterprise, and that it was referred to by Mr Carruthers as having started formally, I find it surprising that there is no documentary material whatsoever to support this.

23. On my site visit I saw that the structure of the former dwelling - subject of the 2011 appeals - remains at the southern end of the Barn. Although I could not have access to the northern end, I was able to look into it from the former dwelling, and saw that it was more or less empty. There was no significant evidence of anything stored there that might be associated with Mr Wassell's firm, and nothing to indicate that manufacturing or repair activities took place

– such as work-benches or tools. Nor was I able to see properly inside the asbestos-cement sheeted building on the eastern side of the site. Peering through a narrow gap between the main door and the frame I could see a few stacked chairs, but nothing else. There was nothing that I saw that would specifically link Mr Wassell's firm or any other light industrial use to the appeal site – such as a name board, or a vehicle with the firm's name.

24. It was argued that this was the time of year when Mr Wassell's business was at its busiest, and all his equipment and vehicles were away from the site. While I accept that stock on site would probably be at its lowest in the summer, it could be expected that there would be at least some items in need of maintenance or repair, or that had been returned for storage awaiting re-hire.

25. Regarding the ancillary vehicle repair and maintenance element of the claimed use, I saw little to suggest where this might occur, since as I note above I saw no work-benches or tools.

26. Advice included in the PPG at paragraph 006 of the section entitled 'Lawful development Certificates - Application and Determination Procedure' is that in the case of applications for existing use, if a local planning authority has no evidence itself, nor any from others, to contradict or otherwise make the applicant's version of events less than probable, there is no good reason to refuse the application, provided the applicant's evidence alone is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to justify the grant of a certificate on the balance of probability.

27. I find the appellant's evidence for a continued light industrial use of the site to be far from precise, and lacking documentary evidence of any kind. I conclude that on the balance of probabilities it is unlikely that the claimed use has subsisted continuously for 10 or more years before the application date of 9 November 2015. I do not consider a light industrial use has become immune from enforcement action, and therefore it cannot be regarded as lawful.

Proposed residential use of a lawful dwelling.

28. I heard that the 'lawful dwelling' referred to is the accommodation at the southern end of the Barn. This comprises a dividing wall across the building separating the southern end from the remainder of the Barn, in which space are a first floor and staircase. On the ground floor are an entrance area, bathroom, kitchen and living room, with a bedroom and bathroom on the floor above.

29. The use of this southern part of the Barn and the related operational development has been subject of several enforcement notices. However, those issued on 9 March 2011[2] are of particular relevance to this case. These alleged, first the change of use of part of the Barn to use as a dwelling (the material change of use notice), and second the related operational development (the operational development notice). The material change of use notice required the use as a dwelling house to cease, the operational development notice required removal of the part of the interior of the barn constructed as a dwelling house.

[2] Enforcement notices ref. 2008/8155.

30. The material change of use notice was upheld at appeal in 2011[3], except to a limited extent on ground (g). The operational development notice was quashed as part of that same appeal[4], mainly on the basis that the works did not constitute a breach of planning control, and were immune from enforcement action. No challenge was made to the decision dismissing the material change of use appeal. I understand this notice was subsequently prosecuted in the Crown Court in October 2014, the appellants convicted, and the use as a dwelling subsequently ceased.

31. I saw that the operational development remains much as described by the Inspector in the 2011 appeals. However, it is clear that there is no residential use of this part of the building, and has not been for several years.

32. The appellant argues that the 2011 material change of use notice is a nullity on the basis that the Council's s.188 register does not include the date of service. However, the register contains the entry for this notice and clearly shows the dates of issue and service as 9 and 10 March 2011 respectively. It is readily apparent that those concerned were fully cognisant of the notices - since they were able to appeal against them - and I note that the appeals on ground (e) against both notices were dismissed, since the Inspector found that the appellants had produced no relevant evidence to show defective service, and that they had not been substantially prejudiced.

33. I do not consider the question of defective service, or the claim that the notices were not served at all, can be revisited as part of this s.195 appeal. Although there has been compliance with requirements of the material change of use notice, the notice is not discharged, and resumption of residential use of this part of the Barn would be in contravention of the notice[5].

34. Notwithstanding the upheld 2011 enforcement notice, this proposal is for a material change of use, which would constitute development as defined in s.55(1) of the Act. It is not one of the operations or uses excepted from that definition in s.55(2), and would require planning permission under s.57(1). It would not be lawful to institute residential use without planning permission, and in the absence of that permission it would not be immune from enforcement action.

35. I note that an application was made for prior approval of a change of use of part of the Barn to Use Class C3 – a dwellinghouse - permissible under the provisions of Class Q of Part 3 to Schedule 2 of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development)(England) Order 2015. This was refused, and a subsequent appeal dismissed[6]. The Inspector in that appeal concluded that the building was not used solely for an agricultural use as part of an established agricultural unit – as required by paragraph Q.1(a) of Class Q.

36. It is clear to me that the site as a whole, including the barn, is not used for agricultural purposes, and that the situation remains very much as described in the 2015 appeal. The building does not benefit from the provisions of Class Q, and a LDC for residential use of part of the building could not be granted on the basis that it would be permitted development.

[3] Appeal refs. APP/L2630/C/11/2149638, 2150088 & 2150094, dated 20 December 2011.
[4] Appeal refs. APP/L2630/C/11/2149639 2150087 & 2150093, dated 20 December 2011.
[5] Under the provisions of s.181(1) & (2) of the Act.
[6] Appeal decision ref: APP/L2630/W/14/3001745, dated 9 June 2015.

37. Overall, residential use cannot take place without contravention of the 2011 material change of use enforcement notice. Even in the absence of an enforcement notice against change to residential use, such a use would not be lawful without the grant of planning permission, and enforcement action could be taken against it. No planning permission for that proposed use has been sought or granted, and there are no permitted development rights available. On the balance of probabilities, I consider the proposed residential use of this part of the building cannot be regarded as lawful.

Proposed residential use of a former dwelling.

38. The 'former dwelling' refers to the accommodation in the Stables building along the western side of the appeal site. I saw that the building as a whole includes a corrugated sheet clad building at the southern end, used for storage of sundry items. Adjoining this to the north is the section formerly used as a dwelling, and beyond that are about nine stable boxes. These have never been used as stabling, and are now largely filled with sundry items and equipment, which Mr Elliott considered should be regarded as rubbish.

39. The part formerly in residential use has a partly glazed entrance porch, and inside was originally partitioned to form a living area, bedroom, kitchen and bathroom. Some of the sanitary fixtures and the kitchen fixtures have been removed. Much of the timber floor is rotten. It is clear that this part of the building has not been inhabited for many years, and in its present form it is uninhabitable.

40. This building was subject of a 2001 enforcement notice ref. CDE.99/11, issued on 18 January 2001. The alleged breach was the change of use of an agricultural building to a building for mixed use of agricultural and residential purposes. The requirements were to cease the alleged use, and restore the building to an agricultural building. The compliance period was three years.

41. Again the appellant argues that the notice is a nullity on account of a defective entry in the s.188 register. In this case I saw that the register contains an entry for this notice and records the issue date, but not the date of service. No appeal was made against that notice, but Mr Elliott was convicted of infringement of the notice at Norwich Crown Court on two occasions - in May 2009 and March 2011. The use subsequently ceased.

42. I consider Mr Elliott had the opportunity to challenge the validity of the notice either by way of a s.174 appeal, or if he had not had a copy of the notice served on him, by way of the Crown Court proceedings under the provisions of s.285(2)(b) of the Act. However he did neither of these things. This is not surprising, in the light of the letter to Mr Elliott from his own solicitor, dated 21 August 2009, advising him that the enforcement notice had - in Counsel's opinion - been properly served. In these circumstances I do not consider it can now be argued that the notice was not properly served, or that Mr Elliott and Ms Chamberlain's interests have been substantially prejudiced.

43. As part of the same application as for the Barn, prior approval was sought for a change of use of this part of the building to Use Class C3 under the GPDO provisions. This was refused, and the 2015 appeal was dismissed. I concur with the view of the Inspector in that appeal that the former dwelling has the appearance of being an abandoned dwelling, and that the building and site as a whole are not in any sort of agricultural use. I consider that it would not

benefit from the allowances for change of use to a C3 dwellinghouse under the provisions of Class Q, Part 3, of Schedule 2 to the GPDO.

44. Again, there is no planning permission for the proposed residential use, the resumption of residential use would be in contravention of the 2001 enforcement notice, and there are no permitted development rights available. As for the proposed residential use of the Barn, even if there were no enforcement notice, this is a material change of use that would require the grant of planning permission in order to become lawful, without which the development would be open to enforcement action. On the balance of probabilities I consider residential use of this part of the building cannot be regarded as lawful.

Proposed equine use

45. The proposal is to use the entire site for equine purposes. In March 2005 a LDC was granted for the continued use of land at Kingsland Farm for the keeping and training of livery and privately owned horses[7]. The plan attached to the certificate includes a strip of land along the eastern boundary of the leg of the 'L' of the appeal site. This strip – now very much overgrown and inaccessible, with hedges to either side - was at one time part of the access track from Middle Road to the fields to the south, prior to the Grove Farm site being separated from the Kingsland Farm site. However, Land Registry records show that it is within the same ownership as the Grove Farm site.

46. I note that in an application in 2000 for planning permission for erection of an agricultural dwelling[8] on the Grove Farm site, the site plan shows that strip of land to be outside the appeal site. It is apparent from this that there had been a degree of uncertainty about the ownership of this piece for some time. However, it is now apparent from Land Registry records that the strip is in the same ownership as Grove Farm.

47. In February 2014 the Council wrote to Dr and Mrs Valori, owners of Kingsland Farm, saying that their attention had been drawn to incorrect plotting of the plan attached to the certificate[9], which shows the Kingsland Farm site to include the strip belonging to the Grove Farm site. The plan originally submitted with the LDC application shows the correct situation, and attached to the Council's letter was a corrected version of the LDC plan.

48. However, under s.191(6) of the Act the lawfulness of any use, operations or other matter for which a LDC is in force shall be conclusively presumed. Although I am satisfied that the inclusion of the disputed strip was a drafting error, there appears to be no mechanism for formally correcting a certificate. In my view this small strip of land remains part of the area for which the keeping and training of livery and privately owned horses has been certified as lawful. However, this does not mean that the remainder of the site may acquire that use.

[7] Certificate of Lawful Use ref. 2005/0097, issued on 7 March 2005.
[8] Application ref. 07/00/1115/F.
[9] Hearing Document 3, dated 21 February 2014.

49. The application for 'equine use' covers the entirety of the site, including areas for which light industrial and residential uses are claimed. Apart from saying the land is 'suitable for the keeping of horses' – which must be questionable - no description is given of the nature of this use, such as whether it would be a private or commercial enterprise, or whether breeding or training would take place. I note that no such use is currently made of any of the site, including the eastern strip.

50. Paragraph 005 of the PPG section on the 'Application and Determination Procedure for Lawful Development Certificates' advises that an application needs to describe precisely what is being applied for, and the land to which the application relates. Furthermore, without sufficient or precise information, a local planning authority may be justified in refusing a certificate.

51. In this case I am not satisfied that there is an adequately precise description of what is being applied for. If for a use such as that at Kingsland Farm – which includes commercial elements – it would require planning permission, as would a change of use from agriculture to the keeping of horses. Furthermore, the proposed equine use cannot be considered as ancillary to some other lawful use of the site. There is no planning permission for this use, and there are no permitted development rights available for it.

52. Given the lack of proper definition of the proposal, and the lack of any planning permission, I do not consider on the balance of probabilities that the proposed use would be lawful. The strip of land to the eastern side of the site is already included within the area where defined equestrian uses have been found to be lawful. There is no power to vary the existing LDC, and I consider this situation must remain as it is.

Storage of caravans, mobile homes et cetera on land used to provide residential services.

53. This application is for the area of mainly open land to the south of the pond, to the east of the stables and animal pens, and including the leg of the 'L'. At present there are numerous sundry items on this part, including a shipping container, stacks of building materials, two derelict caravans, a lorry body, and numerous disused domestic white goods.

54. An enforcement notice ref. 2006/0061 was issued on 5 May 2006, alleging 'the change of use of land from agricultural to standing of residential caravans and a mobile residence'. A record of the notice is contained within the Council's enforcement register, although again the date of service is not recorded. However, it is apparent from correspondence between the Council and Mr Elliott - provided by the appellant - that he was aware of the enforcement notice. In a letter from the Council dated 25 September 2006 it is acknowledged that an appeal had been made against it, but had been withdrawn. The notice was subsequently complied with. It is clear from this that Mr Elliott was well aware of the existence of the notice, and that it must therefore have been served on him. He could, had he wished, have challenged its validity at a s.174 appeal. However, he did not do so. Again, I do not consider the validity of this notice can now be challenged by means of a s.195 appeal.

55. I consider the description of the proposed use to be extremely vague. However, I take the references in the application to 'mobile homes *et cetera'* and to 'land used to provide residential services' to mean that the appellant believes there would be some lawful use for keeping residential caravans on the site.

56. The appellant contended that 'storage' should be distinguished from 'standing', and that this was a different purpose from those previously enforced against. However, if residential services are provided I can see no real distinction between these terms.

57. I note that the caravans I saw on the site to the south of the Barn are in such a state of disrepair that they must have been uninhabitable for many years, and I consider they have been abandoned rather than stored for some future purpose. In any case, 'the standing of residential caravans etc.' would be a contravention of the 2006 enforcement notice, and 'the storage of caravans, mobile homes etc.' would be a change of use requiring planning permission, against which enforcement action could be taken if the use were instituted.

58. I consider this proposal would effectively be a resumption of the use enforced against in 2006. The notice applies to the whole of the Grove Farm land, and such resumption would be a contravention of the 2006 enforcement notice. Furthermore, the 'storage' of caravans, rather then the 'standing' of caravans – even if they could be distinguished – would be a change of use requiring planning permission, and for which there are no permitted development rights. Even if the enforcement notice did not exist, the proposed change of use would not be lawful without any planning permission, and would not be immune from enforcement action. On the balance of probabilities, I do not consider the proposed use would be lawful.

Summary

59. In summary, I have found on the balance of probabilities that the claimed existing light industrial use is not immune from enforcement action. The proposed residential uses of parts of the Barn and the Stables, and proposed storage of caravans and a mobile home must be considered to be development, and there is no planning permission for these uses, nor are there any available permitted development rights. Furthermore, these uses would contravene the requirements of extant enforcement notices. The proposed equine use of the entire site would require planning permission, and there are no permitted development rights available for that use.

60. For the reasons given above I conclude that the Council's deemed refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of proposed light industrial use for the manufacture, repair and storage of goods used to provide services at festivals; the proposed residential use of a lawful dwelling; the proposed residential use of a former dwelling; the proposed equine use of land, and the proposed storage of caravans, mobile homes et cetera on land used to provide residential services was well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Conclusions

61. I have taken account of all other matters raised, including the allusion to the possible infringement of the owners' human rights. However, it is established law[10] that the articles of the Human Rights Act 1998 are not engaged in the context of an LDC appeal, since an LDC is merely declaratory of certain rights in law and the refusal to grant one is merely a refusal to grant the declaration sought. I find neither this not any other matter sufficient to outweigh the considerations which have led me to my decision that the Council's deemed refusal was well-founded.

Stephen Brown

INSPECTOR

[10] *Massingham v SSTLR & Havant BC* [2002] QBD318.

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Stuart Carruthers	Appellant.
Mr C Elliott	Part owner of the appeal site.
Jennifer Chamberlain	Part owner of the appeal site.

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Chris Trett BSc(Hons) MRTPI	Team Leader of Development Management South Norfolk District Council.
Martin Burrows	Planning Enforcement Officer South Norfolk District Council.

INTERESTED PERSONS:

Peter Hill	Chair of Denton Parish Council.
Clare Valori	Nearby resident.
Dr Murray Gray	District Councillor for Earsham Ward.
Roger Gibson	Nearby resident.
Cynthia Greenway	Former resident of the area.

DOCUMENTS

1 Attendance list.
2 The Council's letters of notification of the appeal dated 4 February and 7 July 2016.
3 The Council's letter to adjoining owners dated 21 February 2014, concerning LDC ref.2005/0097.
4 Letters of representation.

PLANS

A Application plans.