



Appeal Decisions

Inquiry commenced on 18 June 2019

Site visit made on 1 August 2019

by C Sherratt DipURP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 18 December 2019

Appeal Ref: APP/P1560/X/18/3194582

Land at 40 Colne Way, Point Clear Bay, Clacton on Sea, CO16 8LL

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 against a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
 - The appeal is made by Mr William Taylor against the decision of Tendring District Council.
 - The application Ref 17/01974/LUEX, dated 31 October 2017, was refused by notice dated 9 January 2018.
 - The application was made under section 191(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
 - The development for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is use of premises as permanent residence.
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Appeal Ref: APP/P1560/C/18/3201307

Land at 40 Colne Way, Point Clear Bay, Clacton on Sea, CO16 8LL

- The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991.
 - The appeal is made by Mr William Taylor against an enforcement notice issued by Tendring District Council.
 - The enforcement notice, numbered 10/00602/BRCH3, was issued on 9 April 2017.
 - The breach of planning control alleged in the notice is the breach of the conditions 01 and 02 to planning permission TEN/97/0221 dated 8 April 1997.
 - The development to which the permission relates is use of a chalet for extended occupancy replacing condition 1 of Planning Permission TEN/252/99.
 - The conditions in question are Nos 01 and 02 which state that:
 01. The permanent year round occupation of this property shall relate solely for the benefit of Mr M J and Mrs D S Savage and their children and only for a limited period expiring on 31 October 1998 on which date the permanent residential use of the property hereby permitted shall cease.
 02. Upon the cessation of the permanent residential occupation as from 31 October 1998 the property shall only be occupied for residential purposes during the period 1 March to 31 October in any one year.
 - The notice alleges that the conditions have not been complied with by the year round occupation of this chalet after 31 October 1998 other than in compliance with Conditions 01 and 02 to the said Planning Permission TEN/97/0221.
 - The requirements of the notice are to: Comply with the Conditions 01 and 02 of Planning Permission TEN/97/0221 dated 8 April 1997 by ceasing the permanent residential occupation of the chalet on the land and by then only occupying it for residential purposes between 1 March and 31 October in any one year.
 - The period for compliance with the requirements is 1 November 2018.
 - The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(a), (d) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
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Procedural Matters

1. A number of appeals relating to several properties at Point Clear Bay were heard together at the above Inquiry over a period of 14 days. General evidence relating to flooding considerations and the location of the appeal properties in relation to services and facilities, common to many appeals containing ground (a), including this one, was heard during Week 1 and presented on behalf of a number of appellants by Mrs Kelly. There was an opportunity for any matters specific to individual appeals to be heard throughout the remainder of the Inquiry. The appellant gave evidence, under oath, on 10 July 2018.
2. The Council confirmed that the date on which the notice was issued should be 9 April 2018 not 2017. The appellant confirmed no prejudice would be caused if I were to correct the Notice to record the correct date. The planning permission referred to in the description of the development should be Planning Permission TEN/252/89 not Planning Permission TEN/252/99. I shall therefore correct the date of issue and planning permission reference accordingly.
3. The period for compliance stated in the notice gives a date rather than a period of time. However, it is possible to establish the time period between the notice taking effect on 15 May 2018 and the time for compliance on 1 November 2018. No prejudice would be caused to the main parties if I were to specify an equivalent period for compliance. The Council confirmed any corrected period for compliance could be rounded up to the nearest month.
4. It has also been necessary to correct the period for compliance in relation to other notices. The Council's witness accepted that there should be a consistent compliance period across this group of appeals. Accordingly, I intend to vary the compliance period to 14 months to correspond with the longest period specified for compliance with the notices amongst this set of appeals.

Decisions

Appeal A

5. The appeal is dismissed.

Appeal B

6. It is directed that the enforcement notice be corrected by the deletion of the words "1 November 2018" and the substitution of the words "14 months" as the period for compliance ; and by the deletion of the year "2017" and the substitution of the year "2018" as the date of issue and to delete the reference to planning permission "TEN/252/99" and substitute "TEN/252/89" in the description of the planning permission concerned.
7. Subject to these corrections the appeal is allowed and the enforcement notice is quashed.

Reasons

Appeal A – LDC and Appeal B, ground (d)

8. The time limits for taking enforcement action are set out in Section 171B of the Act. In these appeals S171B(3) applies which states that in the case of any

- other breach of planning control, no enforcement action may be taken after the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of the breach.
9. For the appeals to succeed the onus is upon the appellant to demonstrate, on the balance of probability, that the condition referred to in the enforcement notice has been breached for a continuous period of ten years or more prior to (a) the date of the application for a certificate of lawfulness and (b) the date of the issue of the Enforcement Notice.
 10. An enforcement notice was previously issued, dated 20 Dec 1999 that relates to the non-compliance with the same condition. An appeal was subsequently lodged but the notice was upheld. The period for compliance was 28 days.
 11. The point was made on behalf of the appellant that it was too late for the Council to take further enforcement action because S171B (4)(b) explains that the preceding sub-sections (those subsections that set out the time limits beyond which no action may be taken), do not prevent the taking of further enforcement action in respect of any breach of planning control if, during the period of four years ending with that action being taken, the local planning authority have taken or purported to take enforcement action in respect of that breach. This is often referred to as the 'second bite provision' as it allows the local planning authority to take further action outside of the time limits set out in S171B(1), (2) and (3) but still rely on the date of the earlier action. It does not however impose a 4-year time limit within which the Council can take further action when that further action is taken within the time limits set out in those preceding sub-sections.
 12. The Council properly conceded that it was not relying on the second bite provisions, accepting that it was too late to do so. I agree that the current enforcement notice was issued too late for the Council to rely on S171B(4)(b). In this case, the relevant date against which the ten-year period should be assessed is therefore on or before 9 April 2007.
 13. Nevertheless, the Enforcement Notice remains in force.

Appeal A

14. Section 191(3) of the Act makes it clear that a use cannot be lawful if it is in breach of a Breach of Condition Notice or an Enforcement Notice. Given the existence of the 1999 Enforcement Notice Appeal A cannot therefore succeed. The Council's decision to refuse a Certificate of Lawfulness was therefore well founded.

Appeal B – The Legal Points

15. The Council submits that the continued occupation of the property after the date specified for compliance with the enforcement notice, was and continues to be a criminal offence. Accordingly, the Council say the appellant cannot benefit from a claim that an on-going breach, after this compliance date, would contribute to the ten-year 'immunity' period, as the appellant would benefit from their own wrong doing.
16. In support of this submission the Council relies on the judgement of *Welwyn Hatfield v SSCLG v Beesley* [2011] UKSC 15 ('the Welwyn Hatfield judgement'). In this case Mr Beesley was claiming he had gained immunity for the use of a building as a dwellinghouse. One of the issues involved consideration of the

scope and application of the principle that, unless the contrary intention appears, statutes are to be construed to the effect that no one should be allowed to profit from his own wrong. The Court noted that Mr Beesley intended to deceive the Council from the outset by his statements in the planning application. This was positive deception in matters integral to the planning process and directly intended to undermine that process. The Court found that the principle applied despite acknowledging that Mr Beesley's conduct was "not identifiably criminal" and thus not only relevant where there has been the commission of a crime.

17. In this case, there has been no positive deception on the part of the appellant. This is a point accepted by the Council. However, the Council submits that there has nevertheless been the commission of a crime as a result of non-compliance with the Notice, and so the principle that no one should benefit from their own wrong doing is clearly applicable.
18. However, I consider the circumstances differ in this case. The Council has not been deceived due to the actions of the appellant in this case so that it 'missed' an opportunity to take any action in the same way that had occurred in Welwyn Hatfield, due to the actions of Mr Beesley. Indeed, it did serve an enforcement notice. The Council could, at any time since the failure to comply with the Notice, have sought to prosecute non-compliance with it through the Magistrates Court; it still could. The Council has simply chosen not to do so to date. That is different to the circumstances in Welwyn Hatfield where the Council could not have taken action within the required time limits in the first place because the breach was purposely hidden to prevent them from doing so.
19. Furthermore, the Welwyn Hatfield judgement also relates to an appeal against the refusal of a certificate of lawfulness rather than an appeal against an enforcement notice – Mr Beesley was therefore trying to establish that the use as a dwellinghouse was lawful. I recognise that under section 191(3) of the Act, it is clear that the failure to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which planning permission has been granted will only be lawful if the time for taking enforcement action has expired (S191(3)(a)) and it does not constitute a contravention of any of the requirements of any enforcement notice or breach of condition notice then in force (S191(3)(b)). However, no certificate of lawfulness is being sought alongside this ground (d) appeal. Rather the question before me, is solely whether at the date when the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of any breach of planning control which may be constituted by those matters.
20. On that basis, it seems to me that a breach that cannot be lawful due to the existence of a BoCN, can nevertheless give rise to a successful appeal on ground (d) and the quashing of the notice at issue.

Appeal B – the evidence

21. I turn now to consider the evidence specific to this case. All evidence in relation to this ground of appeal was given under oath.
22. In the case of a continuing requirement condition, such as the case here, discontinuance of the offending activity will bring an end to that particular breach. The clock starts again with any subsequent breach. The period of compliant activity needs to be significant and not de minimis, as a matter of fact and degree. The cessation of that breach means that the clock would start

- again for any fresh breach of the condition. The question to be asked during any period of compliant occupation is whether enforcement action could have been taken against a breach of the condition.
23. The appellant explained to the Inquiry that he purchased the property in December 2000 and moved in around 2002. He has lived there since, including during the winter months. I heard that he lived in the property between 2002 and 2008 at which point his daughter also moved in. In 2010 his wife moved in. No evidence was produced by the Council to otherwise contradict this. Indeed, the Council Tax records produced by the Council supported the appellant's claim that he has lived there without any discounts being applied.
24. The appellant told the inquiry that he was not aware of the 1999 enforcement notice or appeal and despite employing a solicitor to carry out the conveyancing nothing appeared on the searches. His first knowledge of the condition was, he said, in 2012 following correspondence from the Council.
25. The evidence submitted does demonstrate that the property has been occupied in breach of the relevant condition for a continuous period of 10 years or more. Appeal B on ground (d) therefore succeeds and the Notice will be quashed.
26. Whilst my decision on Appeal B results in the quashing of the notice because I have found it was too late for the Council to take action in this case, it has no effect on the earlier Enforcement Notice as that is not before me. I recognise that success on ground (d) and the resultant quashing of the notice, may not therefore be of much comfort to the appellant in the knowledge that any on-going breach would not be lawful. However, it would be a matter for the Council to decide whether to bring any prosecution proceedings against the previous Enforcement Notice.
27. Furthermore, as the appeal Notice will be quashed, there is no alleged breach against which the deemed planning application and ground (a) can be assessed. Accordingly, I am unable to proceed to determine whether planning permission should be granted in this case.

Conclusions

28. In respect of Appeal A, for the reasons given above I conclude that the Council's refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the use of premises as permanent residence was well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.
29. For the reasons given above I conclude that Appeal B should succeed on ground (d). Accordingly the enforcement notice will be quashed. In these circumstances the appeal under ground (a) as set out in section 174(2) to the 1990 Act as amended and the application for planning permission deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended does not need to be considered.

Claire Sherratt

Inspector

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Mr William Taylor

She called

Mrs Mandy Kelly

Mr William Taylor

General Planning Issues

Appellant

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Mr Richard Ground QC

He called

Ms Hanna Coogan

Mr Guy Cooper

Mr Keith Hutchinson

Mr Chris Stathers

Instructed by the Council's solicitor

Technical Director in Flood Risk Management
with Jeremy Benn Associates Limited

For the Environment Agency

Of Hutchinsons Planning and Development
Consultants

Enforcement Officer for Tendring District Council

Documents received at the Inquiry

Document 1	Appeal Notification - Copy of Site Notice.
Document 2	Opening Statement by Mrs M Kelly regarding flooding.
Document 3	EA Supplementary Maps 1 and 2.
Document 4	Extract from NPPG 'Flood risk and coastal change'.
Document 5	Judgement: Wisenfeld v Secretary of State for the Environment and another [1992] 1 PLR 32.
Document 6	Judgement: Michael William Howells v SoSCLG & Gloucestershire County Council [2009] EWHC 2757 (Admin).
Document 7	Decision Notice 16/00809/FUL – variation of seasonal occupancy period at Seawick Holiday Village.
Document 8	Extract from Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment (May 2019).
Document 9	EA comments and Committee Report relating to planning application for replacement dwelling at 138 Colne Way.
Document 10	Historic Planning Permissions.
Document 11	Legal Submissions on Breach of Condition Notice for Tendring DC.
Document 12	Legal Submissions from Mandy Kelly.
Document 13	Welwyn Hatfield BC v SSCLG & another [2011]UKSC 15.
Document 14	Bonsall v SSCLG & another [2015]EWCA Civ 1246.
Document 15	Closing Submissions from Mr Everett.
Document 16	Closing Submissions from Mr Ground QC for the Council.
Document 17	Closing Submissions from Mandy Kelly

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