



Appeal Decision

Inquiry commenced on 18 June 2019

Site visit made on 1 August 2019

by C Sherratt DipURP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 18th December 2019

Appeal Ref: APP/P1560/C/18/3193673

Land at 21 Colne Way, Point Clear Bay, Clacton-on-Sea, CO16 8LL

- The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991.
- The appeal is made by Christopher Peverell against an enforcement notice issued by Tendring District Council.
- The enforcement notice, numbered 08/00392/BRCHC3, was issued on 8 December 2017.
- The breach of planning control alleged in the notice is failure to comply with the new condition to planning permission TEN/119/59 dated 7 May 1959 as amended on appeal on 3 July 1990 as set out in the Inspector's decision letter by the occupation of this chalet between the period 1st November and 28th February (29th the [sic] February in a leap year) each year otherwise than in compliance with the amended condition of the said planning permission TEN/119/59.
- The development to which the permission relates is construction of new chalets. The condition in question is set out in paragraph 22.9 of the Inspector's decision letter which states that: The chalet may be occupied for residential purposes only during the following periods (i) At any time from 1 March to 31st October; (ii) At weekends from noon on Friday until noon on Monday between 1st November in any year and the end of February in the following year; (iii) During any period of 10 consecutive days which shall include both Christmas Day and New Year's Day.
- The notice alleges that the condition has not been complied with by the occupation of this chalet between the period of 1 November and 28 February (29th the (sic) February in a leap year) each year otherwise than in compliance with the amended condition of the said planning permission TEN/119/59.
- The requirements of the notice are: Comply with the Condition of Planning Permission TEN/119/59 dated 7 May 1959 as set out in the Inspector's appeal letter dated 3 July 1990 in paragraph 22.9 by ceasing the occupation of the chalet on the land between 1st November and 28th February (29th February in a leap year) each year unless such occupation is during a period allowed by the said Condition during that period.
- The period for compliance with the requirements is 1st November 2018.
- The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(a) and (d) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.

Procedural Matters

1. A number of appeals relating to several properties at Point Clear Bay were heard together at the above Inquiry. General evidence relating to flooding considerations and proximity to services and facilities, common to many appeals containing ground (a), including this one, was heard during Week 1 and presented on behalf of a number of appellants by Mrs Kelly. There was an opportunity for any matters specific to individual appeals were heard

throughout the remainder of the Inquiry. The appellant gave evidence on 11 July 2019.

2. It is clear from reading the notice as a whole that it is the condition imposed on the later 1990 permission, granted on appeal, that varied the earlier condition, that the Notice is directed at. For clarity I intend to vary the requirement to delete and reference to the 1959 permission. No injustice would be caused if I were to do so.
3. The period for compliance stated in the notice gives a date rather than a period of time. However, it is possible to establish the time period between the notice taking effect on 15 January 2018 and the time for compliance on 1 November 2018. No prejudice would be caused to the main parties if I were to specify an equivalent period for compliance. The Council confirmed any corrected period for compliance could be rounded up to the nearest month.
4. It has also been necessary to correct the period for compliance in relation to other notices. The Council's witness accepted that there should be a consistent compliance period across this group of appeals. Accordingly, I intend to vary the compliance period to 14 months to correspond with the longest period specified for compliance with the notices amongst this set of appeals.

Decision

5. It is directed that the enforcement notice be corrected by:

the deletion of the words "of Planning Permission TEN/119/59 dated 7 May 1959" in section 5. What you are required to do; and

the deletion of 3 months and the substitution of 14 months as the period for compliance.

6. Subject to these corrections the appeal is allowed and the enforcement notice is quashed.

Reasons

Ground (d)

7. Ground (d) is pleaded on the basis that at the date when the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of the breach alleged in the notice; in other words, it was too late for the local planning authority to take action. The time limits for taking enforcement action are set out in Section 171B of the Act. In these appeals S171B(3) applies which states that in the case of any other breach of planning control, no enforcement action may be taken after the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of the breach.
8. For the appeal on ground (d) to succeed the onus is upon the appellant to demonstrate, on the balance of probability, that the condition referred to in the enforcement notice has been breached for a continuous period of ten years or more prior to the date of the issue of the Enforcement Notice; in other words that the property has been occupied during the winter period [other than only on weekends from noon Friday to Monday and for 10 consecutive days including Christmas and New Year] for 10 consecutive years without compliance with the condition.

The Legal points

9. A Breach of Condition Notice (BoCN) was issued in 2012 that relates to the same breach. The point was made on behalf of the appellant(s) that it was therefore too late for the Council to take further enforcement action because S171B (4)(b) explains that the preceding sub-sections (those sub-sections that set out the time limits beyond which no action may be taken), do not prevent the taking of further enforcement action in respect of any breach of planning control if, during the period of four years ending with that action being taken, the local planning authority have taken or purported to take enforcement action in respect of that breach. This is often referred to as the 'second bite provision' as it allows the local planning authority to take further action outside of the time limits set out in S171B(1), (2) and (3) provided it does so within this 4-year period. It does not however impose a 4-year time limit within which the Council can take further action when that further action is taken within the time limits set out in those preceding sub-sections.
10. The Council properly conceded that it was not relying on the second bite provisions, accepting that it was too late to do so. I agree that the current enforcement notice was issued too late for the Council to rely on S171B(4)(b). In this case, the relevant date against which the ten-year period should be assessed is on or before 8 December 2007.
11. Nevertheless, the BoCN dated 28 June 2012 remains in force and is not before me. The Council therefore submits that the continued occupation of the property after 1 November 2013, the date specified for compliance with the BoCN, was and continues to be a criminal offence. Accordingly, the Council say the appellant cannot benefit from a claim that an on-going breach, after this compliance date, would contribute to the ten-year 'immunity' period, otherwise the appellant would benefit from their own wrong doing.
12. In support of this submission the Council relies on the judgement of *Welwyn Hatfield v SSCLG v Beesley* [2011] UKSC 15 ('the Welwyn Hatfield judgement'). In this case Mr Beesley was claiming he had gained immunity for the use of a building as a dwellinghouse. One of the issues involved consideration of the scope and application of the principle that, unless the contrary intention appears, statutes are to be construed to the effect that no one should be allowed to profit from his own wrong. The Court noted that Mr Beesley intended to deceive the Council from the outset by his statements in the planning application. This was positive deception in matters integral to the planning process and directly intended to undermine that process. The Court found that the principle applied despite acknowledging that Mr Beesley's conduct was "not identifiably criminal" and thus not only relevant where there has been the commission of a crime.
13. In this case, there has been no positive deception on the part of the appellant. This is a point accepted by the Council. However, the Council submits that there has nevertheless been the commission of a crime as a result of non-compliance with the BOCN, which is still on-going, and so the principle that no one should benefit from their own wrong doing is clearly applicable.
14. However, I consider the circumstances differ in this case. The Council has not been deceived due to the actions of the appellant in this case so that it 'missed' an opportunity to take any action in the same way that had occurred in *Welwyn Hatfield*, due to the actions of Mr Beesley. Indeed, it did serve a BoCN. The

Council could, at any time since serving the BoCN, have sought to prosecute non-compliance with it through the Magistrates Court; it still could. The Council has simply chosen not to do so to date. That is different to the circumstances in Welwyn Hatfield where the Council could not have taken action within the required time limits in the first place because the breach was purposely hidden to prevent them from doing so.

15. Furthermore, the Welwyn Hatfield judgement also relates to an appeal against the refusal of a certificate of lawfulness rather than an appeal against an enforcement notice – Mr Beesley was therefore trying to establish that the use as a dwellinghouse was lawful. I recognise that under section 191(3) of the Act, it is clear that the failure to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which planning permission has been granted will only be lawful if the time for taking enforcement action has expired (S191(3)(a)) and it does not constitute a contravention of any of the requirements of any enforcement notice or breach of condition notice then in force (S191(3)(b)). But no certificate of lawfulness is being sought alongside this ground (d) appeal. Rather the question before me, is whether at the date when the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of any breach of planning control which may be constituted by those matters.
16. On that basis, it seems to me that a breach that cannot be lawful due to the existence of a BoCN, can nevertheless give rise to a successful appeal on ground (d) and the quashing of the notice at issue.
17. That said, the BoCN relating to this property specifically refers to planning permission TEN/119/59 (the 1959 planning permission) and condition 2 of that permission that states, "The chalets shall be used for habitation only during the period 1 March to 31 October in each year and during the winter months may be used for storage of household effects." It therefore refers to a different planning permission and condition to the Notice. A continuous breach against the 1990 condition could therefore be found to be lawful, irrespective of the existence of the BoCN in this case.

The evidence

18. I turn now to consider the evidence specific to this case. All evidence in relation to this ground of appeal was given under oath.
19. In the case of a continuing requirement condition, such as the case here, discontinuance of the offending activity will bring an end to that particular breach. The clock starts again with any subsequent breach. The period of compliant activity needs to be significant and not de minimis, as a matter of fact and degree. The cessation of that breach means that the clock would start again for any fresh breach of the condition. The question to be asked during any period of compliant occupation is whether enforcement action could have been taken against a breach of the condition.
20. The appellant's first-hand knowledge relates to the period after he purchased the property in 2015 with a sitting tenant, who he understood had lived there during the previous Winter. Tenancy agreements dated from Sept 2015 to date are provided. Any gaps in occupancy since then have been, I was told, to renovate the property. Prior to this, it was the appellant's understanding that the previous owners had lived in the property all year round from 1972 to 2006

and 2006 to 2013 (Mrs Curtis) retrospectively. Tenants have lived in property all year round since 2013.

21. A statutory declaration was provided by the appellant from a Mr Abbott, a previous owner of the property. It is dated 7 November 2006. The declaration confirms that Mr Abbot purchased the property on 19 June 1972 and that it was used it as private dwelling house. The declaration was, I heard, produced for Mrs Curtis who purchased the property in 2006. E-mail correspondence was also provided from Hazel Button dated 3 April 2019 stating that her aunt Mrs Curtis, owned 21 Colne Way and lived in the property all year round from 2006 until 2013. Mrs Button then rented the property until 2015 when the appellant purchased it.
22. The Council Tax records provided by the Council show that the only period of non-occupation during the winter months, claimed for Council Tax periods within the period I am concerned with, was between 5 Jan 2017 and 28 February 2017. I am satisfied with the appellant's explanation that this was no more than a short break between tenancies while the property was re-decorated and re-carpeted. I do not consider that this short gap in occupation is such that it could be regarded as a period of compliance with the condition that would effectively result in a new breach commencing and the ten-year immunity period starting again. Indeed, case law has established that a period of non-occupation for refurbishment does not necessarily bring the breach to an end.
23. Accordingly, the evidence submitted does demonstrate that the property has been occupied in breach of the relevant condition for a continuous period of 10 years or more. The appeal on ground (d) therefore succeeds and the Notice will be quashed.
24. Furthermore, as the Enforcement Notice will be quashed, there is no alleged breach against which the deemed planning application and ground (a) can be assessed in this appeal. Accordingly, I am unable to proceed to determine whether planning permission should be granted in this case.

Conclusion

25. To conclude, the appeal on ground (d) therefore succeeds and the notice will be quashed. In view of the success on legal grounds, the appeal under ground (a) as set out in section 174(2) of the 1990 Act as amended and the application for planning permission deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended does not fall to be considered.

Claire Sherratt

Inspector

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Mr Christopher Peverell

He called

Mrs Mandy Kelly

Christopher Peverell

General Planning Issues

Appellant

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Mr Richard Ground QC

He called

Ms Hanna Coogan

Mr Guy Cooper

Mr Keith Hutchinson

Mr Chris Stathers

Instructed by the Council's solicitor

Technical Director in Flood Risk Management
with Jeremy Benn Associates Limited

For the Environment Agency

Of Hutchinsons Planning and Development
Consultants

Enforcement Officer for Tendring District Council

Documents received at the Inquiry

Document 1

Document 2

Document 3

Document 4

Document 5

Document 6

Document 7

Document 8

Document 9

Document 10

Document 11

Document 12

Document 13

Document 14

Document 15

Document 16

Document 17

Appeal Notification - Copy of Site Notice.

Opening Statement by Mrs M Kelly regarding
flooding.

EA Supplementary Maps 1 and 2

Extract from NPPG 'Flood risk and coastal
change'.

Judgement: Wisenfeld v Secretary of State for
the Environment and another [1992] 1 PLR 32
Judgement: Michael William Howells v SoSCLG &
Gloucestershire County Council [2009] EWHC
2757 (Admin)

Decision Notice 16/00809/FUL – variation of
seasonal occupancy period at Seawick Holiday
Village

Extract from Strategic Housing Land Availability
Assessment (May 2019)

EA comments and Committee Report relating to
planning application for replacement dwelling at
138 Colne Way

Historic Planning Permissions

Legal Submissions on Breach of Condition Notice
for Tendring DC

Legal Submissions from Mandy Kelly
Welwyn Hatfield BC v SSCLG & another
[2011]UKSC 15

Bonsall v SSCLG & another [2015]EWCA Civ
1246

Closing Submissions from Mr Everett

Closing Submissions from Mr Ground QC for the
Council

Closing Submissions from Mandy Kelly.

