



Appeal Decision

Site visit made on 24 January 2023

by J Moss BSc (Hons) DipTP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 20th MARCH 2023

Appeal Ref: APP/R5510/C/21/3284968

Land on the south side of Brickfields Lane, Harlington, Hayes, Middlesex UB3 5DX

- The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended. The appeal is made by Mr Anup Khosla against an enforcement notice issued by the Council of the London Borough of Hillingdon.
- The notice, numbered HS/ENF/019167, was issued on 10 September 2021.
- The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is: Without planning permission, the use of land for mixed usage as car sales, car parking, car storage and for the erection of a boundary fence on Land at the Land on the south side of Brickfields Lane, Harlington, Hayes, Middlesex, UB3 5DX ("the breach").
- The requirements of the notice are to:
 - (i) Cease use of the land for car sales;
 - (ii) Cease the use of the land for car parking;
 - (iii) Cease the use of the land for car storage;
 - (iv) Remove from the land all motor vehicles associated with the unauthorised mixed use of the land for car sales, car parking, car storage;
 - (v) Demolish and remove the boundary fence as shown in the approximate position lined in blue on the attached plan¹ and remove all resultant debris;
 - (vi) Remove from the land the hard standing, the portable building(s), lighting columns, CCTV columns, and all other materials, equipment, machinery, tools and paraphernalia that facilitates the unauthorised mixed-use of the land;
 - (vii) Restore the land to its pre-existing ground levels and condition prior to the commencement of the unauthorised use and development works;
 - (viii) Remove from the land all fixtures and fittings, waste and bring building material together with all plant, equipment and machinery used in compliance with requirements (i) to (vii) above as appropriate.
- The period for compliance with the requirements three months after the notice takes effect.
- The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(d), (f), and (g) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.

Summary Decision: The appeal succeeds in part on grounds (d) and (f), it succeeds on ground (g), but is otherwise dismissed and the enforcement notice is upheld with corrections and variations in the terms set out below in the Formal Decision.

Preliminary Matter

1. The site visit had been arranged as an accompanied visit, where a representative of the Council and the appellant should have been in attendance. Whilst an officer from the Council was on site at the arranged date and time, the appellant was not represented. As I was satisfied that I could

¹ Reference in the header to an attached plan is to the plan attached to the enforcement notice.

see all that I needed to without the need to enter the site, I undertook the visit as an unaccompanied site inspection.

The Notice

2. Before considering the grounds of appeal, I have a duty to put the notice in order, if necessary. The powers transferred to Inspectors under section 176(1)(a) of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended (the 1990 Act) include to correct any defect, error or misdescription in the enforcement notice or, under section 176(1)(b), to vary the terms of the enforcement notice. In each case, the only test is whether the correction or variation would not cause any injustice to the appellant or the local planning authority.
3. I have a number of concerns with regard to the notice. Accordingly, I sought the views of the parties on some of these matters and have had regard to the comments received in reaching my decision.
4. The notice alleges 'the use of land for mixed usage as car sales, car parking, car storage and the erection of a boundary fence'. The allegation, as drafted, suggests that the erection of a boundary fence is part of the mixed use, rather than a separate allegation of operational development. Having regard to the case made by the appellant, I am satisfied that he has understood that the allegation relates to both operational development in the form of the fence, as well as a mixed use for car sales, car parking and car storage. Accordingly, I will correct part 3 of the notice to be more precise in how it refers to these two separate matters.
5. The allegation is of the erection of a boundary fence on the land. The land to which the notice relates is an irregular shape. It includes an oblong parcel that runs along the car park area serving the adjoining hotel. This area has been outlined in blue on the enforcement notice plan and I will refer to this as the Blue Land from here on in. The appeal site also includes the access to the Blue Land, shared with the adjoining hotel, as well as a long strip of land to the rear of the adjoining park that is to the west of the Blue Land.
6. Having the benefit of a site visit I note that there was a timber, hit and miss enclosure that varied in height and appearance in the approximate location shown with a blue line on the enforcement notice plan. This is shown in the Council's photographs dated 11 October 2019. There may be other means of enclosure within the land to which the notice relates. However, as only the fence in the location marked in blue on the enforcement notice plan is the subject of requirement 5.(v), the Council are clearly only concerned with the fence in this location. The appellant has understood this and the parties' evidence only refers to this enclosure.
7. In view of the above, I intend to correct the allegation so that it only refers to the boundary fence in the location marked in blue on the enforcement notice plan. This correction is, of course, notwithstanding my conclusions on the ground (d) appeal. In correcting the notice I am satisfied that no injustice would be caused to any party for the reasons given above.
8. Turning to the use, in his evidence the appellant has referred to uses that are not elements of the mixed use alleged in the notice. These uses include 'open storage' and 'the siting of storage containers', which formed part of a mixed use that was the subject of a previous appeal relating to an application for a

lawful development certificate (LDC)². Whilst the appellant has not made a ground (b) appeal³, I still have a duty to consider whether the allegation, including the mixed use, is correct.

9. I noted two storage containers on the site, adjacent to the southern boundary. Ordinarily, such storage containers are associated with a use of the land. I have no reason to find that this is not the case in this instance. In these circumstances, such containers can either facilitate a use of the land or the land can be regarded as being used for the storage of the containers. The **siting** of storage containers is not a use of land.
10. It may well be the case that storage containers have been on site in some form or other for some time. However, the appellant does not suggest that the mixed use of the site now alleged should also include reference to an open storage use or to some other sort of storage use associated with the containers. Neither does he say that there is a separate planning unit on the site that is used only for the storage of containers or for open storage. He has not made the case that the containers are not used in connection with the mixed use as alleged. He only suggests that the requirement to remove the containers exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach in this case, which is a matter I will come to later in this section of this decision.
11. At my site visit I noted that the appeal site was predominantly occupied by vehicles, rather than any other items. There is nothing before me to suggest that the storage of items other than vehicles is taking place on the site as either a primary use that takes place together with the other elements of the mixed use, or as a use that is ancillary to the mixed use alleged.
12. All things considered, I am satisfied that the allegation of a mixed use for car sales, car parking, and car storage is correct and that it need not include any other uses as part of the mixed use.
13. Notwithstanding this, part 1 of the enforcement notice states that there has been a breach of planning control falling within section 171A(1)(a) of the 1990 Act, which is the carrying out of development without the required planning permission. Development is defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act as including 'the making of any material change in the use of any building or other land'.
14. Whilst the notice refers to a mixed use of the site, it does not allege that a material change in the use of the land has occurred. It therefore follows that the allegation in the notice would not constitute development for the purposes of section 55(1) of the 1990 Act.
15. Section 57 of the 1990 Act provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land. Because the breach of planning control as alleged in the notice does not constitute the development of land, it follows that planning permission would not be required for it. The notice is defective in that respect.
16. Having regard to the appellant's case, I am satisfied that he has understood that the allegation was intended to refer to a material change of use. As such,

² Appeal reference APP/R5510/X/20/3254228.

³ That the matters stated in the notice have not occurred. This is a ground of appeal made when, for example, the appellant is of the view that elements of a mixed use have been omitted from an allegation of a mixed use.

a correction to the notice to include reference to a **material change** of use would not cause injustice in this case.

17. With regard to the associated requirements of the notice, these should be consistent with the allegation. Whilst there are requirements to cease the individual elements of the mixed use, to be consistent with the allegation the notice should require the cessation of the mixed use. I will, therefore, correct the notice accordingly. In doing so, I am satisfied that this would not affect the matter targeted by the notice and would not, therefore, cause injustice to any party.
18. On a final matter, the notice requires the removal of 'the portable building(s)'. I saw a site office on the land, which the appellant describes as a portable office building. Under his ground (f) appeal, the appellant does not challenge the requirement to remove this in compliance with requirement 5.(vi). However, he says that he assumes that the storage containers need not be removed in compliance with this requirement. Whilst I acknowledge that the appellant has referred to this matter under his ground (f) appeal, the matter concerns the precision of the notice, which is appropriate to consider at this stage.
19. As drafted, I am concerned that the recipient of the notice would not be reasonably certain of what he must do to comply with the notice. Reference to 'the portable building(**s**)' (my emphasis) suggests that the requirement might be aimed at more than one portable building. I can, therefore, understand why the appellant may have raised this matter. However, in its evidence the Council refers to a portable building, singular. It also refers separately to storage containers in responding to what the appellant says about these, but does not describe these as portable buildings. Indeed, storage containers is an accurate description of the units I saw adjacent to the southern boundary of the site.
20. Having regard to what is within the four corners of the enforcement notice, I note that the reasons for issuing the notice refer to only a single portable building. This is consistent with the Council's evidence, referred to above. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the notice only seeks the removal of the portable office building and that it does not require the removal of the storage containers. I shall, therefore, correct the notice so that 5.(vi) is more certain and requires the removal of the portable building, rather than portable building(s).
21. In correcting the notice I am satisfied that no injustice would be caused. As I have noted above, the Council has referred to storage containers and the portable building separately in its evidence. Had it intended the notice to target the storage containers, as well as the portable building, I am satisfied that it would have separately referred to the storage containers, using that description of them in the notice.
22. In correcting the notice in the manner set out above, there should be no doubt that storage containers would not need to be removed from the site in compliance with the notice. Accordingly, I have no need to consider the matter of the storage containers under the ground (f) appeal.

Ground (d)

23. An appeal on this ground is that, at the date on which the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of any breach of planning control that may be constituted by those matters.
24. I note above the appellant's reference to the former use of the site. He does not, however, make the case that no enforcement action could be taken in respect of the mixed use alleged in part 3 of the notice. In making his case under the ground (d) appeal the appellant has, however, referred to the boundary fence, as well as to items that are only referred to in the requirements of the notice.
25. Whilst I note all the matters referred to in the context of the appellant's ground (d) appeal, my consideration of this ground of appeal is confined to matters that are stated in the allegation. Accordingly, it is only confined to the matter of the fence. The appellant's case with regard to the remaining items will, therefore, be considered in the context of the ground (f) appeal.
26. Having regard to the corrections I intend to make to the notice, my determination of the ground (d) appeal will be with regard only to the fence in the approximate location indicated in blue on the enforcement notice plan. In order to succeed on ground (d), the appellant must show that the enforcement notice was issued after the end of the period of four years beginning with the date on which the operations, the blue line fence in this case, were substantially completed⁴. The relevant date, four years prior to the issue of the notice is 10 September 2017. The test of the evidence is on the balance of probability and the burden of proof is on the appellant.
27. The appellant has provided a series of aerial photographs and a street view photograph of the site. The 2020 aerial photograph shows what appears to be a means of enclosure in the location of the blue line on the enforcement notice plan. This is consistent with the fencing shown in the Council's 2019 photographs of the site.
28. The vast majority of the fence around the Blue Land appears visible in the 2018, 2013, and 2008 aerial photographs. The timber, hit and miss form of the fence can also be seen in the 2008 street view photographs around the northernmost part of the Blue Land. However, part of the enclosure along the boundary of the Blue Land with the hotel car park is not visible in these older aerial photographs. I have attached to this decision a copy of the enforcement notice plan, which I have annotated with a green line to show the approximate location of the section of fence in question. The parts of the enclosure visible in these older aerial photographs appears to form part of an enclosure around a larger parcel of land. This larger parcel forms an 'L' shape comprising the Blue Land and the southern part of the hotel car park.
29. In addition to the above, I have compared the sections of fence visible in the appellant's 2008 street view photographs with the enclosure I saw on site and that visible in the Council's 2019 site photographs. Having done so, I can see that these sections of the fence appear to be the same. Indeed, there is nothing before me to suggest that any of the original enclosure around the Blue Land has been replaced.

⁴ In accordance with section 171B (2) of the 1990 Act.

30. I turn now to the section of the enclosure in the approximate location of the green line on the plan attached to this decision. Having considered the aerial imagery, it is more likely than not that this section of fence has been added at a later date to the southernmost part of the boundary of the Blue Land shared with the hotel car park. Indeed, this section of the enclosure is taller and has a different appearance to the fence along the remainder of this boundary.
31. The Council has provided aerial imagery from 2008 and 2012, although it does not refer to these with regard to the fence. Nevertheless, these are not inconsistent with the appellant's aerial imagery as far as the enclosure is concerned.
32. Having regard to all of the above, it is more likely than not that the vast majority of the enclosure subject of this appeal formed part of a larger means of enclosure that had been substantially completed prior to the time the appellant's 2008 aerial photographs were taken. The section of enclosure indicated in green on the attached plan was, on the balance of probability, erected as a separate operation that was substantially completed sometime between when the May 2018 and April 2020 aerial photographs were taken.
33. For the above reasons, I conclude that on the date the enforcement notice was issued no enforcement action could be taken in respect of part of the boundary fence that is the subject of the notice and, therefore, part of the breach of planning control alleged. The appellant's ground (d) appeal should succeed insofar as it relates to the boundary fence around the Blue Land, excluding the section erected along the southernmost part of the boundary shared with the hotel car park, the location of which is indicated in green on the plan attached to this decision.
34. The partial success of the ground (d) appeal will not mean that the notice is quashed. Instead, I will vary part 3 of the notice to refer only to the section of fence in the approximate location indicated in green on the plan attached at the end of this decision. At this stage I also intend to vary the notice to require the removal of this section of the enclosure alone. This is, of course, notwithstanding my decision on the ground (f) appeal insofar as it relates to the fence.
35. In these circumstances, the appeal on grounds (f) and (g) do not fall to be considered in so far as they relates to the section of fence that I have found to be immune from enforcement action.

Ground (f)

36. For the appeal to succeed on ground (f), I must be satisfied that the steps required to comply with the notice exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control or, as the case may be, to remedy any injury to amenity which has been caused by the breach. Having regard to the requirements of the notice, its purpose must be to remedy the breach of planning control that has occurred.
37. As I have already noted, the appellant does not object to the removal of the 'portable office building'. Neither does he object to the removal of CCTV cameras. He does, however, suggest that the CCTV cameras have been mounted on some of the lighting columns, rather than being on separate columns. Accordingly, the appellant's case under the ground (f) appeal

primarily relates to the requirements to remove the fence, hard standing, and the lighting columns. He also objects to the requirement to restore the land to its pre-existing ground levels.

Hardstanding

38. 5.(vi) requires the removal of the hardstanding from the land. As I have already noted above, as well as the Blue Land, the land to which the notice relates also includes both the shared access and the vegetated area to the south of the adjoining park. Whilst I could not see any hardstanding on the vegetated area, the shared access has a hard surface. It is clear from the Council's case that it had not intended for the notice to target the hardstanding on the shared access and that it only objects to the hardstanding on the Blue Land. However, as drafted, the notice targets all hardstanding on the land to which it relates, which in this case is hardstanding on the Blue Land and the shared access.
39. Section 173(4)(a) of the 1990 Act provides that an enforcement notice may require that the breach is remedied by discontinuing any use of land or by restoring the land to its condition before the breach took place. Settled case law has established that where an enforcement notice is issued in respect of a material change of use, and works were carried out to facilitate the material change of use, the notice may require that 'ancillary' works are removed in order that the site is restored to its previous condition and the breach is remedied. This is even when the ancillary works would otherwise be immune from enforcement action.
40. Accordingly, in order to determine whether or not the requirement to remove the hardstanding is necessary to remedy the breach, I must consider whether or not the hardstanding is an ancillary operation to the mixed use alleged and, therefore, part and parcel of that use.
41. With regard to the hardstanding on the Blue Land, the Council say that its 2008 aerial photograph shows this part of the site without a concrete surface. However, it acknowledges that by 2012 part of the Blue Land has been laid with hardstanding. Having regard to both the Council's and the appellant's aerial photographs, I can see that since 2008 the vegetation along the western boundary of the Blue Land has been cut back and that since 2013 the Blue Land has not had a vegetated surface. Whilst it is difficult to say what surfacing has been on the site since 2013, there is nothing before me to suggest that the surfacing visible in the appellant's 2013, 2018 and 2020 photographs is not hardstanding. In view of this, it is more likely than not that hardstanding was laid on the Blue Land in 2013.
42. With this in mind, I now consider when the material change of use alleged in the notice, once corrected as I intend, first commenced in order to determine whether or not the works to lay the hardstanding are connected in some way to the alleged use of the land. I have had regard to the previous Inspector's decision, which relates to an application for a lawful development certificate (LDC). The relevant date in that case (i.e. the date the LDC application was made) is 11 February 2020. The LDC application was for the use of the land⁵ for car parking, car storage, open storage and siting of storage containers.

⁵ Whilst I have not been provided with a plan showing the land that was the subject of the LDC application, the evidence indicates that this land included the Blue Land.

Importantly, the Inspector's decision refers to this use of the site before and since the hardstanding was laid on the Blue Land.

43. In the decision it would appear that the Inspector is satisfied that the use for which the LDC was sought had taken place, but that it had not been shown that the use had taken place on the site for the full 10 year period considered in order to justify the grant of the LDC. Her conclusion demonstrates that, at the time the LDC application was submitted, the use of the site was not the same as that alleged in the enforcement notice. I acknowledge that elements of the previous mixed use of the site are also elements of the mixed use subject of this appeal. However, I note that there is no dispute that the previous use is materially different to the use alleged in the enforcement notice. It is, therefore, more likely than not that the mixed use that is the subject of this appeal commenced sometime after 11 February 2020, which is some 7 years after the lard surfacing was laid.
44. Having regard to the above, it is more likely than not that the hardstanding on the Blue Land was laid in order to facilitate a previous use of the site, whether that be the use that was the subject of the LDC application or some other use. For this reason, I can only conclude that the hardstanding on the Blue Land was not laid as an ancillary operation to the mixed use alleged in the notice and that it was not, therefore, part and parcel of the mixed use. Accordingly, I find the requirement to remove the hardstanding from the Blue Land exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control.
45. As for the hardstanding on the shared access, I note that this appears on all of the aerial photographs. I acknowledge that this hardstanding is used for access to the Blue Land. However, for the same reason given above, the evidence does not suggest that the shared access hardstanding is an ancillary operation to the mixed use alleged. It is also required for a safe means of access to the hotel. Accordingly, I find the requirement to remove the hardstanding from the shared access exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control.

Lighting and CCTV Columns

46. As noted above, whilst the appellant does not object to the removal of CCTV cameras, he says that these have been mounted on some of the lighting columns. He suggests that the lighting columns have been on the site since 2008 and that 'they were associated with the hotel use who historically leased the site'. Whilst the detail on the aerial photographs since 2008 is not sufficient to indicate whether or not this is correct, I note the Council do not dispute what the appellant says. Indeed, the Council do not suggest that the works to erect the lighting columns were part and parcel of the mixed use alleged in the notice.
47. Having regard to the above, it is more likely than not that the lighting columns were erected in order to facilitate a previous use of the site, rather than the use alleged in the notice. The works to erect the lighting columns were not, therefore, part and parcel of the mixed use. Accordingly, I find the requirement to remove the lighting columns from the land exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control in this case.

48. As the appellant does not object to the removal of the CCTV cameras, the notice can be varied so that it requires the removal of the CCTV cameras alone, rather than the CCTV camera columns.

Ground Levels

49. The appellant suggests that there has been no change to the ground levels on site. The Council has not referred to a change in ground levels in its appeal statement and does not, therefore, contradict the appellant's contentions. At the site visit I noted that the appeal site and the surrounding land is fairly level. I could see no obvious evidence of ground levels having been changed on the site, either as part and parcel of the material change of use alleged or in order to facilitate a previous use of the site. On this basis, I conclude that a requirement to restore the land to its pre-existing ground levels exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control in this case.

Fence

50. In view of my conclusions on the ground (d) appeal, my consideration of this ground (f) appeal is confined to the section of fence in the location indicated in green on the plan attached at the end of this decision. The appellant suggests that, as the fence is lawful, a requirement to remove it goes beyond what is necessary to remedy the breach. I have, however, concluded that the ground (d) appeal should fail in so far as it relates to the section of fence along the green line. As I have been given no other reason to conclude that the fence should remain, a requirement to remove this section of the fence is entirely necessary to remedy the breach of planning control in this case.
51. In addition to the above, the fence is a separate allegation in the notice. As such, my conclusions above would not change even if I were to find that the fence is not part and parcel of the alleged material change of use of the site.

Summary

52. Of the remaining matters that are the subject of the appellant's ground (f) appeal, I find the requirement to remove the hardstanding, the lighting columns, and to restore the land to its pre-existing ground levels exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control in this case. I cannot, however, find the same with regard to the requirement to remove the fence along the green line shown on the plan attached to this decision. The requirement to remove the CCTV columns, rather than just the CCTV cameras, also exceeds what is necessary to remedy the breach. I conclude therefore that the ground (f) appeal should succeed in part and I will vary the requirements of the notice accordingly. In doing so I am satisfied that no injustice would be caused to any party.

Ground (g)

53. An appeal on ground (g) is that the period specified in the notice falls short of what should reasonably be allowed. The notice specifies a period of 3 months after the notice takes effect. The appellant has suggested a 9 month period.
54. The appellant suggests that more time is needed to employ a specialist contractor to undertake the works to comply with the notice. However, the works requirement by the notice will be reduced, following the variations I intend to make. As the removal of the vast majority of the fence, the

hardstandings and the lighting columns would no longer be required, I have no reason to conclude that a specialist contractor will be needed to undertake the remaining works, or that an extended period would be required to find a contractor and for the contractor to carry out the works. Indeed, it has not been suggested that there is any difficulty in securing a contractor in this area.

55. With regard to the requirements to cease the use and remove the cars and portable office from the site, it is clear that the appellant wishes to continue his business elsewhere. I can agree, therefore, that a period of three months is a particularly short time to search for appropriate alternative premises, secure that premises and then to move the business from the appeal site to its new location. However, it has not been suggested that the appellant would have difficulty in finding alternative premises, such that a three fold increase in the compliance period can be justified. In my judgement, a six month period would be sufficient to move the business and then to comply with the remaining requirements of the notice.
56. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the period specified in the notice falls short of what should reasonably be allowed. For this reason, the ground (g) appeals should succeed. I will vary the notice to give a six month period for compliance.

Conclusion

57. On the balance of probabilities, the appeal on ground (d) should succeed in respect of part of the matters which, following the correction of the notice, are stated as constituting the breach of planning control.
58. I also conclude that certain requirements of the notice are excessive to remedy the breach of planning control. The appeal on ground (f) should succeed in part.
59. Finally, I conclude that the period for compliance with the notice falls short of what is reasonable. The appeal on ground (g) should succeed.
60. I shall vary the enforcement notice, prior to upholding it.

Formal Decision

61. It is directed that the enforcement notice is corrected and varied by:

- From part 3, the deletion of the words 'Without planning permission, the use of land for mixed usage as car sales, car parking, car storage and for the erection of a boundary fence on Land at the Land on the south side of Brickfields Lane, Harlington, Hayes, Middlesex, UB3 5DX ("the breach")' and their substitution with the words 'Without planning permission the making of a material change of use of the Land to a mixed use for car sales, car parking, and car storage. Also, without planning permission, the erection of a fence on the Land in the location identified in green on the plan entitled 'Enforcement Notice Plan 2' attached to this notice';
- From part 5, the deletion of requirements (i), (ii), and (iii) in their entirety and their substitution with the following words '(i) cease the use of the Land for a mixed use for car sales, car parking, and car storage by ceasing the use of the Land for car sales; ceasing the use of the Land for car parking; and ceasing the use of the Land for car storage;';

- From part 5.(v), the deletion of the words 'blue on the attached plan' and their substitution with the words 'green on the plan entitled 'Enforcement Notice Plan 2' attached to this enforcement notice';
- From part 5.(vi), the deletion of the words 'Remove from the land the hard standing, the portable building(s), lighting columns, CCTV columns' and their substitution with the words 'Remove from the Land the portable building, CCTV cameras';
- From part 5.(vii), the deletion of the words 'pre-existing ground levels and';
- From part 6, the deletion of the words 'Three (3)' and their substitution with the words 'Nine (9)'; and
- After the plan attached to the notice, the insertion of the plan entitled 'Enforcement Notice Plan 2' attached at the end of this decision.

62. Subject to the corrections and variations pursuant to grounds (d), (f) and (g), the appeal is otherwise dismissed, and the enforcement notice is upheld.

J Moss

INSPECTOR



Plan

This is the plan referred to in my decision dated: 20TH MARCH 2023

by J Moss BSc (Hons) DipTP MRTPI

Land at: Land on the south side of Brickfields Lane, Harlington, Hayes, Middlesex UB3 5DX

Reference: APP/R5510/C/21/3284968

Not to scale

Enforcement Notice Plan 2

**Land on the south side of Brickfields Lane, Harlington,
Hayes, Middlesex UB3 5DX**

Not to scale

