



Appeal Decision

Site visit made on 11 October 2023

by Nick Bowden BA(Hons) DIP TP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 17 November 2023

Appeal Ref: APP/K2610/W/23/3319046

Wayside, Honeycombe Road, Great Little Plumstead, Norwich NR13 5HY

- The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against a refusal to grant planning permission.
 - The appeal is made by Mr Pete Huggins against the decision of Broadland District Council.
 - The application Ref 20210717, dated 10 February 2021, was refused by notice dated 28 September 2022.
 - The development proposed is the change of use of existing Farthing Cottage from holiday let to separate residential property.
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Decision

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Preliminary Matters

2. The original submission was made to the Council as a full planning application for the change of use of the premises from a holiday let to an independent dwelling. In implication and potential effect, this is the same as an application to delete the holiday let occupancy condition, condition 3, from the original planning permission, ref 20121797.

Main Issue

3. The main issue is the effect of providing a new dwelling outside a designated settlement limit, including the loss of holiday accommodation.

Reasons

4. Farthing Cottage comprises a modest, chalet style, holiday let associated with the main dwelling at Wayside. It comprises a small but neatly contained unit of accommodation. There is a kitchen-dining area and living room downstairs and two double bedrooms upstairs which are set within the roof space. A small front garden area is delineated by a hedge and a gate.
5. Planning permission was originally granted for the holiday let in 2012. This was permitted as an extension to the garage to Wayside and was restricted, by way of condition 3 of the planning permission, to be for holiday use only for periods not exceeding six weeks by any person. The reason for the imposition of this condition was to prevent the occupation of the accommodation on a permanent basis.
6. Policy GC1 of the Broadland Development Management DPD (DMDPD) promotes the presumption in favour of sustainable development. Policy GC2 states that outside of settlement limits, development will be permitted where it accords with a specific allocation and/or policy of the development plan.

Wayside, and by extension, Farthing Cottage are outside the settlement limits and are not within any specific allocation of the development plan. The development proposed is for a new dwelling. Accordingly, the development does not comply with Policies GC1 and GC2 of the DMPDP.

7. Policy H2 of the DMDPD relates to the removal of occupancy conditions. In this case, the development proposed would amount to the same thing; namely the removal of a unit of accommodation with an occupancy condition restricting the use to a holiday let.
8. I have given consideration to the arguments put forward to support the development. I note the health conditions and personal situation of the appellant. In these circumstances, and in addition to managing the accommodation with inflationary cost pressures, I can sympathise with the position. However, the submitted financial data indicates the premises is viable as a small-scale operation, albeit on tight margins.
9. The site is not in a sustainable location. It is distant from shops and services that would be meaningful on a daily basis with minimal public transport provision in reasonable proximity, excepting for an infrequent bus service. The nominated proximity to the hairdressers and public house would not cater for the day-to-day needs of a single dwelling. Other shops and services are only accessible by way of narrow, unlit lanes. There are few pedestrian footpaths in the vicinity and none directly outside the appeal site. I therefore conclude that any new dwelling will be most reliant on the private motor vehicle.
10. Accommodation at the Brick Kilns, opposing the site, would remain, however this offers a different type of service as a bed and breakfast as opposed to the self-contained offering at Farthing Cottage. The proposal results in a net increase of one permanent dwelling. This, however, does not outweigh the loss of the unit of holiday accommodation, particularly in this unsustainable location.
11. Reference has further been made to similar conversion schemes and new houses in the locality. However, no details as to the precise nature of these developments permitted or their circumstances have been drawn to my attention in the evidence provided and I am therefore unable to give them more than very limited weight. I have noted the reference to policy GC2 allowing for conversions. This, however, is not my reading of the policy. The policy allows for development to occur where it accords with a specific allocation and/or policy of the development plan. In this case, there is a conflict with policy H2 of the DMDPD. No other policies relating to conversion of buildings to other uses have been drawn to my attention.
12. As such, I conclude that the proposed development conflicts with policies GC1, GC2 and H2 of the DMDPD which require development to be sustainably located and justification for the removal of occupancy conditions to be demonstrated. No other material considerations have been brought to my attention that warrant a decision contrary to that advocated in the development plan.

Planning Balance and Conclusion

13. In reaching my decision I have taken into account the situation of the appellant. However, the Planning Practice Guidance advises that, in general,

planning is concerned with land use in the public interest. Furthermore, the new dwelling is likely to remain long after those personal circumstances cease to be material. I have given careful consideration to the appellant's health issues but can only attribute limited weight to their personal circumstances and this is insufficient to outweigh the harm I have identified.

14. Reference has been made to nutrient neutrality and the Council's five year housing land supply. Even if there were a shortfall in the supply of housing, I find that the harm arising from the proposed development would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits.
15. There are no other material considerations before me that outweigh the harm I have identified, or that would lead me to find otherwise than in accordance with the development plan, read as a whole. Therefore, for the reasons given above I conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

Nick Bowden

INSPECTOR