



Appeal Decision

Inquiry held on 14 May 2024

Site visit made on 14 May 2024

by D Moore BSc (HONS), PGDip, MCD, MRTPI, IHBC

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 28/05/2024

Appeal Ref: APP/T5150/C/23/3335123

65A and B Townsend Lane, London NW9 8BP

- The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the 1990 Act).
- The appeal is made by Mr Daniel Albu against an enforcement notice issued by the Council of the London Borough of Brent.
- The notice was issued on 6 November 2023.
- The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is without planning permission, the material change of use of the ground floor and garden from residential to a mixed use as residential, builders/storage yard and business use and erection of buildings in the rear garden.
- The requirements of the notice are:
 1. Demolish the unauthorised outbuilding to the rear of the premises.
 2. Remove all items, materials and debris, arising from that demolition, and remove all materials associated with the unauthorised development from the premises.
 3. Remove the containers to the rear of the premises.
 4. Cease the use of the premises for storage of building materials and builder's equipment located in the rear garden of the premises.
 5. Remove all building materials, waste and materials associated with the unauthorised use from the premises.
 6. Cease the use as a builders/storage yard and business use and erection of buildings in the rear garden.
- The period for compliance with the requirements is 3 months.
- The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of the 1990 Act as amended. Since an appeal has been brought on ground (a), an application for planning permission is deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the Act.

Summary of Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the enforcement notice is upheld with corrections and a variation in the terms set out below in the Formal Decision.

Applications for costs

1. Applications for costs were made by (1) Mr Daniel Albu against the Council of the London Borough of Brent in relation to the Inquiry appeal ref APP/T5150/C/23/3335123, and (2) Mr Daniel Albu against the Council of the London Borough of Brent in relation to a previous appeal ref APP/T5150/C/20/3259772. These applications are the subject of separate Decisions.

Preliminary Matters

2. Oral evidence on matters of fact was given under affirmation.

3. The appellant criticised the Council and argued that established procedures were not followed prior to the issue of the notice. Expediency is a matter for the Council, however, and this complaint does not form part of my considerations. It was also indicated that the notice was issued without the proper authority, since the initial delegated report contained a different compliance period to the notice as issued. The Council explained that the delegated authority lies with the Enforcement Manager who imposed a shorter period for compliance. I have no reason to consider the notice 'ultra vires' but such complaints would normally be the subject of Judicial Review.
4. In the Statement of Common Ground, it is stated that Flat A is a separate unit of occupation, the occupiers of which have no interest in or use of the rear of 65 Townsend Lane. The main parties agreed that the notice could be corrected by the deletion of "A and" from Schedule 1 'the premises affected', without causing injustice. It was also agreed a related correction to the allegation in Schedule 2 would be required to replace the words "ground floor and garden" with "the premises", and this could be made without injustice. I shall correct the notice accordingly.
5. The Council submitted an alternative plan which was intended to omit Flat A. Following my site visit I am not certain that the proposed plan is correct. I shall not substitute the Council's plan but, in any event, I am satisfied that the notice, as corrected, is clear because it is apparent which premises is targeted.
6. There is an error in the description of the breach which describes the erection of buildings. Only one has been erected. It was agreed that the allegation should be corrected accordingly.
7. Finally, the parties agreed that there is duplication in the requirements. The steps should flow from the allegation and should require the alleged unauthorised mixed use to cease by ceasing the use of the premises as a builders'/storage yard and business use. This would allow the residential use to remain. The steps should then require the removal of any facilitating works, which would be the building in the rear garden. I am satisfied that these corrections can be made without injustice since the effect of the notice would be unchanged.

The ground (b) appeal

8. To succeed on ground (b), the appellant must show on the balance of probabilities that the matters alleged have not occurred as a matter of fact.
9. The appeal premises includes a detached building that has been converted into four flats pursuant to planning permission ref 09/3043 dated 22 December 2009¹. The permission was subject to a condition requiring a scheme for the provision of landscaping. The condition was discharged, and a scheme was approved². The approved landscaping plan included a rear garden for the use of the occupants of Flat B, the appeal property, and beyond that a communal garden and a shared parking area. The garden for Flat B was provided but the remainder of the works were not completed. The land remained as a yard, which was separated from the garden of Flat B by a fence.

¹ Retention of single and two storey rear extension, first floor side extension and conversion of dwellinghouse into 4 self-contained flats with associated landscaping, provision of 3 off-street parking spaces and erection of bay window to rear elevation.

² Ref 10/0633 dated 16 June 2010.

10. The appellant said that he first occupied Flat B with his family in April 2013. He intended to store tools and materials associated with his building company in the basement, but this was not possible due to damp and water ingress. Consequently, the landlords agreed that the appellant could clear the yard area at the rear of the garden and use it for storage. The land was available since it had not been laid out as a communal garden and parking area as required by the conditional planning permission.
11. The appellant explained the timeline of events as follows. He started to store tools and materials in the yard in late summer and early Autumn 2013 but added a container sometime in 2016 due to the risk of theft. A storage tent was erected around April 2018, along with a shed. A second container was then added, and the tent was moved to another part of the yard. By March 2019 the appellant had roofed over the two containers and enclosed the area between them. Later, the appellant extended the roof to enclose a further area between the back of the storage containers and the dividing fence. This is used as an office and as a place to watch TV and relax. There are sofas, a table and a desk and a separate WC has been installed. This area was referred to in evidence as the 'man-cave'.
12. The appellant argued that the yard and man-cave should be treated as a separate planning unit, which is in use for business purposes with an ancillary domestic use. It was submitted that the notice is incorrect and the alleged change of use to a mixed use has not occurred.
13. In *Burdle*³, it was held that the planning unit is usually the unit of occupation, unless a smaller area can be identified which, as a matter of fact and degree, is physically separate and distinct, and occupied for different and unrelated purposes. The concept of physical and functional separation is key.
14. The flat, its garden and the former yard area are all within the ownership of Mr and Mrs Casey, the landlords, who let Flat B to the appellant and his wife. The appellant has an informal agreement for the use of the yard, although this does not extend to the erection of buildings. The yard and man-cave are contiguous with the garden to Flat B and there is access between the two areas. Services are shared between the flat and the yard. This amounts to a physical connection.
15. The appellant maintained that the flat and garden are occupied by himself and his family, whereas the yard and man-cave are occupied exclusively by the appellant, in connection with his business. However, I am not persuaded that this arrangement amounts to functional separation. Whether or not other family members use and occupy the yard and man-cave, it is apparent that the appellant himself uses and occupies both areas regularly. The appellant lives in the flat and conducts his business from the yard and man-cave, while also using the latter as a place to relax. This is a significant functional link. I am satisfied that the planning unit has been identified correctly to include the flat and the yard.
16. In terms of use, the concept of a mixed use is one of two or more primary uses existing within the same planning unit. One is not incidental to the other, although there may be incidental uses associated with each primary use. In this case, the planning unit is put to two primary uses, the residential use of

³ *Burdle & Williams v SSE & New Forest DC* [1972] 1 WLR 1207.

the flat and garden area, and the business use of the yard and man-cave. This amounts to a mixed use because neither use can be said to be ancillary to the other. I note that this finding accords with that of the previous Inspector who considered the same issue in an appeal at the premises⁴.

17. I conclude that the change of use to a mixed use of residential, a builders'/storage yard and business use has occurred as a matter of fact. The appeal on ground (b) must fail, therefore.

The ground (c) appeal

18. To succeed on ground (c), the appellant must show on the balance of probabilities, that the matters alleged do not constitute a breach of planning control.
19. The Council maintained that the lawful use of the yard area is residential in consequence of the planning permission that led to the flat conversion, despite the yard area never having been used as anticipated. Crucially, there is no dispute that there has been a material change of use of the yard area, whatever its lawful use. The disagreement between the parties concerns when the business use commenced, which I consider below as part of the ground (d) appeal.
20. There is no planning permission for the alleged mixed use, and it constitutes a breach of planning control. The ground (c) appeal fails, therefore.

The ground (d) appeal

21. In order to succeed on ground (d), the appellant must show on the balance of probabilities that the material change of use took place ten or more years prior to the issue of the notice and continued after the date of change without significant interruption such that it is now too late for the Council to take enforcement action.
22. The Council says the notice represents a 'second bite' under Section 171B(4)(b) of the 1990 Act. This allows for "taking further enforcement action in respect of any breach of planning control if, during the period of four years ending with that action being taken, the local planning authority have taken or purported to take enforcement action in respect of that breach".
23. So long as the Council issued an enforcement notice in respect of a breach of planning control within the appropriate four or ten year period, they have a further four years to issue another notice in respect of (what in essence must be) the same breach and site. The Council may have 'purported' to act, for example, where they issued a defective notice which was found null or invalid.
24. A previous enforcement notice was issued on 13 August 2020, which was within the relevant four year period. That notice concerned land at 65A-D Townsend Lane, and the premises affected was shown outlined in black on the attached plan. The alleged breach in the first notice was the erection of metal shipping containers and outbuilding at the premises, and the material change of use of the rear garden to the storage of building materials and builder equipment.

⁴ Ref APP/T5150/C/20/3259772 dated 16 June 2023.

25. That notice was quashed because the Inspector found it did not specify with sufficient clarity the alleged breach of planning control. It was considered that the land to which the notice related comprised a single planning unit that was in a mixed use of residential and the storage of building material and equipment. The second notice was issued in line with the Inspector's findings.
26. Although the address differs slightly between the notices, in terms of which flats were listed, the enforcement notice plans are identical. It is apparent that they related to the same site. There are differences in the allegations, which arose from a misdescription in the first notice. However, there are no factual differences in the range or nature of uses or operations on the site when the notices were issued. Both concern a change of use to a use for the storage of building materials and both concern the erection of a building. The differences in wording are minor and it is clear to me that the physical reality of the breach is the same.
27. The appellant drew my attention to *Fidler*⁵ and argued that it is necessary to focus not on the Council's broad intention but on the terms of the enforcement notices themselves and, in particular, on the actual breach or breaches of planning control alleged. Taking this approach, I would reach the same conclusion. Although the previous notice was not directed at a mixed use, this arose from a misdescription. The residential element of the mixed use is considered lawful and is not required to cease. As such, the second notice does not target a wider range of components than the aggregate of the components covered by the earlier notice.
28. Where an enforcement notice is issued under Section 171B(4), I must consider any ground (d) appeal on the basis of whether the development was lawful on the date of the first notice, or when the Council first purported to take action. That is how the 'second bite' provisions operate to stop the clock in proceedings. I am satisfied that the first notice concerned essentially the same breach and site. That notice was issued on 13 August 2020, and this becomes the relevant date for the purposes of ground (d).
29. The concept of a material change of use is not defined in statute. The basic approach is that, for a material change of use to have occurred, there must be some significant difference in the character of the use of the land from what has gone on previously as a matter of fact and degree. I have found that the planning unit is identified correctly to include the flat and the former yard and the allegation is correct to identify a mixed use has taken place. I must consider when the material change of use to a mixed use occurred.
30. Notwithstanding the submissions on the second bite issue, the appellant maintained that the change of use took place at least ten years prior to 13 August 2020. Mr Casey, the landowner and also a builder, explained that he had completed the conversion of the building into four flats by December 2009. He then continued to use the yard for the storage of equipment and materials in connection with other jobs until the appellant took the yard over in 2013. Prior to this, it was explained that the yard was used infrequently, and it had become a little overgrown.
31. My attention was drawn to a street view image dated October 2009, which shows scaffolding on the main building. An aerial image dated June 2010 shows

⁵ *Fidler v FSS & Reigate and Banstead BC* [2004] EWCA Civ 1295.

the scaffolding had been removed but there was some scattered building material remaining in the yard. Mr Casey explained that items stored in the yard included a pack of plywood, 'heras' fencing and support props. Materials such as bricks and bags of sand or aggregate were also stored there. Mr Casey occasionally parked vehicles in the yard, some of which are shown in the aerial image dated July 2013.

32. Mr Casey maintained that he used the yard for the storage of building materials continuously after the conversion works were completed. However, he did not occupy Flat B as this was let to an unrelated individual in March 2010. Consequently, even if the yard had been shown to be in use for the storage of building materials, and this amounted to a material change of use, it would not assist the appellant. The allegation concerns a mixed use as residential and as a builders'/storage yard and business use. As explained, I must consider when the material change of use to a mixed use commenced.
33. Mr Casey's description of activities would have been a single primary use operating within the yard only, which would have been a different planning unit. On the basis of the appellant's own evidence, it is clear that the material change of use to a mixed use took place sometime after April 2013 and would not be immune from enforcement action.
34. Moreover, the street view and aerial images show that any storage of materials prior to 2013 was relatively small scale. This contrasts with the appearance of the land in April 2017. Images show the majority of the site was covered with materials and the first container had been sited. This amounted to a significant difference in the character of the use of the land, which would have had planning consequences due to its effect on the character and appearance of the area. I consider that the alleged material change of use occurred around the time the first container was sited and when the yard was used extensively for open storage, which would have been around April 2017.
35. It is clear from the notice that the unauthorised building is considered integral to and solely for the purpose of facilitating the unauthorised use and should be removed so that the site is restored to its previous condition. The appellant argued, however, that the building was operational development in its own right and would be subject to the four year timescale provided by Section 171(B)(1) of the 1990 Act, as clarified by the Court of Appeal in *Caldwell*⁶.
36. The parties were agreed that, at some point, the appendages which had been added to the containers had led to them becoming a building. Section 336(1) of the 1990 Act includes in the definition of the word 'building' any structure or erection, and any part of a building, as so defined. This description has been interpreted by the Courts to include structures which would not ordinarily be described as buildings. In *Cardiff Rating Authority*, which was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in *Skerritts*, three primary factors were identified as decisive of what was a 'building' and these are as follows: (a) that it was of a size to be constructed on site, as opposed to being brought on to the site, (b) permanence, (c) physical attachment. No one factor is decisive⁷.

⁶ *Caldwell & Timberstore Ltd v SSLUHC & Buckinghamshire Council* [2024] EWCA Civ 467.

⁷ *Cardiff Rating Authority v Guest Keen Baldwin's Iron and Steel Co Ltd* [1949] 1QB 385 and *Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v SSETR* [2000] JPL 1025.

37. The containers were brought onto the site and placed in their current locations. The initial works were the provision of a roof over the containers and the creation of an enclosed storage area in between. The appellant explained it would be relatively straightforward to remove the roof without causing any damage. Similarly, the cladding which has been added to the exterior could be removed fairly easily. At that point the containers were not physically attached to the land.
38. More recently, the roof was extended and attached to a pre-existing panel fence. The fence posts are set in concrete and the roof is physically attached to this structure. The resulting man-cave has a tiled floor and cladding to its internal and external walls. The latest works to the containers have resulted in a structure that cannot easily be moved nor is it intended to be moved. Further, I consider it is now physically attached to the ground and it has resulted in a change to the physical characteristics of the land. Consequently, I find that the containers became a building in 2020 when the man-cave was created.
39. Therefore, even if I were to accept the appellant's argument on this matter, I find that the building was not substantially completed four or more years prior to the issue of the first notice and so would not be immune from enforcement action. The appeal on ground (d) fails, therefore.

The ground (a) appeal and the deemed planning application

Background and Main Issues

40. The ground (a) appeal is that planning permission should be granted for the matters alleged. The terms of the deemed planning application are derived from the corrected allegation. Hence planning permission is sought for the material change of use of the premises from residential to a mixed use as residential, builders'/storage yard and business use and the erection of a building in the rear garden.
41. The main issues are the effect of the development on (i) the character and appearance of the host property and the surrounding area, and (ii) the living conditions of neighbouring occupiers with regard to noise and outlook.

Character and Appearance

42. No 65B Townsend Lane occupies part of the ground floor of a two-storey building that has been converted into four flats. The building is situated on the corner of Townsend Lane and Sunnymead Road in a predominantly residential area.
43. The yard area at the rear is occupied by a large building that covers at least half of the space available. The building has a flat roof that rises to 2.75 metres and extends across the full width of the plot. The building is highly visible and prominent in the street scene, especially in views looking to the east along Sunnymead Road and from the adjoining property. The containers have been partially covered in timber cladding and painted in a dark colour in an attempt to lessen their visual impact.
44. Nonetheless, the resulting building is an obtrusive and dominant feature that does not accord with the character of the surrounding development and is overbearing when seen in context with the host building. The harm could not

be alleviated through increasing the height of the side fences. Any such height increase would need to be significant to have any effect and this, in itself, would have an adverse visual impact. There is limited scope for landscaping due to the extent of the building. I saw that there are other outbuildings and garages in the vicinity, but these tend to be smaller scale and less prominent.

45. The open storage within the yard area is screened behind the wall but the materials are visible when the gates are open. Although the open storage has been reduced it still has potential to contribute to the adverse visual impact of the site.
46. Overall, I find that the unauthorised development has an adverse effect on the character and appearance of the host property and the surrounding area. It does not complement the locality due to its scale and the siting and design of the building. It is thus contrary to Policy DMP1 of the Local Plan 2019-2041 (February 2022) and the building would not meet the guidance contained within the Council's Supplementary Planning Document 2: Residential Extensions and Alterations (2018) due to its size and scale. Nor does it meet the aims of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) insofar as it seeks to promote high quality design.

Living Conditions

47. The unauthorised development comprises use as a builders'/storage yard and the appellant also manages his business from the site. This type of use would not normally be acceptable within a residential setting.
48. The appellant explained that daily activities include a meeting in the man-cave with up to four employees. Tools are taken from the container three or four times per week depending on the job. I understand that only one employee drives to the premises and the others walk or get a lift. The majority of the activity takes place in the morning. In addition, there may be deliveries to the site and spare materials are unloaded. Deliveries vary but could take place up to two or three times per week.
49. The appellant runs a relatively small operation from the site. Although there is likely to be some noise and disturbance arising from the activities, this tends to be confined to the mornings or late afternoons. I consider that this could be mitigated through the imposition of a suitable planning condition to restrict the hours of operation. I am satisfied that this would overcome the Council's objections and those raised by other people.
50. As explained above, the building is visible from the adjoining property. However, I do not consider that its effect on the outlook from that property would be material due to its position towards the end of the garden. This does not overcome my concern about the effect of the building on the character and appearance of the wider area, however, for the reasons set out above.
51. I find that the development does not have an adverse effect on the living conditions of neighbouring occupiers with regard to noise and outlook, nor would it generate significant movement of goods or materials by road. It therefore accords with Policies DMP1 and BT3 of the Local Plan and the Framework which, among other things, seek to protect residential amenity.

Alternative schemes

52. The appellant offered alternative schemes in the event that the building was found to be unacceptable. These included either the retention of the containers and the use of the yard, and the removal of the man-cave, or the retention of the single secure container where the tools are stored.
53. Section 177(1) of the 1990 Act provides that planning permission may be granted in relation to the whole or any part of the matters alleged or in relation to the whole or any part of the land to which the notice relates. Therefore, I would be considering whether planning permission should be granted for the siting of containers and the use of the yard for the storage of building materials and equipment, or the siting of a container for the storage of building materials and equipment.
54. The siting of containers in this location, and the open storage of building materials, would not be acceptable due to the effect on the character and appearance of the area. Even a single container would stand out in the street scene due to its scale, size and form and the prominent position of the yard.
55. I note that another container has been positioned in a yard opposite the site, but there is no evidence that this is lawful, and it cannot be considered part of the area's established character. The alternative schemes would not overcome the planning concerns, therefore.

Other Matters

56. The Council agreed that a domestic style garage on the site would be likely to be acceptable, as would the use of the yard for domestic storage. I agree that a modest-sized domestic garage would not be uncharacteristic of the area, but this does not justify a much larger building that is put to a business use.
57. The appellant maintained that the development makes a contribution to the local economy, through employing local people, and through its contribution to the building supply chain. The business also provides a service to local people as work is undertaken at affordable rates. I agree that the development would contribute to the local economy, and may provide a service, but this benefit would be limited due to the size of the business.
58. It was also argued that the yard is now safe and secure and, if it becomes vacant, it may attract antisocial behaviour or become untidy. This is based on speculation, however, and the consideration carries limited weight. Similarly, I cannot give weight to the suggestion that a large garage could be erected on the site, and this may fall into disrepair and become unsightly, or that a dwelling may be erected sometime in the future which would be more dominant, as this is simply conjecture.
59. I do not consider the appellant's suggested conditions of either granting a personal permission, or a temporary permission, would make the development acceptable in planning terms. Both scenarios would allow the building to be retained for several years and this would perpetuate the harm caused by the unauthorised development.

Conclusion

60. Overall, I find the unauthorised development to be contrary to the development plan as a whole. The totality of the other considerations advanced carry limited weight and do not outweigh the conflict with adopted planning policy.
61. The appellant's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, which is incorporated into the Human Rights Act 1998, must be considered. Article 8 deals with the right to respect for family life and the home. Dismissal of this appeal will require the appellant to find alternative storage for his tools and materials, which may even require him to move house or find alternative employment. This would represent an interference with his home and family life.
62. However, the conflict with local planning policy which would arise, in particular the fact that the development is incompatible with the surrounding area is significant. I am satisfied that the legitimate aim of conforming with planning policy cannot be achieved by any means which are less interfering with the appellant's rights. As such, the interference with home and family life is proportionate and necessary in the circumstances and would not result in a violation of their rights under Article 8.
63. For the reasons given above, the ground (a) appeal fails.

The ground (f) appeal

64. Section 173(4) of the 1990 Act sets out the two purposes of an enforcement notice (a) to remedy the breach of planning control that has occurred and (b) to remedy any injury to amenity caused by the breach. The notice requires the use to cease and the removal of the facilitating works. Its purpose is to remedy the breach of planning control. What must be considered is whether the steps required exceed what is necessary to achieve that purpose.
65. The appellant claimed that the only unlawful element of the development was the extended roof that formed the man-cave and, thus, the notice could do no more than require its removal. However, I have found that it has not been shown that the material change of use is lawful, nor has it been shown that the building would be immune from enforcement action. Therefore, the unauthorised use must cease, and the building must be removed to remedy the breach and achieve the statutory purpose behind the notice.
66. It was agreed that the pre-existing panel fence that was extended to support the roof to the man-cave was lawful and should be allowed to remain. It was further agreed that the relevant requirement could be amended accordingly without injustice.
67. I find that the requirements of the notice do not exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control, save that the dividing fence need not be removed. The ground (f) appeal succeeds to that limited extent.

The ground (g) appeal

68. The ground (g) appeal is that the compliance period falls short of what should reasonably be allowed. The appellant is seeking two years to allow time to

make alternative arrangements for the business and find a secure location for the storage of tools and equipment.

69. I appreciate that this decision will lead to stress and uncertainty for the appellant. Consequently, I accept the appellant's request that the period for compliance be extended. This would enable more time for him to find alternative storage provision. However, this must be balanced against the need to address the harm resulting from the breach of planning control. I consider that six months is an adequate length of time to make alternative arrangements. To this extent, the appeal on ground (g) succeeds.

Conclusion

70. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the appeal should succeed only partially on ground (f) and on ground (g). I shall uphold the enforcement notice with corrections and a variation and refuse to grant planning permission on the application deemed to have been made under Section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Formal Decision

71. It is directed that the enforcement notice is:

(a) corrected by -

- The deletion of the words "A and" from Schedule 1.
- The deletion of the words "the ground floor and garden" from Schedule 2 and their replacement with the words "the premises".
- The deletion of the words "erection of buildings" in Schedule 2 and their replacement with the words "erection of a building".
- The deletion of the requirements in Schedule 4 in their entirety and their replacement with:
 - 1) Cease the unauthorised mixed use of the premises by ceasing the use as a builders'/storage yard and business use.
 - 2) Demolish the unauthorised building to the rear of the premises, except for the pre-existing panel fence that forms part of the east facing wall of that building.
 - 3) Remove all items, materials and debris arising from that demolition, and remove all materials associated with the unauthorised use from the premises.

and (b) varied by the deletion of three months and the substitution of six months as the period for compliance.

72. Subject to the corrections and the variation the appeal is dismissed, the enforcement notice is upheld and planning permission is refused on the application deemed to have been made under Section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended.

D Moore Inspector

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANTS:

Mr Sebastian Charles (Solicitor)

He called:

Mr John Casey

Mr Daniel Albu

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Mr Nigel Wicks (Director of Enforcement Services Ltd)

He called:

Ms Anna Mascheroni (Enforcement Officer)

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED AT THE INQUIRY

Copy of Assured Shorthold Tenancy Agreement dated 6 March 2010

Google Aerial and Streetview Images 2008-2022 in date order