



Appeal Decisions

Site visit made on 21 January 2025

by M Savage BSc (Hons) MCD MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 27 May 2025

Appeal A Ref: APP/X5210/X/24/3351948 38 - 40 Windmill Street, London W1T 2BE

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) against a failure to give notice within the prescribed period of a decision on an application for a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
- The appeal is made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden.
- The application ref 2024/2186/INVALID is dated 26 May 2024.
- The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
- The use for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is 'confirmation that the caravan compliant container shown in the plans accompanying this application meets the approval granted in application 2023/4907/P'.

Appeal B Ref: APP/X5210/X/24/3351952 38 - 40 Windmill Street, London W1T 2BE

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) against a failure to give notice within the prescribed period of a decision on an application for a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
- The appeal is made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden.
- The application ref 2024/2187/INVALID is dated 25 May 2024.
- The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
- The use for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental to the lawful residential use.

Appeal C Ref: APP/X5210/X/24/3345029 38-40 Windmill Street, London W1T 2BE

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) against a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
- The appeal is made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden.
- The application ref 2024/0862/P is dated 2 March 2024.
- The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
- The use for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is the siting of a shipping container for use incidental to the lawful residential use.

Appeal D Ref: APP/X5210/X/24/3358455 38-40 Windmill Street, London W1T 2BE

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) against a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
- The appeal is made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden.
- The application ref 2024/3551/P is dated 12 August 2024.
- The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
- The use for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental to the residential use.

Appeal E Ref: APP/X5210/X/24/3358238 38-40 Windmill Street, London W1T 2BE

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) against a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
 - The appeal is made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden.
 - The application ref 2024/3476/P is dated 12 August 2024.
 - The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended.
 - The use for which a certificate of lawful use or development is sought is the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental to the lawful residential use.
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Decision: Appeal A

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Decision: Appeal B

2. The appeal is dismissed.

Decision: Appeal C

3. The appeal is dismissed.

Decision: Appeal D

4. The appeal is dismissed.

Decision: Appeal E

5. The appeal is dismissed.

Applications for costs

6. Costs applications were made by T&CPP Limited against the Council of the London Borough of Camden in respect of appeals A, B, C, D and E. These applications are the subject of separate decisions.

Preliminary Matters

7. With respect to Appeal A, the appellant has identified the proposed use as 'C3' and states that historically, the land edged red on the site plan accompanying the application has been in residential use. The appellant states that a certificate was granted for the siting of a caravan on this site for use incidental to the residential use on the fourth floor and that confirmation is sought that the caravan compliant container shown in the plans accompanying this application meets the approval granted in application 2023/4907/P. Since this is clearly what the appellant is seeking determination of, I have used this in the banner heading above.
8. With respect to Appeals B and E, the appellant has identified the proposed use as 'C3' and states that historically, the land edged red on the site plan accompanying the application has been in residential use. The appellant states that the siting of a shipping container shown in plans accompanying this application within the land edged red and hatched red on the site plan accompanying this application for use ancillary/incidental to lawful residential use does not constitute development for which planning permission is required and therefore a certificate should be issued. Also, the container proposed is caravan compliant in that it meets the definition of a caravan set out in the Planning Act [sic]. Since the appellant is clearly seeking determination that the siting of the proposed shipping containers would be lawful, I have used this in the banner headings above.
9. With respect to Appeals C and D, the appellant has identified the proposed use as 'C3' and states that historically, the land edged red on the site plan accompanying the application has been in residential use. The appellant states that the siting of a shipping container shown in plans accompanying this application within the land edged red and hatched red on the site plan accompanying this application for use ancillary/incidental to lawful residential use does not constitute development for which planning permission is required and therefore a certificate should be issued.

With respect to Appeal D, the appellant goes on to explain that the container proposed is caravan complaint in that it meets the definition of a caravan set out in the Planning Act. It explains that it shows internal facilities that could be put in place within the container which would not require the need for planning permission. Since the appellant is clearly seeking determination that the siting of the proposed shipping containers would be lawful, I have used this in the banner headings above.

10. Appeals A and B are both made against the Council's failure to give notice of their decision within the appropriate period on an application for a certificate of lawful use or development. The Council advise that it determined these two applications were invalid as the required application fee had not been paid to the Council.
11. Planning fees in England are set nationally by the government, as detailed in the Town and Country Planning (Fees for Applications, Deemed Applications, Requests and Site Visits)(England) Regulations 2012, as amended (the Fees Regulations). For a certificate to state that some future development would be lawful under section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the fee would be half the application fee for applying for planning permission to carry out whatever form of development is the subject of the certificate, in accordance with regulation 11(3)(c) of the 2012 Fees Regulations, as amended.
12. The carrying out of operations (including the erection of a building) within the curtilage of an existing dwellinghouse, for purposes ancillary to the enjoyment of the dwellinghouse as such, or the erection or construction of gates, fences, walls or other means of enclosure along a boundary of the curtilage of an existing dwellinghouse, the fee for a planning application would be £258, half of which would be £129.
13. The Council also imposes an administration fee of £41.50. However, the basis for this fee is not clear and the Council has not expanded upon this either through its evidence or in response to the costs applications. Local planning authorities can charge an additional fee for paying by credit card¹, however, the appellant did not pay by credit card. The evidence shows that the appellant paid £168 for each application by bank transfer on 5 July 2024.
14. The underpayment appears to relate to an increase in the administration fee that the Council charges. The Council officer advised in an email that the appellant has until Friday, which would have been 12 July 2024, to pay the outstanding balance. The Council advise the applications were withdrawn by it on 11 July 2024, as the required application fee had not been paid to the Council.
15. The Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2015 (as amended)(the DMP) sets out, at Article 39, paragraph (1) that an application for a certificate under section 191(1) or 192(1) of the 1990 Act must be made on a form published by the Secretary of State (or on a form substantially to the same effect) and must, in addition to specifying the land and describing the use, operations or other matter in question in accordance with those sections, include the particulars specified or referred to in the form.

¹ Charges are set locally by the local planning authority but should not be more than the cost of handling the credit card payment.

16. Article 39 paragraph (2) states that an application to which paragraph (1) applies must be accompanied by (a) a plan identifying the land to which the application relates drawn to an identified scale and showing the direction of North; (b) such evidence verifying the information included in the application as the applicant can provide; and (c) a statement setting out the applicant's interest in the land, the name and address of any other person known to the applicant to have an interest in the land and whether any such other person has been notified of the application.
17. Article 39, paragraph (12) states that in this article, "valid application" means an application which (a) complies with the requirements of paragraphs (1) to (4); and (b) is accompanied by the appropriate fee. The Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) advises that the correct fee must be paid when the application is submitted in order for i. the local planning authority to begin to process the application; and ii. The application to be valid. Until the local planning authority accepts the application as valid, it cannot be registered or decided. If the application cannot be validated, the local planning authority must notify and return the fee to the applicant, as required by regulation 3(5) of the 2012 Fees Regulations, as amended.
18. In my view, 'the appropriate fee' means the fee set out in the Fees Regulations, not some other fee that a local planning authority may decide to charge under different legislation. From the evidence, it appears that the appellant paid the fee required by the Fees Regulations and provided the necessary information required by paragraphs (1) to (4) of the DMP. The applications were therefore valid for the purposes of Article 39(12) of the DMP.
19. The appellant has submitted Appeals A and B on the basis that the local planning authority failed to give notice of their decision within the appropriate period on an application for a certificate of lawful use or development. I shall therefore deal with those appeals on this basis.

Main Issue

20. The main issue in these appeals is whether the Council's decision to refuse, or in respect of Appeals A and B its deemed refusal of, the certificate of lawfulness is well-founded.

Reasons

21. An application under section 192(1)(a) of the Act seeks to establish whether any proposed use of buildings or other land would have been lawful at the time of the application. Section 191(2)(a) and (b) sets out that uses and operations are lawful at any time if: i) No enforcement action may be taken in respect of them (whether because they did not involve development or require planning permission or because the time for enforcement action has expired or for any other reason); and ii) They do not constitute a contravention of any enforcement notice then in force.
22. Planning merits form no part of the assessment of an application for a lawful development certificate (LDC) which must be considered in the light of the facts and the law. In an application for a LDC, the onus is firmly on the applicant to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the development would be lawful.

23. Section 55(1) of the Act sets out the meaning of development. Development comprises two limbs: (1) The carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land; and (2) The making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land. The appellant's cases are put forward on the basis that the siting of the proposed containers would not be development for which planning permission is required.
24. The appeal site is located along Windmill Street, a predominantly one-way street, which is generally characterised by four or five storey buildings, with commercial uses on the ground floor and office and residential uses above. The appeal site comprises a six-storey building, with a basement, with retail space at ground floor level, storage and distribution space on the first and second floors, office space at the third floor and residential accommodation on the fourth and fifth floors. The fourth floor comprises a roof terrace, which overlooks Windmill Street.
25. The Council issued a Certificate of Lawfulness (Proposed) on 12 January 2024, reference 2023/4907/P certifying that the siting of a caravan for use, incidental to the lawful residential use of the land, at the fourth floor would be lawful within the meaning of section 192 of the Act. The reason given is that 'The use of the terrace for purposes incidental to the dwelling is lawful. However, this includes no determination of lawfulness as to any future physical structure that may accommodate that use.'
26. The application form for Appeal A states 'A certificate was granted Ref 2023/4907/P for the siting of a caravan on this site for use incidental to the residential use on the fourth floor. Confirmation is sought that the caravan compliant container shown in the plans accompanying this application meets the approval granted in application 2023/4007/P.' The grounds for application provided for Appeal D also makes reference to the above approval and cites this as a reason the proposal would not require planning permission.
27. A plan, entitled 'Caravan Compliant Container', drawing number 24/3821, has been submitted in support of appeals A and D², and shows a structure which would measure approximately 9.12m in length, 2.44m in width and 2.591m in height. The container would have windows and a door in the side elevations and would be laid out with what appear to be a bathroom, kitchen area, sleeping and living area. The plan is not annotated.
28. The application forms for Appeals B, C and E state 'The siting of a shipping container shown in plans accompanying this application within the land edged red and hatched red on the site plan accompanying this application for use ancillary/incidental to the lawful residential use does not constitute development for which planning permission is required and therefore a certificate should be issued.' With respect to appeals B and E, the application forms also state 'The container proposed is caravan compliant in that it meets the definition of a caravan set out in the Planning Act'.
29. The plans accompanying appeals B, C and E show a container which measures over 12m in length, just over 3m in height, and around 3m in width. The plans are not annotated and the container/s is/are not laid out with any obvious facilities for human habitation, such as a bathroom or kitchen.

² The plan has also been submitted in support of Appeal C for illustrative purposes only.

30. From the application forms and the appellant's appeal forms, it is clear that the appellant is seeking determinations that the container/s shown in the drawings can be lawfully sited at the appeal site. This is not a general query as to whether a caravan can be sited.

Whether the proposed containers would be a caravan

31. In law, a caravan is only a caravan if it meets the description laid down in section 29 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (the 1960 Act) and Caravan Sites Act 1968 (as amended)(the CSA68). Either the proposed containers would be a caravan, or they would not. The appellant uses the term 'caravan compliant' throughout their submissions, seemingly in an attempt to suggest that the structures proposed would meet the definition of a caravan. The term 'caravan compliant' is not used in the legislation and, whilst 'compliant' is generally held to mean someone or something that obeys particular rules or laws, it cannot (in my view) be taken to mean that the containers proposed would be a caravan for the purposes of the Acts.
32. The Council suggests that a structure that may, on the face of it, comply with the definition of a caravan, still be capable of constituting operational development under the Planning Act. The Council has drawn my attention to *Measor v SSETR & Tunbridge Wells DC* [1999] JPL 182, where the Deputy Judge said that he would be wary of holding, as a matter of law, that a structure which satisfies the definition of, for example, a mobile home under section 13(1) of the CSA68 could never be a building for the purpose of the Act, but it would not generally satisfy the well-established definition of a building, having regard to factors of permanence and attachment.
33. The Council submits that the context, which is a roof in central London, is not consistent with the intended legal or normal everyday definition of a caravan and that the legal definitions should be considered in that context. However, the approach established in *Wyre Forest BC v Allen's Caravans* [1990] 2 WLR 517 is that where a planning permission or lawful development certificate relates to a caravan, the word should be construed in accordance with the statutory definition³. The rooftop nature of the location proposed for the siting of the caravan/structure is not reason, in my view, to justify a departure from it in this case.
34. Significantly, the Council has already certified that it would have been lawful to site a caravan within the site for use incidental to the lawful residential use of the land. Section 192(4) provides that the lawfulness of any use or operation for which a lawful development certificate is in force under section 192 shall be conclusively presumed unless there is a material change before the use is instituted or the operations are begun, in any of the matters relevant to determining such lawfulness. Therefore, if I find the proposed container/s would fall within the definition of a caravan, then it follows that it would be lawful to site them within the appeal site, so long as there would be no material change of use of the land.
35. Section 29 of the 1960 Act sets out that, in this Part of Act, unless the context otherwise requires, "caravan" means any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor

³ And referred to in *Breckland DC v SSHCLG* [2020] EWHC 292 (Admin)

vehicle so designed or adapted, but does not include (a) any railway rolling stock which is for the time being on rails forming part of a railway system, or (b) any tent.

36. However, there is limited evidence to show why the appellant considers the proposed containers would meet the definition of a caravan. It has not been explained how the containers would be brought to site, whether they would be constructed on site or delivered ready assembled. Were the containers to be constructed on site, they would likely be comprised of multiple pieces. The act of constructing the containers would likely be a building operation.
37. Furthermore, it has not been explained how the containers would be fixed to the ground or whether foundations would be required. While shipping containers are not always anchored in place, the appeal site comprises a fourth storey balcony which is unlikely to have been designed to accommodate such a heavy structure. As a consequence, I consider it likely that it would be necessary to carry out works to support such a structure and to fix the structure in place. Given the limited size of the balcony, once it has been placed upon it, it is unlikely to be moved.
38. Moreover, it has not been explained what the shipping containers would contain when they are brought to site. The containers proposed in appeals B, C⁴ and E are not shown as being designed or adapted (notwithstanding the submission of a document showing a 'caravan compliant container' which is stated to be illustrative and not part of the application) for human habitation and so would not meet the definition of a caravan in law, even if a table and chairs, or a bed were placed within them.
39. With respect to appeals A and D, although the plans show that the containers would be laid out with what appear to be bathroom and kitchen facilities, shipping containers are not, ordinarily, fitted with a bathroom, kitchen, living area and windows. While it may be possible to modify such a container prior to being brought to site, it is not clear whether such modification would be carried out before or after the containers are brought to site. This matters, because a container which has not been modified would not meet the definition of a caravan.
40. Furthermore, it is not clear whether, once modified, the containers would be capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer). While shipping containers are generally designed to be moved, it cannot be assumed that such ability would remain once the structure has been modified.
41. Thus, it has not been demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the proposed containers would meet the definition of a caravan in law.

Whether the proposed containers would be a building

42. Even if the proposed containers would not be a caravan in law, that does not mean that they would automatically be a building for the purposes of the Act. Section 336 of the Act states a "building" 'includes any structure or erection, and any part of a building, as so defined, but does not include plant or machinery comprised in a building.'

⁴ Notwithstanding the appellant has provided a plan of a 'Caravan Compliant Container' situated on the site for illustrative purposes only in support of Appeal C.

43. The appellant has provided me with 'Opinion of Counsel' ('the Opinion'), which was given in respect of appeal reference APP/R3650/X/23/3333287. This case concerned the proposed siting of a shipping container for use ancillary to a residential property. The advice given considered various legal judgements and their application to the proposal at hand. The Opinion is just that, an opinion, given in respect of a different site, with different facts at play. I am not bound by it. Significantly, the author of the Opinion recognises that whether something is a building is a matter of judgement⁵.
44. The main characteristics of a building, as found in *Cardiff Rating Authority v Guest Keen Baldwin's Iron & Steel Co Ltd* [1949] 1 KB 385 and *R (oao Save Woolley Valley Action Group Ltd) v Bath and North East Somerset Council* [2012] EWHC 2161 (admin), and *Barvis v SSE* [1971] 22 P&CR 710, as a matter of fact and degree, are (a) physical attachment, (b) permanence and (c) of a size to be constructed on site, as opposed to being brought onto the site. No one test is conclusive⁶.
45. The shipping containers proposed would be substantial in size. While they may be similar in size to, or smaller than a caravan, as set out above, it has not been demonstrated that the structures proposed would meet the definition of a caravan. The size of the containers would be, in my view, significant and they would appear a dominant feature on the roof terrace which would be visible from both within and outside of the site.
46. As set out above, the appellant has not explained how the proposed shipping containers would be brought to the site or whether they would be fixed into place and if so, how. The Opinion⁷ suggests that the shipping container is 'by definition not constructed on the hereditament, but is brought on to it ready made.' However, while some containers are delivered in one piece, in my experience, containers can also come in 'flat pack' form, for construction on site.
47. If not constructed on site, given its proposed location on the 4th floor of the building, it seems likely that the container/s would have to be craned into position. Even if the containers are to be delivered in one piece, this would likely take some planning, given the urban context within which the site is located and its location along a one-way section of road and be carried out by suitably qualified individuals.
48. Although a shipping container will often rest under its own weight when placed on the land, given its position on the 4th floor, I consider it likely it would be necessary to fix it into place, in the interests of health and safety. Even if the shipping container/s would not be fixed into place, once it has been placed upon the terrace, given its substantial size and the limited size of the terrace, I consider it unlikely it would be moved to any significant degree within the site.
49. The shipping containers would be of sufficient size to be of significance in terms of its visual impact and is likely to remain in place for sufficient time to have the quality of permanence. As a matter of fact and degree, I consider the shipping containers would be a building for the purposes of the Act.

⁵ As held in *Save Woolley Valley Action Group v BANES* [2012] EWHC 2161 (Admin)

⁶ As held in *Chester CC v Woodward* [1962] 2 WLR 636, 2 QB 126

⁷ In respect of APP/R3650/X/23/3333287

50. While I note the importance of the method of erection was mentioned in the Supreme Court judgement of *Dill v SSCLG & Stratford-on-Avon DC* [2017] EWHC 2378 (Admin), [2018] EWCA Civ 2619, [2020] UKSC 20; [2020] JPL 1421, this case concerned the application of the *Skerritts* criteria to listed buildings. The findings in *Hall Hunter v First Secretary of State* [2007] 2 P.& C.R.5, which concerned polytunnels erected over the course of a week, or indeed *Skerritts*, which concerned a marquee erected over a period of around 14 days, do not lead me to a different conclusion in this regard: as set out above, no one test is conclusive.
51. The appellant has referred me to appeal reference APP/V0728/W/23/3314720, which concerned a change of use from a building supplies depot to a self-storage facility. Although its relevance is not articulated by the appellant, one of the matters the Inspector had to grapple with in that decision was whether the correct fee was paid. This turned on whether the containers would be buildings or a use of the land. The containers in that case would be brought to site and placed on the land, without affixation and could be removed quickly and easily using a crane and a lorry. This is not, therefore, comparable to the appeal schemes before me.
52. The appellant has drawn my attention to an application, reference WA/2024/00634, which considered the stationing of a shipping container for use ancillary to the lawful agricultural use of the land. While I do not have full details of that case, it does not appear to be comparable to the appeal scheme before me. For example, I note that the Council considered, on the balance of probabilities, that the container would be moved around the site to facilitate haymaking or other agricultural activities. The appeal shipping containers, by contrast, are unlikely to be moved given the limited size of the terrace and the likely need to employ a crane to move it once it has been constructed or located at the site. Moreover, this is a judgement made by a local planning authority and so I am not bound by the Council's decision.
53. Other decisions which have been brought to my attention include: application reference PAP/2024/0107, which was an LDC for the proposed siting of a shipping container related to agricultural use of field [sic]; Appeal reference APP/U2370/C/19/3236326, which concerned the siting of a storage container for storage purposes; Appeal reference APP/W1850/X/22/329616, which concerned the siting of a caravan for use ancillary to the lawful agricultural use of the land; Appeal reference 1814012, which concerned change of use to create commercial storage facility (use class B8 storage) under the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 (as amended) and which considered whether containers were buildings.
54. While both parties have drawn my attention to a range of decisions⁸, each of the decisions cited turned on its own facts. As set out above, it has not been demonstrated on the balance of probabilities, that the proposed containers would be caravans in law, as was proposed in APP/W1850/X/22/329616. The proposed location of the shipping container means that siting it on the 4th floor balcony is likely to require a crane. Given the limited width of Windmill Street, it may be that a road closure is required. Even if it is not, there is likely to be required considerable planning involved to ensure that the container can be safely placed on the balcony.

⁸ The Council has also cited 3314720, 3236326, 2164822, 3247457, 3245635 & 3291112.

This is markedly different to an agricultural site, or a storage site, where moving a container is likely to be more straight forward and, depending upon the circumstances of the case, likely to occur. The examples drawn to my attention by the appellant are therefore not comparable to the appeal scheme before me.

55. The appellant has not demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the proposed containers would be caravans in law, or that their siting would not constitute development for the purposes of the Act. Consequently, the appeals must fail.

Conclusion: Appeal A

56. For the reasons given above I conclude that, had the Council refused to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the caravan compliant container shown in the plans accompanying the application, that refusal would have been well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Conclusion: Appeal B

57. For the reasons given above I conclude that, had the Council refused to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental, that refusal would have been well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended."

Conclusion: Appeal C

58. For the reasons given above I conclude that the Council's refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the siting of a shipping container for use incidental to the lawful residential use, is well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Conclusion: Appeal D

59. For the reasons given above I conclude that the Council's refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental to the lawful residential use, is well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.

Conclusion: Appeal E

60. For the reasons given above I conclude that the Council's refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the siting of a shipping container for use ancillary/incidental to the lawful residential use, is well-founded and that the appeal should fail. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(3) of the 1990 Act as amended.

M Savage

INSPECTOR