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## Appeal Decisions

Inquiry held on 21 to 24 October 2025

Site visit made on 23 October 2025

by **J Moss BSc (Hons) DipTP MRTPI**

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 28 January 2026

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**Appeal A Ref: APP/U1105/C/25/3365463**

**Appeal B Ref: APP/U1105/C/25/3365464**

**Appeal C Ref: APP/U1105/C/25/3365465**

**Land at Greendale Farm Shop, NHS Drive Through Vaccination Centre, Sidmouth Road, Farringdon, Devon EX5 2JU**

- The appeals are made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended).
- The appeals are made by FWS Carter & Sons Ltd (Appeal A), Mr Robin Carter (Appeal B) and Mr Rowan Carter (Appeal C) against an enforcement notice issued by East Devon District Council.
- The notice was issued on 11 April 2025.
- The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is unauthorised operational development consisting of the erection of a building (shown edged in blue on the attached location plan<sup>1</sup>) for use as an NHS vaccination centre and an associated car parking area (shown edged in red on the attached location plan).
- The requirements of the notice are to:
  - I. Permanently cease the use of the Building (whose position is shown edged in blue on the attached Location Plan) as an NHS Vaccination Centre.
  - II. Permanently cease the use of the associated car parking area (shown edged in red on the attached Location Plan).
  - III. Permanently dismantle and remove the Building and the associated car parking area from the Land.
  - IV. Permanently remove all hardcore, materials and debris resulting from the compliance with step III above from the Land.
  - V. Permanently remove all non-agricultural items from the Land and return the land to agricultural use only.
- The period for compliance with the requirements is 6 months from the date the notice takes effect.
- The appeals are proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(c), (f) and (g) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended).

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**Summary Decisions: the appeals are dismissed and the enforcement notice is upheld with variations.**

### Preliminary Matters

1. These appeals were considered at the public inquiry alongside another appeal<sup>2</sup> that relates to land in close proximity to the east of this appeal site. Both appeal sites are located within a wider site which I will refer to in this decision as the wider Greendale farm shop site. My decision on that other appeal is the subject of a separate decision.

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<sup>1</sup> Reference to a location plan here and elsewhere in the header is to a plan attached the enforcement notices to which these appeals relate.

<sup>2</sup> Appeal reference APP/U1105/C/25/3365468.

## **The Appeal Site and Surrounding Area**

2. At the inquiry and in evidence there was particular reference to the wider area surrounding the appeal site, which is part of the appellants' interests. The wider Greendale farm shop site comprises a distinct complex of buildings, structures and extensive hard surfacing, spread across the appeal site and surrounding land. It includes the main farm shop building and associated, fairly extensive, hard surfaced yards that are occupied by a series of storage containers, refrigeration units and other storage structures. It also includes a separate retail building, close to the site entrance, and other smaller retail structures adjacent to the extensive car parking areas.
3. When referring to the Greendale farm shop site in evidence at the inquiry, in addition to the above-mentioned buildings, the parties included buildings, hard surfacing and the access road to the south of the farm shop. This includes the recently permitted Mud Ventures building and the Nanny Bears nursery building. This wider site also includes the building referred to above, to the east of the appeal site.

## **The Notice**

4. Before considering the grounds of appeal, I have a duty to put the notice in order, if necessary. The powers transferred to Inspectors under section 176(1)(a) of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended (the 1990 Act) include to correct any defect, error or misdescription in the enforcement notice or, under section 176(1)(b), to vary the terms of the enforcement notice. In each case, the only test is whether the correction or variation would not cause injustice to any party.
5. Caselaw referred to by the parties (*Oates v SSCLG v Canterbury CC* [2018] EWCA Civ 2229) sets out that an enforcement notice must inform the recipient with reasonable certainty what the breach of planning control is and what must be done to remedy it. This approach was discussed at length at the inquiry.
6. At both the case management conference (CMC) held before the inquiry and at the inquiry itself I advised the parties of my concerns regarding the notice subject of these appeals. In short, these relate to:
  - i. The consistency of the allegation with the requirements of the notice, in that the first two requirements of the notice appear to achieve more than a remedy to the breach of planning control alleged, which is the purpose of the notice; and
  - ii. That the second part of requirement V. of the notice also seeks to achieve more than a remedy to the breach of planning control alleged.
7. The appellants suggest that the requirements of section 173(1) of the 1990 Act have not been met and that, for this reason, the notice is invalid.
8. Section 173 of the 1990 Act sets out the necessary contents and the effect of an enforcement notice. The relevant subsections of section 173 are as follows:
  - (1) An enforcement notice shall state:
    - (a) the matters which appear to the local planning authority to constitute the breach of planning control; and

- (b) the paragraph of section 171A(1) within which, in the opinion of the authority, the breach falls.
- (2) A notice complies with subsection (1)(a) if it enables any person on whom a copy of it is served to know what those matters are.
- (3) An enforcement notice shall specify the steps which the authority require to be taken, or the activities which the authority require to cease, in order to achieve, wholly or partly, any of the following purposes.
- (4) Those purposes are:
  - (a) remedying the breach by making any development comply with the terms (including conditions and limitations) of any planning permission which has been granted in respect of the land, by discontinuing any use of the land or by restoring the land to its condition before the breach took place; or
  - (b) remedying any injury to amenity which has been caused by the breach.
- 9. The notice states the relevant sub section of paragraph 171A of the 1990 Act and so complies with section 173(1)(b). As for compliance with section 173(1)(a), part 3 of the notice states that the matters which appear to constitute the breach of planning control comprise unauthorised operational development consisting of the erection of a building for use as an NHS vaccination centre and an associated car parking area. The location of these operations is also specified in part 3.
- 10. What is stated in part 3 of the notice is clear with regard to the matters that appeared to the Council to constitute the breach of planning control. The description as put in part 3 can only, in my judgement, be regarded as an allegation of the carrying out of operations, as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act.
- 11. Whilst I acknowledge that the description refers to the use of the building, this only serves to provide a more detailed description of the operational development that has been carried out. This adds clarity with regard to what is alleged. I note the appellants' objection to the description used and the suggestion that this causes prejudice to them. However, there is no dispute that the activity that takes place within the building is to administer vaccines. Accordingly, I find the description to be accurate. Having regard to part 3 of the notice alone, the recipient would be reasonably certain that the breach of planning control alleged is the erection of an NHS vaccination centre building.
- 12. Similarly, the operation comprising the laying of a hard surfaced area, which the parties agree is also the target of the notice, is described in more detail by reference to how it is used; it is referred to in part 3 of the notice as a car parking area. The link between this operation and that comprising the erection of the building is made clear by reference to it as an **associated** car parking area.
- 13. Having regard to the above, I find there to be little ambiguity in part 3 of the notice, which is, after all, the part of the notice that sets out the matters which appear to the Council to constitute the breach of planning control. I must, however, consider the notice as a whole. In doing so, and having particular regard to the requirements of the notice, I have sympathy with the appellants' suggestion that the notice is defective. This is because, despite what is quite clearly alleged in part 3

of the notice (i.e. a breach of planning control comprising operational development), requirements I. and II. in part 5 both require a use to cease.

14. The first requires the use of the building as an NHS vaccination centre to cease. This is a requirement that only targets the use of the building, rather than the use of the appeal site as a whole. I understand why the Council may have phrased the requirement in this way. At the inquiry, the appellants confirmed that, since the erection of the building, it has only ever been used to administer vaccinations and that vaccinations take place only within the building. Whilst there is a 'drive through' vaccination service at the site, I was told that these vaccinations are administered under the cover of the building. The roof of the building extends to an open sided section to the rear where vehicles can pull in and their drivers can receive a vaccination without leaving their vehicle. Nevertheless, 5 I. is a requirement that is consistent with an allegation of a breach of planning control comprising a material change of use, whereas such a breach of planning control is not alleged.
15. As for the 5 II. requirement, it does not specify what use must cease. I assume that the use that must cease is a use for parking associated with the vaccination building. That being the case, the requirement would be consistent with an allegation of the material change of use of this part of the appeal site for parking incidental to a vaccination centre use. Again, such a breach of planning control is not alleged at part 3.
16. The Council has confirmed that the purpose of the notice is to remedy the breach. My concerns (as set out in the CMC) are that requirements I. and II. exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control that is alleged in part 3. They require steps to be taken to remedy a breach of planning control that is not alleged in the notice. It is for this reason that I find the notice to be defective.
17. The appellants take a different view. Whilst they refer to requirements I. and II. in making the case that the notice is defective, they suggest that there has been a material change of use of the land which they say that the Council were aware of. They say that because the notice does not identify a material change of use within the allegation, yet requires uses to cease, the notice fails to comply with section 173(1) of the 1990 Act.
18. I note the Council's suggested correction to part 3 of the notice, to include an allegation of a material change of use. It says that this is suggested as a means of 'aligning the allegation with the requirements'. If I were to agree with the appellants' reasons for suggesting the notice is defective, I would agree that such a correction might well resolve this defect, although whether or not injustice would be caused would be another matter. However, the absence of a reference to a material change of use in the allegation, whether or not such a breach has occurred does not make the notice defective.
19. I have already noted above my duty to put the notice in order, if necessary. This includes to ensure that the matters constituting the breach of planning control alleged are clearly and accurately described. The notice alleges a breach of planning control comprising operational development. I have found no fault in how that operational development is described in the notice. Neither have the appellants. I say this because they do not dispute that the operational development described in the notice has occurred. Neither do they suggest that what has

occurred is a material change of use, and not operational development. There is no ground (b) appeal. Accordingly, there is no suggestion that the allegation of a breach of planning control comprising operational development is wrong.

20. I acknowledge that there may have also been an identifiable material change of use of the appeal site, in addition to the operational development that is the subject of the notice, but these are different types of development and would, therefore, be different breaches of planning control. Although an enforcement notice can allege both operational development and a material change of use, if it does, it should distinguish between the two. However, an enforcement notice does not have to include both. These matters can be the subject of separate enforcement notices, even where there is a connection between the two types of development.
21. Section 172 of the 1990 Act informs that a 'local planning authority **may** issue a notice [ ] where it appears to them (a) that there has been a breach of planning control' (my emphasis). In cases where there are multiple breaches of planning control on a site, a local planning authority can issue an enforcement notice that targets only some of the unauthorised development, whilst leaving the remaining breaches of planning control unenforced.
22. I acknowledge that, had the notice alleged a breach of planning control comprising a material change of use, I would have had a duty to ensure that the notice clearly and accurately states the matters constituting that breach, so as to comply with section 173 (1) and (2) of the 1990 Act. However, there is no need for me to do that in this case as the enforcement notice before me does not allege a breach of planning control comprising a material change of use. Furthermore, even if there has been a breach of planning control on the site comprising a material change of use, the notice need not include this as an allegation for it to be valid, for the reasons given above.
23. It is for this reason that I am not with the appellants in their view that the Council is not concerned with any current use of the land and regard it as inexpedient to take enforcement action in respect of any current use. Having regard to the breach of planning control that is the target of the enforcement notice, whether or not there has been a breach of planning control comprising a material change of use of the appeal site is not for me to determine in this case. For the reasons I give above, this is a matter that is entirely outside of the remit of this appeal. Whether or not the Council enforce against any material change of use of the land is for the Council to decide.
24. Notwithstanding the above, I have found the notice to be defective for other reasons. Those reasons relate to some, but not all of the requirements of the notice. Requirements 5 III. and IV. are entirely consistent with the allegation of a breach of planning control comprising operational development. These specify the steps required to be taken in order to remedy the breach. Furthermore, read together with requirements III. and IV., I am satisfied that the first part of requirement V. is reasonable to achieve the removal from the land of any other items that are part of the operational development, following compliance with requirements III. and IV. These requirements comply with sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 173 of the 1990 Act. Furthermore, they are steps that are independent of the remaining requirements of the notice. By this I mean that the steps they specify can be taken independently of requirements I., II. and the remaining part of V. For this reason, I cannot regard the notice to be a nullity.



25. This does not change that the notice is defective. It is defective because requirements I. and II. would achieve more than is required in the statutory provisions. This is a concern because, although I make no determination as to the lawful use of the appeal site and whether or not there has been a material change of use of it, these requirements might interfere with the operation of section 57(4) of the 1990 Act. Furthermore, as the second part of 5 V. requires the land to be used for a specified purpose, I consider this to be unreasonable and may also interfere with the operation of section 57(4). The requirements of a notice should do nothing more than remedy the breach of planning control that has occurred.
26. One way to remedy the defect in the notice might be to change the allegation in the manner suggested by the Council. However, if the notice was amended to include an allegation of a breach of planning control comprising a material change of use of the appeal site, I am not satisfied that the matters that would constitute such a breach would be accurately described as a use as a NHS vaccination centre. I say this, not least because of the evidence I heard at the inquiry regarding the other purposes to which the land that is the subject of the enforcement notice has been put. In particular, I heard reference to the use of the appeal site for the holding of car shows and to the parking of delivery and customer vehicles relating to the farm shop on the wider Greendale farm shop site.
27. Notwithstanding this, the suggested amendment to the notice would introduce a new alleged breach of planning control, widening the notice's scope and effect. I can only agree with the appellants, that this would cause injustice to them. Whilst I acknowledge that much of the appellants' ground (c) appeal concentrates on the use of the land, I cannot be satisfied that other grounds of appeal would not have been made or that the appellants' approach to their appeal would not have been different.
28. The alternative option would be to vary the notice to remove the requirements that render it defective. I conclude above that requirements I., II. and the second part of V. are severable from the remaining requirements. Their removal from the notice would not alter the remaining steps or interfere with the appellants' ability to carry out the works necessary to comply with them.
29. Notwithstanding this, the appellants refer to the removal of requirements I. and II., but suggest that V. is amended to 'reflect lawful uses'. They say, however, that 'questions would emerge about whether the Council could properly (without challenge) have decided, or would have decided, to take enforcement proceedings in the first place, bearing in mind the ability of the Appellant to erect a building of the size subject to enforcement'.
30. Firstly, as I note above, I am not persuaded that any steps in the notice that would require a use to be carried out would achieve the purposes of remedying the breach of planning control comprising operational development. Whilst I am mindful of the provisions of section 57(4) of the 1990 Act, neither section 173 nor any other provisions within the 1990 Act require that a notice specify the use for which the land could lawfully have been used if the development resulting in the breach of planning control had not been carried out.
31. Secondly, when considering the expediency of issuing an enforcement notice, the Council might have regard to whether or not development of the same type and

dimensions could otherwise be carried out on a site. However, this is not relevant to whether or not an enforcement notice is valid.

32. On a final point, and to make clear, the removal of the offending requirements would not result in the provisions of section 173 (11) being engaged with regard to the use of the appeal site, causing injustice to the Council. As the notice alleges a breach of planning control comprising operational development, it could not have required the activities (uses in this case) specified in requirements I. and II. to cease, for the reasons I have given.
33. There is no suggestion that any other prejudice might arise, were I to remove the requirements that render the notice defective, and none are obvious to me. As varying the notice in this way would make it less onerous, I am satisfied that I am able to correct the defects by removing the offending requirements without causing injustice to any party.

### **Ground (c)**

34. To succeed on ground (c), the appellants must demonstrate that, on the balance of probability, the matters alleged in the notice do not constitute a breach of planning control. The burden of proof is on the appellants.
35. As I have made clear above, the breach of planning control alleged in the notice is operational development comprising the erection of a building and a car parking area.
36. The appellants' case focuses on the use of the site. They say that the lawful use of the site is for a purpose falling within Class E (commercial business and service) of Part A, Schedule 2 of The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 as amended. Notwithstanding this, in making their ground (c) appeal, the appellants do not dispute that the building and the car parking area require the benefit of express planning permission or that the necessary permission has not been granted. Accordingly, there is no dispute that the development that is the subject of the notice constitutes a breach of planning control.
37. The subject of the enforcement notice is operational development and I have been careful to correct the defects in the notice to ensure that its requirements do not interfere with the operation of section 57(4) of the 1990 Act. To be clear, this does not mean that I conclude that the lawful use of the appeal site is for the uses referred to in 5 I., II. and V. of the notice. Indeed, in setting out my reasons above for correcting the notice as I intend, I reach no conclusion on what might comprise the lawful use of the site and I do not conclude on how the site is currently used. Despite the time spent at the inquiry on this, it is not a matter for me to consider within the remit of this appeal, for the reasons I have given.
38. Accordingly, I conclude that the matters alleged in the notice constitute a breach of planning control, on the balance of probability. For this reason, the ground (c) appeals must fail.

### **Ground (f)**

39. As I have already noted, the purpose of the notice is to remedy the breach of planning control. Accordingly, the main issue in these ground (f) appeals is whether or not the steps required by the notice to be taken, varied as I intend, exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach.

40. In determining the ground (f) appeals, the appellants ask that I consider the prospect that, following compliance with the notice, an identical building could be erected with the benefit of planning permission granted by reason of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 as amended (the 2015 Order). Accordingly, the suggestion is that, having regard to what the appellants say they could build in the place of the building, as permitted by the 2015 Order, the requirement to remove the building is excessive.
41. Class A of Part 6, Article 3, Schedule 2 of the 2015 Order permits, amongst other matters, the erection of a building on agricultural land that is reasonably necessary for the purposes of agriculture within that agricultural unit. The appellants suggest that there is a real prospect that an agricultural building will be erected in the place of the vaccination centre building. There are, however, certain limitations to the purpose to which a building permitted by Class A might be put. These include that the development would not be permitted if it would consist of a building used for the accommodation of livestock or for the storage of slurry or sewage sludge where the building would be within 400 metres of the curtilage of a protected building. The dwellinghouses close to the entrance of the wider Greendale farm shop site were drawn to my attention. These are within 400 metres of the building subject of this appeal.
42. Furthermore, planning permission granted for the erection of a building by Class A is on condition that an application is made for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the local planning authority will be required as to the siting, design and external appearance of the building. The planning permission granted by Class A is only crystallised on the positive determination of a prior approval application or in circumstances where no decision is made within the prescribed period.
43. I have had regard to the appellants' farming interests in the vicinity of the appeal site and elsewhere and do not doubt that there would be a real prospect of further agricultural development in the future somewhere within the appellants' agricultural unit. However, there is no guarantee that if an application were made, prior approval would be granted for a building of a similar size, design and location as that subject of this appeal. I say this mindful of the findings of the conclusions of the previous Inspector<sup>3</sup> on the effect of the existing building on the character and appearance of the area. I have no doubt that the Council would have regard to these conclusions if it were to receive a prior approval application for a building of a similar size, design and location as the building subject of this appeal. As such, I cannot find it likely that such a prior approval application would receive a favourable recommendation. This element of the appellants' case on ground (f) does not, therefore, lead to a conclusion that the requirement to remove the existing building is excessive.
44. On a separate matter, the appeal building is a building used as an NHS vaccination centre. If the appellant were to succeed on ground (f) in so far as it relates to requirement 5. III, this would allow a building for use as an NHS vaccination centre, as alleged in the notice, to remain. There would be no requirement to use the building for the purposes of agriculture. And I cannot impose such a requirement, as to do so would make the notice more onerous. Accordingly, even if I were to agree with the appellants and find there to be a real prospect of a building used for

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<sup>3</sup> Appeal reference Appeal Decision APP/U1105/W/23/3330631.



agriculture being erected in the place of the appeal building, it would not lead me to conclude a requirement to remove a building for use as an NHS vaccination centre is excessive.

45. I would also add to the above that a ground (f) appeal cannot be a means of obtaining a planning permission by reason of section 172(11) of the 1990 Act, where permission is otherwise unobtainable under section 177(1). Furthermore, I am unable to consider within the remit of this appeal whether or not the building would be acceptable, if put to some other use that has not already been considered. The mechanism for this to be considered would be via a separate application for planning permission to the Council.
46. On a final point, the appellants suggest that harm would be caused by the demolition of the building, by reason of the embodied carbon within it. Whilst such a consideration may weigh in the favour of the grant of planning permission, the ground (a) appeal has been barred in this case. Nevertheless, the harm arising from the loss of embodied carbon does not justify the retention of the building, nor does it provide sufficient reason to conclude that its removal is unnecessary to remedy the breach in this case.
47. In reaching my conclusions on these ground (f) appeals, I have had regard to the case law brought to my attention, including *Tapecrow Ltd v FSS & Vale of White Horse DC* [2006] EWCA Civ 1744. The purpose of the notice is to remedy the breach, the retention of the building would not achieve this purpose. No other alternative or lesser steps have been suggested to achieve the purpose of the notice and, having regard to both the nature of the breach and requirements of the notice, no other steps that would achieve this purpose are obvious to me. On this basis I can only conclude that the steps required in the notice, once varied as I intend, do not exceed what is necessary. For these reasons, the appeals under ground (f) should fail.

### **Ground (g)**

48. An appeal on ground (g) is that the period specified in the notice falls short of what should reasonably be allowed. The notice specifies a period of 6 months from the date it takes effect.
49. At the inquiry I heard that the building was erected in sections and that to remove it, it would require dismantling, rather than demolition, which is consistent with the requirement. There was no indication that the dismantling of the building would be complicated or that this would take longer than it would to demolish.
50. Similarly, there was no suggestion that additional time would be required to remove the hard surfacing or that this would be a complicated step. The appellants suggested that additional time would be required to bring the land back to a suitable condition for, say, an agricultural use. However, the notice, once varied as I intend, does not require this.
51. The appellants suggest that a significant period would be required for the current occupier to find accommodation elsewhere. They refer to there being a chronic shortage of alternative premises. I note the evidence before me of the lack of business premises in the District. Although not all business premises would be suitable for a medical use, I have no reason to disagree with the evidence. Nevertheless, I note the findings of the previous Inspector in their determination of

the appeal against the refusal of planning permission for the existing building, which I have already referred to above. In particular, they refer to evidence of vaccines being delivered in more central locations, closer to the target population, where a permanent building was not necessary.

52. I am told that, since this recent appeal decision, planning permission has been granted for the use of a large building on the nearby Greendale Business Park as a medical centre. Although previously occupied by the NHS, the appellants indicated that this building now has a different occupier. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the use of part of that building to deliver NHS vaccinations has been adequately explored.
53. Importantly, I was told at the inquiry that the lease for the building ends in March 2026, after which time the appellants would no longer have a legal obligation to the occupiers. Furthermore, after this time the occupiers would also have no certainty that their occupation of the building would continue. As responsible landlords, I would have expected the appellants to inform the occupiers of the building of the recent appeal decision and the current enforcement notice. The occupiers of the building should not, therefore, have had any certainty about their continued occupation of the site and I would expect them to have begun to make alternative arrangements.
54. The appeal site is a more remote part of the wider Greendale farm shop site, away from the farm shop and its main car park. I am not persuaded that the works necessary to comply with the notice would substantially interfere with the operation of the wider site, or that the site could not be temporarily closed off to avoid any risk to visiting members of the public.
55. The appellants refer to a shortage of available contractors to undertake the work necessary to comply with the notice. It was suggested that this is a national issue, not limited to the surrounding area. There was, however, little evidence to support this claim. For example, the appellants have not provided evidence to show that they have attempted to contact suitable contractors to gauge their availability and the possible wait times for the carrying out of the necessary works. There was also little evidence to demonstrate a need for specialist contractors to undertake the work, such that they would be more difficult to find.
56. Having regard to the nature and extent of the works necessary to comply with the requirements of the notice, once corrected as I intend, I do not consider the 6 month period for compliance to be insubstantial. All things considered, the evidence before me is not sufficient to persuade me that the period specified in the notice falls short of what should reasonably be allowed. For this reason, I conclude that the ground (g) appeals should fail.

## **Conclusions**

57. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the appeals should not succeed. I shall uphold the enforcement notice with variations.

## **Formal Decisions**

58. It is directed that the enforcement notice is varied by:

- the deletion of requirements 5. I. and 5. II. in their entirety; and

- the deletion of the words “and return the land to agricultural use only” from requirement 5. V.

59. Subject to these variations, the appeals are dismissed and the enforcement notice is upheld.

*J Moss*

INSPECTOR

## **APPEARANCES**

### **FOR THE APPELLANT:**

|                                            |                              |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Wayne Beglan                               | Counsel                      |
| Ben Read BSc (Hons) MA MRTPI               | Black Box Planning           |
| Dan Trundle                                | Black Box Planning           |
| Timothy Western BSc (Hons)                 | Catalyst Rear Estate Limited |
| David Williams BA (Hons) Dip (Hons) LA MLI | Landscape Consultancy        |
| Polly Hallchurch BA (Hons) Dip TP CIHT     | Stantec                      |
| Mathew Carter                              | FWS Carter & Sons            |
| Paul Jones                                 | FWS Carter & Sons            |
| Mr Clegg                                   | Black Box Planning           |

### **FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:**

|                               |                             |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Odette Chalaby                | Landmark Chambers           |
| Chris Hariades MA CMLI        | East Devon District Council |
| Claire Rodway MA MRTPI        | East Devon District Council |
| Jamie Quinton BSc (Hons), MSc | East Devon District Council |
| Damian Hunter                 | East Devon District Council |

## **INQUIRY DOCUMENTS**

- ID1 OS plan submitted by the Council showing the distance from the farm shop to the building at unit 4 (subject of appeal reference APP/U1105/C/25/3365468)
- ID2 Series of aerial photographs of the site, provided by the Council.
- ID3 Annotated OS plan of the wider Greendale farm shop site entitled 'Plan B' submitted by the Council.
- ID4 Annotated OS plan of the wider Greendale farm shop site entitled 'Plan C' submitted by the Council.
- ID5 Annotated OS plan of the wider Greendale farm shop site entitled 'Plan D' submitted by the Council.
- ID6 Annotated OS plan numbered 8857-LP2 Revision A showing the wider Greendale farm shop site, submitted by the Appellants.
- ID7 Annotated OS plan numbered 8857-LP2 Revision C showing the wider Greendale farm shop site, submitted by the Appellants.
- ID8 Documents submitted with the prior approval application Council reference 18/2388/PDR.