



Appeal Decisions

Inquiry held on 2 & 3 December 2025

Site visit made on 3 December 2025

by **M Madge Dip TP MA MRTPI**

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 02 February 2026

Appeal A Ref: APP/W0530/C/25/3370686

Appeal B Ref: APP/W0530/C/25/3370687

Appeal C Ref: APP/W0530/C/25/3370688

Appeal D Ref: APP/W0530/C/25/3370689

Appeal E Ref: APP/W0530/C/25/3370690

The Laurels, Fen Road, Cambridgeshire CB4 1TU

- The appeals are made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended).
- Appeal A is made by Mr Ray Bell, Appeal B is made by Ms Olivia Deadman, Appeal C is made by Mr Chris Jenkins, Appeal D is made by Mr Mark Sykes and Appeal E is made by Mr Tony Till against an enforcement notice issued by South Cambridgeshire District Council.
- The notice was issued on 8 July 2025.
- The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is “Without planning permission, the change of use of the land to a residential caravan site and the laying of hardstanding.”
- The requirements of the notice are:
 1. Cease the use of the land as a caravan site.
 2. Permanently remove all caravans and residential paraphernalia from the land.
 3. Permanently remove all hardstanding from the land and lay lawn turf or grass seed, other than the area hatched green on the attached plan.
 4. Permanently remove all materials and waste resulting from steps 1, 2 & 3 from the site.
- The period for compliance with the requirements is six months from when the notice takes effect.
- The appeals are proceeding on the grounds set out in sections 174(2)(d) and (g) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended).

Decisions

1. It is directed that the enforcement notice is corrected and varied by:
 - *the insertion of the word "Chesterton" after "Fen Road," in section 2;*
 - *the insertion of the word "material" after the word "the" and before "change" in section 3;*
 - *the deletion of words "and lay lawn turf or grass seed" and substitute the words "return the land to its condition before the breach occurred" in paragraph 5.3; and*
 - *the deletion of six months and its substitution with nine months as the time for compliance.*
2. Subject to the correction and variations, Appeals A, B, C, D and E are dismissed and the enforcement notice is upheld.

Matters Concerning the Notice

3. It is incumbent upon me to put the notice in order. While the address provided for the land affected by the notice includes the street, county and postcode, it fails to identify a town or village. This omission does not prevent the land being identified, for precision however, it was agreed that “Chesterton” shall be included.
4. For a change of use to be development, section 55 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended states it must be material. As written, the allegation fails to identify that development has occurred. The main appeal parties agreed that no injustice would arise from my correction of the allegation to include the word ‘material’.
5. Historically the appeal site has been used as a waste transfer station. Some of the older aerial images and photographic images provided show parts of the land to contain hardstanding beyond the area hatched green in the plan attached to the notice (“the Plan”). There is no evidence showing that any pre-existing hardstanding was removed before the hardstanding referred to in the notice was laid. I am therefore satisfied that requiring the laying of turf or grass seed goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to remedy the breach. It is however necessary to require the land to be returned to its condition before the breach occurred. The appellants are best placed to know what that condition was, and I am satisfied no injustice would arise from my variation of step 3 in this manner.

Preliminary Matters

6. The inquiry sat for 2 days and oral evidence was presented under oath.
7. Proofs of evidence produced by Mr Chris Barnes, Mr Joseph Upton and Mr Brian Woods provide detailed accounts of evidence later relied upon in their oral submissions. While proofs of evidence were also provided by Mr Chris Jenkins, Mr Tony Till and Mr Mark Sykes, these provide little more than names, addresses and confirmation that they *“have lived in the local area surrounding the appeal site since at least 2015”* and *“know the appeal site well”*. This could undermine the veracity of the oral evidence provided by those witnesses, if it lacks precision or is ambiguous.
8. It is a matter of common ground that the planning permission granted on 29 January 2014 for the *“change of use to 7 caravan plots for Travellers”*¹ has not been implemented (“the 2014 PP”). If it had been implemented it would have restricted the use of the land to no more than 7 pitches for use by persons meeting the definition of travellers set out in Annex 1 to the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites (March 2012), amongst other things. The documents submitted in support of that application, and as part of this appeal, do however contain information/evidence relevant to this appeal.
9. The appeal land is divided into six distinct areas and I am told they have six different owners. For ease of reference, I shall number the areas from right to left as plot 1, plot 2, plot 3, plots 4 & 5, plot 6 and plot 7. I shall refer to the plot containing Mr Upton’s dwelling as “JU’s plot”.

¹ Application reference S/2150/11

10. While I do not have land registry documentation, it is my understanding that ownership of the appeal site now is as follows:

Chris Jenkins ("JC")	–	Plot 1 (confirmed in oral evidence)
Joe Upton ("JU")	-	Plot 2 (confirmed in oral evidence)
Olivia Deadman	-	Plot 3 (stated by Mark Sykes)
Joseph & Sidney Breaker	-	Plots 4 and 5 (stated by Mark Sykes)
Tony Till ("TT")	-	Plot 6 (confirmed in oral evidence)
Mark Sykes ("MS")	-	Plot 7 (confirmed in oral evidence)

The Appeals on Ground (d)

11. An appeal on this ground is that, at the date the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of the breach of planning control alleged. It is for the appellant to show that the material change of use to a residential caravan site and laying of hard standing occurred before the material date and has continued without significant interruption for 10 years or more. The material date is 8 July 2015, and any 10 year period is relevant. The relevant test is the balance of probabilities.
12. It is the appellants' contention that caravans were on the land before July 2015 and caravans have remained on the land since then, such that a residential caravan site could always have been enforced against. They further assert that the definable character of the use is an unregularized residential caravan site and the increase in caravans stationed on the land, from approximately 2020, could not therefore constitute a material change of use through intensification.

Legal Authorities

13. The appellant's initial submissions direct me to *Reed v Bracknell Forest* [2014] EWCA Civ 241, where the Court of Appeal endorsed the test adopted by Ouseley J, namely that while intensification is capable of amounting to a material change of use, for it to do so it must have resulted in "*a material change in the definable character of the use of the land.*"² Mr Cottle also directed me to *Hertfordshire*, in particular that, no matter how severe or minimal the change in effects of the use, that of itself does not constitute a material change in use. In recognition of the potential for intensification to amount to a change of use, Ouseley J goes on:

"44. ...Although earlier cases...say that the existence of a material change in the use by intensification is well recognised, they do no more themselves than recognise that material change of use by intensification may exist. They have never actually found one.

45. This reflects what Sullivan J said in R v Thanet District Council v Kent International Airport Plc [2001] P&CR 2 at paragraph 54:

² *Hertfordshire County Council v SSCLG and Metal and Waste Recycling Limited* [2012] EWCA Civ 1473

“It is easy to state the principle that intensification may be of such a degree or on such a scale as to make a material change in the character of a use, it is far more difficult to apply it in practice. There are very few cases of ‘mere intensification’. Usually the increase in activity will have led to some other change: from hobby to business, from part to full-time employment, or an increase in one use at the expense of other uses in a previously mixed use.”

46. *The precise description of the existing and changed uses is important. Mere generic descriptions may not always be sufficiently precise to reflect material planning differences. The statutory overlay, for example in relation to generic residential and industrial uses, may now qualify what might have been the role which the concept of intensification may have been thought to play many years ago. But for all that, the cases have all emphasised the need to identify a material change in the definable character of the use of the land. None of them has suggested that this could be done simply by reference to examining impacts alone, relevant though they are to that crucial issue in a material change of use by intensification case.”*
14. In respect of whether there is any definable character difference between transit traveller use, contractors use and use by the homeless Mr Cottle directed me to *I’m Your Man Limited v SSE* [1999] PLCR 109 and *Gravesham Borough Council v SSE* (1984) 47 P&CR 142. In *I’m Your Man Limited* it was held that *“Materiality for the purposes of section 55(1) should be judged as a matter of degree on a comparison between the use before and after the change. I do not consider that generally the character of a use would alter whether it was to last for one year or seven years or was permanent.”*
15. Unlike in *I’m Your Man Limited*, planning permission has not been granted for use of the land as a residential caravan site. There is therefore no defined lawful use against which to assess the materiality of any changes in the character of the use(s) that may have taken place throughout any relevant 10-year period.
16. In *Gravesham* it was held that a restriction on use of a unit of private domestic facilities for living and eating in, to use only as a ‘weekend and holiday chalet’, did not prevent it from being a dwelling. Applying a similar approach to this case, Mr Cottle argues, *“whether caravans are lived in by the homeless, or by travellers or commuting or live in contractors does not alter the fact that the land is in use as a (unregulated) residential caravan site.”*³ I agree with Mr Cottle in that, to meet the statutory definition, a caravan has to provide for human habitation, and that it is not the character of the occupant that defines the character of the use.
17. *Brooks and Burton Ltd v SSE & Dorset* (1978) 35 P&CR 27 relates to pre and post intensification uses being within the same Use Class. The use of land as a residential caravan site is however a sui generis use to which the need to demonstrate a material change in the definable character of the use would be required to find that a material change of use had occurred.
18. In *R (oao Childs) v FSS & Test Valley BC* [2005] EWHC 2368 (Admin) a site had a Lawful Development Certificate (“LDC”) for a residential caravan site for 4 caravans. LDCs for proposed uses as a caravan site for 8, 15, 30 and 50 caravans were refused. The argument that the specified number of 4 caravans

³ Paragraph 15 of the appellants’ Closing Submissions

was “*merely surplusage*” was rejected. Whether intensification might or might not constitute a material change of use was a matter of fact and degree, and not comparable to the situation where a use falls within a Use Class. It does however reinforce *Hertfordshire* in that the outcome of this appeal will be a question of fact and degree based on the facts of the case.

19. I have also been directed to paragraph 28 of APP/W1905/C/14/2216527 and paragraph 18 of APP/W1905/C/14/2216526, where the Inspectors concluded “...*whether or not the caravans were intended as permanent or temporary accommodation, or included an element of ‘leisure’ use, the purpose for which they were first placed, and subsequently retained, on the land was human habitation.*” The relevance of these decisions will depend on whether the evidence shows caravans were first placed and subsequently retained [my emphasis] on the land.
20. The Planning Practice Guidance (“PPG”) relating to applications for lawful development certificates is equally relevant to ground (d) appeals. In determining whether an existing use is lawful, an appellant’s evidence must be sufficiently precise and unambiguous to allow the decision maker to understand exactly what has taken place⁴ on the land throughout the relevant period.

The Evidence

21. Documentary evidence provided by the appellants consists of those associated with several historic planning applications and aerial imagery. I shall address these in turn before moving on to the appellants’ oral evidence.
22. Starting with the 2014 PP, in response to whether the change of use has already started, the application form states, “*Yes. In part only plots 1 and 2 June 2011*”. In response to section 15 questions however, the current use of the land is described as “*Waste Transfer Station*”, that the land is vacant and it was last used as a Waste Transfer Station in 2010. The section relating to the number of residential units confirms “*7 caravans*” are proposed while the existing number is left blank.
23. The approved survey drawing reference 5934A/10 dated July 2010 shows approximately two thirds of the appeal site to be laid to “*hardcore*” and “*hardcore/spoil*”, but no caravans on what will become plot 1 or plot 2. The Phase 1 Contamination Survey, prepared by Terragen Environmental Consultants, dated January 2011, refers to use of the land being for the storage of skips and as a waste transfer station up to approximately 2008. Details taken from their ‘site walkover’ notes, which took place on 21 January 2011, corresponds with the survey drawing details in terms of site surfacing, it also states the land is vacant.
24. The Design and Access Statement states: “*The site has been cleared of all buildings and hardcore/fill on the site left generally level*”. Photographs taken during the Terragen site walkover⁵ provide general views of the land as it was in 2011. The only caravans/mobile homes visible in these photographs are on the adjacent Sandy Park caravan site, which JU confirmed to be the case in his oral evidence.

⁴ PPG 17c-006-20140306

⁵ Page 330 of the appellant’s Facts to Support Ground D document

25. A planning application was submitted for the replacement of the dwelling on JU's plot in May 2013 (Council reference S/1176/FL). This was subsequently granted planning permission in June 2014. The location plan for this planning permission shows JU's plot outlined in red and what will become plot 1 outlined in blue. The purpose of the blue outline is to show other land in the appellants ownership. There is no dispute that JU was the appellant.
26. Turning now to the aerial images. The 2012 image shows JU's plot with the original dwelling, a shed and what could be a touring caravan in the dwelling's curtilage. There are walls/fences defining the areas that will become plot 1 and plot 2. The quality of the image prevents definitive identification of what is on these two areas of land; although I accept that there could be vehicles shown, I remain unconvinced that they are caravans. The image is however sufficiently clear to show that hard surfacing only extends across approximately the eastern half of the land.
27. The April 2015 image shows approximately two thirds of the land to be hard surfaced. The replacement dwelling on JU's plot is identifiable as are the two touring caravans located in its front garden. The two defined areas, which will become plot 1 and plot 2, still have things on them and their precise nature is still not discernible due to the quality of the image. However, in oral evidence, JU claims the item circled in red is the caravan he and his wife occupied while their replacement dwelling was being erected.
28. The image dated May 2017 shows two static caravans on plot 1, one static caravan on plot 2, four static caravans on plots 4 and 5. Plot 3 appears to have vehicles on it and plot 6 is vacant. Plot 7 has one static caravan on it and the area where the trees were removed remains unsurfaced. While it is agreed that the 2014 PP was not implemented, the site layout shown in this image is not dissimilar to that which was granted planning permission.
29. The image dated May 2020 shows eight static caravans on plot 1, four static caravans on plot 2, eight static caravans on plot 3, twelve static caravans on plots 4 and 5, and four static caravans on plot 6. On plot 7 there appears to be a building where the trees were removed, two mobile homes and possibly one caravan and two vehicles.
30. The image dated June 2021 shows that the number of static caravans on plot 2 has increased to six, Plot 7 has been extended towards the railway line and there are what appear to be 2 or 3 mobile homes and several vehicles on it. Little has changed in the image dated March 2022, apart from the number of caravans on plot 1 has reduced to seven. In the image dated June 2023 there are again eight caravans on plot 1 and works to remove the building on plot 7 appear to be occurring.
31. The image dated June 2024 shows that the building has been removed from plot 7 and there are now twelve caravans on it. Nothing has changed on the land in the image dated March 2025, which pre-dates the fire that saw five caravans destroyed on plots 4 and 5, and the removal/cessation of use of four caravans on plot 6.
32. Turning to the oral evidence, JU confirmed: he bought the land, including where his dwelling is located, in approximately 2001; he operated a skip hire business

which later developed into the waste transfer station and which he operated up until about 2010; he sought planning permission firstly for 15 traveller pitches⁶ followed by the successful 7 traveller pitch proposal; how he and his family occupied caravans on the land while the works to replace his dwelling were carried out; how people working on his bungalow and later employed by him lived in a caravan on the land; and how he sold plots 1 and 3 to 7 off from 2016 (despite his written evidence saying he started to sell them from 2011).

33. In CJ's oral evidence he told of how he had purchased plot 1 from Nan (Anne) Hughes before she recently passed away. He thinks she bought it from JU in 2010/2011 but then went on to say he let JU stay on plot 1 while the replacement dwelling was being erected. Since it was purchased from JU, plot 1 has been used by travellers visiting their families, who reside elsewhere off Fen Lane, for events such as weddings or religious holidays. He stated no one stayed longer than a month. While he confirmed he owns the eight static caravans on plot 1 and rents them out, he could not give a date for when plot 1 came under his control.
34. In MS's oral evidence he confirmed he bought plot 7 in 2023. There were four or five static caravans on the land when he purchased it although the previous owner had removed the building. MS described the building on plot 7 as being seven caravans stitched together. Following his purchase, he increased the number of static caravans firstly to eight and then twelve. He also confirmed his personal knowledge of the land, and that the appeal site had been used by travellers as described by CJ from 2010.
35. In TT's oral evidence he confirmed that he purchased plot 6 in 2019/2020 and that while he has had up to six caravans, there are currently only three on his land. Further, none were occupied at the time of the fire, as he was away travelling and had not arranged tenancies.
36. Turning now to the Council's documentary evidence. They purportedly served an injunction in July 2011 to secure the removal of caravans from the land⁷. The Council claim that the caravans were removed and their file was closed in November 2011. In his oral evidence JU claimed to have no recollection of this injunction or caravans being removed from the land. Further, the appellants' Statement of Case refers to the Council failing to provide a copy of this injunction when it was requested. Mr Barnes explained in his oral evidence that it was the papers in relation to the 2025 injunction that were requested and they were provided.
37. The Council's aerial image dated 18 July 2016 shows two static caravans on plot 1 and what could be a vehicle on plot 2, although JU would have me believe it is the caravan he and his wife occupied while the replacement dwelling was being built. The remaining land within the appeal site is shown to have been hard surfaced and divided, presumably to define the six plots. It also shows that trees adjacent to plot 7 have been cut back, although the resultant land is not surfaced.
38. The Council wrote to JU on 21 October 2016, identifying a breach of conditions relating to the 2014 PP. It states that during a recent site visit two static caravans on plot 1 and four static caravans on plots 4 and 5 were observed. The letter also

⁶ Application reference S/0863/10/F

⁷ Paragraph 4.1 of the Council's Statement of Case

draws JU's attention to the need for occupants of any caravans on the land to have gypsy/traveller status as defined by Annex 1 of the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites.

39. A hand drawn layout plan of the appeal site, dated 22 November 2016, is also provided. This shows two static caravans on plot 1, one static caravan on plot 2, one static caravan on plot 3, four static caravans on plots 4 and 5, plot 6 as vacant, and plot 7 as having one static caravan and half of one static caravan on it. It is not clear who drew this plan or what purpose it serves. Its accuracy has not been disputed.
40. Green Planning Studios ("GPS") responded to the Council's letter of 21 October 2016 on behalf of Mr Upton, Mr Joseph Breaker and Mr Sidney Breaker by email dated 29 November 2016. This email responds to the specific matters raised in the Council's letter relating to static caravan numbers and occupancy. However, in more general terms, it also states that *"Works to develop the site commenced six months ago, and the site currently remains under development."* And *"There are currently people living on the appeal site who are carrying out works...they are only living on the site for a limited period whilst they carry out works for which permission was granted. Discussions with Mr Upton have revealed that those workers will cease living on the site and will have moved elsewhere by the Christmas period of this year."* In his oral evidence, JU claims to have no recollection of discussions with GPS or its response to the Council.

Assessment of the Evidence

41. There is no dispute that the last lawful use of the appeal site was as a waste transfer station. While the evidence is not specific as to when this use ceased, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that it had ceased by 2010.
42. Having regard to the legal authorities and relevant guidance, I need to identify when caravans were first stationed on the land such that use as a residential caravan site began. I must then be satisfied that the residential caravan site use continued for 10 years or more without significant interruption or another material change of use occurring.
43. The appellants' evidence needs to be sufficiently precise and unambiguous in terms of establishing the date when caravans were first placed and subsequently retained for use as a residential caravan site. Further, as established in *Hertfordshire*, it is not enough to establish that a generic use of land has subsisted throughout the relevant period, a specific use must be shown. I do not therefore agree with the appellants' argument that I should only have regard to whether an unrestricted, therefore generic, caravan site use has taken place throughout the relevant 10 year period.
44. The residential caravan site use taking place at the time the notice was served continues to date. Each of the individual plots have had between six and twelve static caravans placed on them and they have subsequently been retained for human habitation purposes. The owners of each plot own the static caravans and rent them out to tenants, who pay rent monthly. While tenants may change, the static caravans are retained for use by subsequent tenants. It is this specific residential caravan use that the appellants are seeking to demonstrate that enforcement action cannot be taken against due to the passage of time.

45. The oral evidence given to the Inquiry by JU affirms caravans were first stationed on the land (JU's plot and plot 1) for purposes associated with the erection of his replacement dwelling and for purposes incidental and ancillary to the residential use of the original and replacement dwellings. The primary use of the land during the time these caravans were placed on it was therefore a Use Class C3: dwellinghouse use. Caravans placed on the land for incidental and ancillary Class C3 purposes would not, therefore, amount to use of land as a caravan site as they do not amount to primary uses.
46. It could be argued that any caravan on the plot 1 land at this time was outside the Class C3 dwellinghouse's planning unit. While CJ claims Nan (Anne) Hughes owned this land from 2011, the location plan accompanying the replacement dwelling planning application shows it to still be in JU's ownership. In the absence of documentary evidence of ownership by Ms Hughes, I find the location plan to be the more credible as it was produced at the time, rather than being the recollections of someone who had no direct interest in the land at that time.
47. Accepting the oral evidence given by CJ and MS, that the appeal site was used by travellers visiting relatives in the local area as part of their nomadic habit, such use amounts to a traveller transit site use. A transit traveller caravan site use is a primary use. Its character is defined by the comings and goings of travellers during their nomadic habit. While caravans are placed on the land to facilitate this use, they are not subsequently retained. There is therefore a material definable difference between the character of a transit traveller caravan site and that of the use taking place at the time the notice was issued.
48. Furthermore, given the lack of documentary evidence, including aerial images, of the appeal site being used for transit traveller caravan site purposes, this activity may have overlapped with JU's and his family's stationing of caravans for ancillary residential purposes. Such a combined use of the land would amount to a mixed use of the land, which again is not the use taking place at the time the notice was issued.
49. It is not until July 2016 that aerial images show that all the land has been laid to hardstanding and divided into the six separate plots. Two static caravans are visible in this image, and they are stationed on plot 1. From the oral evidence given, these static caravans were occupied by employees of JU, who worked in his business. As already set out above, the type of occupier of the static caravans is not determinative of whether the specific residential caravan site use I have identified has commenced.
50. The GPS email however casts doubt on whether the two static caravans on plot 1 were stationed on the land for the specific residential caravan site use to which the notice applies. If any caravans placed on the land were indeed for purposes associated with works directed at implementing the 2014 PP, those caravans may well have then been removed when such works were completed.
51. Given the images from 2017 onwards continue to show the two static caravans on plot 1 it would be reasonable to conclude they were placed and subsequently retained for human habitation purposes. Even if I were to accept that the placing of these two static caravans on plot 1 commenced the specific residential caravan site use, the first aerial image in which they appear is dated some considerable

time after the material date of 8 July 2015. Evidence of when they were first placed on the land needs to be shown.

52. From the aerial images it would be reasonable to conclude that the specific residential caravan site use had not commenced by April 2015 as there are no static caravans placed on any of the land up to that date. There is a considerable amount of time between April 2015 and 18 July 2016.
53. Identifying what occurred on the appeal site during the period between April 2015 and 8 July 2015 is therefore crucial to the outcome of this appeal. It would need to be shown that hardstanding had been laid across the appeal site and the two static caravans had been placed on plot 1 within this three to four month period. The oral evidence provided by the appellant witnesses gave no more definitive a date for caravans being placed on the land (not specifically plot 1) than before 2015. The oral evidence does not therefore clarify matters for this period.
54. No specific evidence relating to who owned the two static caravans or the date they were first placed on the land has been given. Furthermore, the witnesses did not suggest any date for when the hardstanding was laid across the appeal site, although JU claims that individual plot owners did their own hardsurfacing works.
55. If individual plot owners were carrying out hardsurfacing works on an individual basis it would not be unreasonable to expect such works to take longer than 4 months to complete. Furthermore, from the GPS email it can be deduced that works, such as laying of hardsurfacing, did not commence until April/ May 2016. In these circumstances it would seem more likely than not that the two static caravans, or any other static caravans, were placed on the land and subsequently retained on it by 8 July 2015.
56. Taking all these factors together, I find it more likely than not that the matter alleged did not occur until after the material date. In the circumstances it is not necessary for me to consider whether the intensification of the residential caravan site use in approximately 2020 resulted in a further material change of use of the land.

Conclusion on ground (d)

57. For the reasons given above I find the appellants' evidence to be imprecise and ambiguous. They have therefore failed to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities that the use of land as a residential caravan site commenced on or before the material date. The date when enforcement action could be taken had not passed on the date the notice was issued.
58. The appeal on ground (d) fails.

The Appeals on Ground (g)

59. An appeal on this ground is that the period to comply with the steps required to remedy the breach falls short of what should reasonably be allowed.
60. The appellant claims the six months specified in the notice is insufficient to allow the residents of the land to find alternative homes and they will become homeless. While a period of 12 months was initially requested, a period of nine months has

been agreed with the Council, which I also find to be reasonable when weighing the personal needs of residents against the wider public harm caused.

61. The appeal on ground (d) succeeds to this limited extent.

Overall Conclusions

62. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the appeals should not succeed. I shall uphold the enforcement notice with corrections and variations.

M Madge

INSPECTOR

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Stephen Cottle
Garden Court Chambers

Counsel for the appellant instructed by Brian Woods
WS Planning & Architects

He called:

Brian Woods	of WS Planning & Architects
Joseph Upton	landowner (part of the appeal site)
Chris Jenkins	appellant
Mark Sykes	appellant
Tony Till	appellant

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Asitha Ranatunga
Of Cornerstone Barristers

Counsel for the Council instructed by Vanessa Blane,
Solicitor for South Cambridgeshire District Council

He called:

Chris Barnes	Principal Compliance Officer, South Cambridgeshire District Council
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INTERESTED PARTIES:

Katrina Davey	Resident
Amanda Brown	Resident

DOCUMENTS

ID1	Appellant's opening
ID2	Council's opening
ID3	Homeless Prevention Loan Agreement for Mr Richard Williams (26/11/2019)
ID4	Letter of support from Emma Parris (resident)
ID5	Council's closing submissions
ID6	Appellant's closing submissions
ID7	Broxbourne Borough Council v SSE and others [1978]
ID8	I'm Your Man Limited v SSE [1998]
ID9	Hertfordshire County Council v SSCLG & Metal and Waste Recycling Limited [2012] EWHC 277 (Admin)

- ID10 Hertfordshire County Council v SSCLG & Metal and Waste Recycling Limited
[2012] EWCA Civ 1473
- ID11 APP/W1905/C/14/2216524 & APP/W1905/C/14/2216525
- ID12 APP/W1905/C/14/2216527