



Appeal Decision

Inquiry held on 13 and 14 January 2026

Site visit made on 13 January 2026

by Mark Harbottle BSc MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 13 February 2026

Appeal Ref: APP/U2370/C/25/3372425

Land at Mayfield House, New Lane, Eagland Hill, Pilling, Lancashire PR3 6BA

- The appeal is made under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) ("the 1990 Act").
- The appeal is made by Ms Michell Woodburn against an enforcement notice ("the notice") issued by Wyre Borough Council.
- The notice was issued on 31 July 2025.
- The breach of planning control as alleged in the notice is: Without planning permission, the material change of use of land from a use for agriculture to a residential use and, without planning permission, the erection of a dwellinghouse.
- The requirements of the notice are: (i) Cease the use of the land for residential purposes; (ii) Demolish the dwellinghouse in its entirety; and (iii) Remove from the land all building materials and debris resulting from compliance with the works described at (ii).
- The period for compliance with the requirements is 6 months.
- The appeal is proceeding on the grounds set out in section 174(2)(a), (b), (d) of the 1990 Act. Since an appeal has been brought on ground (a), an application for planning permission is deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act.

Summary of Decision: The appeal is dismissed and the notice is upheld with a correction and variation in the terms set out below in the Formal Decision.

Preliminary Matters

1. The inquiry sat for 2 days. Factual evidence on grounds (b) and (d) was given on affirmation.
2. The Government published a consultation on proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework ("the Framework") and other changes to the planning system during the appeal. The consultation period on those proposed reforms has not ended, and the draft Framework does not constitute Government policy or guidance, although it may be treated as a material consideration in local plan examinations and appeals. Accordingly, it was not necessary to revert to the parties on this matter, and I have assessed the appeal based on the version of the Framework published in December 2024 and amended on 7 February 2025.

The appeal on ground (b)

3. The alleged breach of planning control comprises 2 forms of development: the material change of use of the land from a use for agriculture to a residential use and the operational development of the erection of a dwellinghouse. In each case the appeal will succeed if the appellant can demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that what the notice alleges has not occurred in fact.

4. A further opportunity for success may lie in the appellant's assertion that the structure, if it is found to be a building, was not erected as a dwellinghouse but to be used for purposes incidental to the use of Mayfield House as a dwellinghouse.

The material change of use of the land

5. It is agreed that, when the notice was issued, there was a residential use of land that had formerly been in agricultural use. There is no evidence of any intervening use of the land, so it is a matter of fact that the alleged material change of use of the land had occurred before the notice was issued. Whether enforcement action could have been taken against the material change of use on the date the notice was issued will be considered in the appeal on ground (d).

The operational development

6. The appellant makes 2 arguments. The first is that the alleged dwellinghouse is in fact a caravan, so the operational development of erecting a building (the dwellinghouse) has not occurred. Noting the differing views on this, I shall use the neutral term 'structure' except where I refer to a party's stated position.
7. The second argument is that the structure has only ever been used for purposes incidental to the use of Mayfield House as a dwellinghouse. If so, even if a building has been constructed, it would not constitute a dwellinghouse.

Whether the structure is a caravan or a building

8. The primary definition of a caravan is made by section 29 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 ("the 1960 Act"). This is "any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor vehicle so designed or adapted." The definition excludes rolling stock on rails forming part of a railway system and tents, but the structure is evidently neither.
9. The appellant contends that the structure is a twin-unit caravan, as further defined by section 13(1) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 ("the 1968 Act"), meaning it is a structure designed or adapted for human habitation which:
 - (a) Is composed of not more than two sections separately constructed and designed to be assembled on a site by means of bolts, clamps or other devices ("the construction test"); and
 - (b) Is, when assembled, physically capable of being moved by road from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) ("the mobility test").
10. Section 13(1) goes on to state that such a caravan "shall not be treated as not being (or as not having been) a caravan ... by reason only that it cannot lawfully be so moved on a highway when assembled." Read as a whole, section 13(1) requires that a twin-unit caravan must be capable of being moved in one piece, not that it would be legal to do so on a public highway.
11. The construction test requires that the final act of assembly of such a caravan must be to join 2 sections that were designed and built with that intention. The appellant contends that this occurred between June and December 2021. While

that was less than 6 years ago, no contemporary records of the assembly process or invoices or statements from contractors who undertook it have been produced. The appellant's case therefore relies entirely on her own evidence in this respect.

12. The appellant describes the structure as a caravan "composed of timber cladding to the walls and tile effect metal roof panels, internally finished with plasterboard." She states that it "forms two sections that are bolted together and sits on a base of concrete blocks."
13. In her oral evidence, the appellant provided more detail, affirming that she and her father oversaw the work carried out by contractors. She further affirmed that 2 sections were constructed on the site, each with a floor, walls, and a roof, and that each section was self-supporting and could stand on its own. She continued that she had observed that the 2 sections were joined with bolts and clamps and that they could be taken apart again.
14. While the appellant's description of the construction process is limited and is not supported by documentary evidence, the Council has no evidence to contradict it. Indeed, the Council's witness stated that it was entirely unclear to him how the structure had been formed. On balance and considering the weight that should be afforded to tested oral evidence, I accept the appellant's claim that the structure passes the construction test.
15. Turning to the mobility test, the appellant relies upon a report prepared by a professional with qualifications in building surveying, spatial design, and building studies. The report concludes that the structure passes the mobility test as it is "physically capable of being moved by road via a standard low-loader without structural alteration." However, that conclusion does not appear to be consistent with specific content of the report.
16. First, the author confirms that it was not possible to determine whether the structure rests on temporary supports or permanent foundations because access to the underside was prevented by blockwork. It is therefore unclear how he or she reached the view that the structure is not fixed permanently to the ground.
17. Second, the blockwork also prevented direct observation of the condition of the chassis and cross-members understood to form the base of the structure. Instead, reliance was placed upon the absence of soft spots and sagging in the floor. It is therefore unclear how the author formed the view that "the structure can be moved without structural damage or need for disassembly beyond normal procedures."
18. Third, and most significant, the author identified a methodology in which the structure is demounted "by splitting the unit using hydraulic jacks to lift and safely separate the two halves of the caravan." The methodology continues with the halves being winched or manoeuvred onto separate vehicles for road transport.
19. The author did not appear at the inquiry, so these apparent inconsistencies are unexplained. In these circumstances, the only finding I can make is that, despite its conclusion, the report does not demonstrate that the structure is capable of being moved when assembled, meaning in one piece.
20. The appellant affirmed that she is not an expert in these matters, but she considers the structure could be moved intact based on discussion with people with relevant experience. However, who those people are, what qualifications and

experience they have, and crucially what they know about the structure were not revealed. Accordingly, and despite her oral evidence having been tested, the appellant does not convince me that the structure is capable of being moved in its assembled state, contrary to the expert advice she commissioned.

21. Accordingly, it has not been demonstrated that the structure is a twin-unit caravan as defined by section 13(1) of the 1968 Act. As it has not been demonstrated that the structure is capable of being moved without being taken apart, it has also not been demonstrated to be a caravan as defined by section 29 of the 1960 Act.
22. The definition of a building in section 336(1) of the 1990 Act includes any structure or erection. Case law¹ identifies that a determination as to whether something is a building should have regard to 3 factors: its size, its permanence, and its physical attachment to the ground.
23. While the structure conforms to the maximum dimensions of a twin-unit caravan, that does not preclude it being a building. Many buildings, including sheds and detached domestic garages are smaller and the structure has the attributes of a building in terms of its size.
24. Following the judgment in the *Skerritts* case² any consideration of permanence should include whether the structure “would normally remain in situ and only be removed by a process amounting to pulling down or taking to pieces.”
25. The appellant’s stated reasons for needing the structure relate to her family’s present circumstances. However, there is no reason to believe that it could not provide useful accommodation to her family or to any future owner or occupier for many years. That would appear to be so, regardless of whether it is used for purposes incidental to Mayfield House or as a separate dwellinghouse. Considering this, and the effort that would be involved in moving the structure, it is reasonable to expect it to remain where it is, so long as it continues to offer a benefit to the resident household.
26. That is likely to be a sufficient period for the structure to be significant in planning terms and be seen as a permanent feature of the land. Viewed in this way, the structure would most likely have a permanent relationship with the land, characteristic of a building.
27. Turning to attachment to the ground, as noted, the appellant’s professional advisor could not determine whether the structure rests on temporary supports or on permanent foundations and no such evidence is before me. It has therefore not been demonstrated to be unattached.
28. Despite the lack of clarity on attachment, I find the structure’s size and permanence to be decisive and that both indicate that it is a building as defined by section 336(1) of the 1990 Act.

Whether the structure was erected as a dwellinghouse or for purposes incidental to the use of Mayfield House as a dwellinghouse

29. The appellant bought Mayfield House and the holding associated with it in 2012. Her parents live at Mayfield House, and she initially occupied a caravan that was

¹ *Cardiff Rating Authority v Guest Keen Baldwin's Iron and Steel Co Ltd* [1949] 1 KB 385 and *Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v SSETR* (No.2) [2000] 2 PLR 102.

² *Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v SSETR* (No.2) [2000] 2 PLR 102.

stationed where the structure is, and which is now sited elsewhere on her land. The caravan became her main residence in January 2019 and continued to be until she moved into the completed structure in December 2021.

30. The appellant's father also stayed in the caravan when specific work that was being carried out to Mayfield House made it necessary for him to move out. In her oral evidence, the appellant affirmed that this occurred between 2012 and late 2018 but neither the precise nature of the works nor their duration was specified. Only the appellant and her daughter lived in the caravan after January 2019.
31. Any use of the caravan ancillary or incidental to the use of Mayfield House by reason of the appellant's father's temporary occupation ended some 5½ years before the notice was issued and has never applied to the structure. The question of ancillary or incidental use of the structure must therefore be determined having regard to the appellant's relationship with Mayfield House since December 2021.
32. The appellant described the structure as her sole residence when responding to a planning contravention notice in October 2024. Nevertheless, she affirmed at the inquiry that she had not taken advice on what that meant in planning terms and should have described its occupation as ancillary to that of Mayfield House.
33. The appellant provides care and support to her parents, including shopping, transport to medical and other appointments, administering medication and responding to any incidents. Medication is given up to 4 times each day, so she enters Mayfield House daily. These arrangements are understandable within a family, but they do not require the appellant to live in Mayfield House, indeed she confirms that it is only necessary for her to live nearby.
34. Apart from the assistance provided to her parents, summarised above, there is no evidence of the appellant or her daughter using any of the facilities within Mayfield House instead of, or as well as, those within the structure. There is no evidence of the appellant and her daughter sharing meals with her parents or any other domestic activity indicative of a single household occupying Mayfield House and the structure. Rather, the picture is of separate households with a high degree of contact and support that understandably follow from family connection.
35. Turning to physical factors, the appellant's written submissions state that the structure is judged, on balance, to fall within the curtilage of Mayfield House. In doing so, she refers to relevant case law³ in which 'curtilage' was established to connote "a building or piece of land attached to a dwelling house and forming one enclosure with it." The judgment continues that curtilage "is not restricted in size, but it must fairly be described as being part of the enclosure of the house to which it refers."
36. Drawings used in applications for planning permission made by the appellant in 2019 and 2024 include land edged red around Mayfield House, indicating the extent of the planning unit in which the development was proposed to take place. The land where the structure stands is edged blue, indicating other land in the same ownership, on each drawing. The appellant affirmed that she did not understand the planning concept of curtilage although she accepted that the red lines defined the planning unit. She also affirmed that she had not seen the drawings before they were submitted. The people who created the drawings did

³ *Lowe v First Secretary of State* [2003] EWHC 537 (Admin).

not appear, so it is unclear how they came to the view that the land where the structure now stands was not then within the curtilage of Mayfield House, as their drawings indicate.

37. The structure stands within a parcel of land that is, with one exception, divided from the remainder of the appellant's holding by hedges, gates or fencing. The exception is the most northern part of the appeal site boundary, which opens onto a gravelled area providing parking spaces and vehicular and pedestrian access to New Lane, which is shared with Mayfield House. It is possible for 2 or more separate properties to share an access to the highway, something that is sometimes found in new housing layouts, so I do not consider this to be determinative of a single planning unit.
38. Water and electricity are supplied from Mayfield House, and no evidence of separate metering has been produced. While that arrangement is to be expected with incidental accommodation, it does not preclude independent living in terms of daily routine and whether there is one household or two.
39. Returning to the enclosed boundaries, I saw a beech hedge marking the end of the back garden of Mayfield House and a gate alongside it allowing pedestrian access between it and the garden area closest to the structure. Viewed in this light, the structure does not lie within one enclosure associated with Mayfield House but sits within its own defined curtilage.

Conclusion on ground (b)

40. Despite my finding on the construction test, it has not been demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that the structure is capable of being moved in its assembled state. Section 13(1)(b) of the 1968 Act makes clear that the test must be applied to the structure when assembled, not after disassembly. Accordingly, the structure is not a caravan and, as noted, it has the attributes of a building.
41. The evidence of how the appellant and her parents have lived since December 2021 does not demonstrate a single household occupying Mayfield House and the structure and the layout of the holding includes physical demarcation between them. Accordingly, and considering the evidence before me, the appellant has not demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the structure is used for purposes incidental to the use of Mayfield House as a dwelling. The structure and the land edged red on the plan accompanying the notice are, on the balance of probabilities, a separate planning unit and the building constitutes a separate dwellinghouse, as alleged.
42. The appeal on ground (b) must therefore fail.

The appeal on ground (d)

The material change of use of the land from a use for agriculture to a residential use

43. The appeal on this ground will succeed in respect of the material change of use if the appellant can demonstrate 2 things on the balance of probabilities. First, that it was made on or before 31 July 2015, 10 years before the date on which the notice was issued, and second, that the residential use continued thereafter without significant interruption for a period of not less than 10 years.

44. No evidence is before me as to when the land was last used for agriculture. However, the appellant affirmed that the land had been unused for 5 years when she bought Mayfield House and the holding in 2012, whereupon she began using it as a garden and for no other purpose. She described garden activities including trampolining, cycling and football. A trampoline can be seen on the land in aerial images taken in April 2015, July 2017, June 2018, and April 2020. The trampoline was moved between July 2017 and June 2018, seemingly to allow a building to be erected beyond the caravan then on the land. The trampoline is not visible in the later aerial images, perhaps because it fell out of use as the appellant's daughter grew older. However, its relocation between July 2017 and June 2018 supports the claim of continuing garden use then.
45. Also evident from the aerial images is the formation of a fence separating the land subject of the notice from a larger part of the holding to the east after April 2015 and by July 2017. The beech hedge enclosing the back garden of Mayfield House appears to have become established over that period and screen planting along the southern boundary of the holding also becomes evident. These changes are indicative of a dedicated garden area for the caravan then present.
46. The caravan was not the appellant's main residence prior to January 2019, but she affirmed that she had used it "more often than not" before then, even though her main address was elsewhere. That was in addition to it accommodating her father when certain building works were taking place at Mayfield House. While the frequency or regularity of occupation by the appellant and her father is imprecise, the aerial images lend support to the claim of continuing residential use of the land at that time.
47. The Council notes the absence of evidence relating to the use of the caravan between 2019 and 2021 in the appellant's chronology. However, she affirmed that there was no break in her use of the caravan during that period. Given that it became her main residence in January 2019, that appears more likely than not.
48. The caravan was relocated to its current position on another part of the holding in 2021 and the appellant states that she continued to occupy it while the dwellinghouse was built. While this represents a break of some 6 months in the residential use of the land, the appellant's intention to resume it can reasonably be inferred from the erection of the dwellinghouse during that period.

The erection of the dwellinghouse

49. The ground (d) appeal will succeed for this if the appellant demonstrates on the balance of probabilities, that the erection of the dwellinghouse was substantially completed on or before 31 July 2021, 4 years before the notice was issued.
50. On her evidence, construction was not substantially complete until December 2021, when she was able to move in. As that was less than 4 years before the date on which the notice was issued, the operational development of the erection of the dwellinghouse was not immune from enforcement action on that date.

Conclusion on ground (d)

51. It is agreed that the land has been in residential use since the appellant moved into the dwellinghouse in December 2021. Evidence of the use of the land for residential purposes from 2012 until then is limited. Nevertheless, the available

images support the claim of garden use since April 2015, whether it was associated with Mayfield House or exclusive to the caravan, primarily by reason of the trampoline. Boundaries of the appeal site had become defined by the time of the July 2017 image, indicating that a garden area associated with the caravan and separate from Mayfield House had become formalised by then. No other use of the land during that period has been identified by either party.

52. While the caravan does not appear to have been occupied permanently until after January 2019, the appellant has affirmed periodic use before that. Coupled with the presence of the trampoline since April 2015 and the formalisation of garden boundaries by July 2017, I find this sufficient, on the balance of probabilities, to demonstrate a continuous residential use of the land. Any break during the 6 months in which the dwelling was erected was temporary and it seems clear that it was always intended to resume that use on completion of the dwellinghouse, as has happened. It was therefore not a significant interruption.
53. It has therefore been demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the material change of use to residential use was made more than 10 years before the date on which the notice was issued. It has also been demonstrated, on the same terms, that the residential use continued thereafter without significant interruption for a period of not less than 10 years
54. The operational development of the erection of the dwellinghouse was not, however, substantially completed on or before 31 July 2021 and it was therefore not immune from enforcement action on the date that the notice was issued.
55. For these reasons, the appeal on this ground succeeds for the use of the land but fails in respect of the erection of the dwellinghouse. I shall correct the notice accordingly. It would be reasonable to make a corresponding variation to the requirements of the notice even though an appeal on ground (f)⁴ was not made.

The appeal on ground (a)

56. While the appellant framed this ground of appeal as seeking planning permission to retain the stationing of a caravan for purposes ancillary to the use of Mayfield House as a dwellinghouse, I have found that was not what occurred.
57. Furthermore, following my finding in the appeal on ground (d) and the correction I shall make to the notice, it is not necessary to consider whether planning permission should be granted for the change of use of the land to residential use.
58. The main issues in this appeal are therefore:
 - Whether the erection of the dwellinghouse is appropriate to the countryside location having regard to the development plan's development strategy.
 - Its effect on the open and rural character of the countryside.
 - Whether there is safe and adequate vehicular, cycle and pedestrian access to and from the dwellinghouse.

⁴ That the steps required by the notice to be taken, or the activities required by the notice to cease, exceed what is necessary to remedy any breach of planning control which may be constituted by (the matters alleged in the notice) or, as the case may be, to remedy any injury to amenity which has been caused by any such breach.

Reasons

The countryside location and the development strategy

59. The site lies within countryside beyond the boundaries of any settlement. Policy SP1 of the Wyre Local Plan 2011 - 2031 incorporating partial update of 2022 ("the WLP") expects development to be strictly limited in the countryside unless it is specifically supported by another policy of the WLP.
60. Policy SP1 indicates that exceptions may be made for appropriate development that will help diversify the rural economy or support tourism and policy SP4 sets out a fuller list of potential exceptions.
61. The appellant does not claim that the dwellinghouse meets any of those policy exceptions, rather it is argued that policy SP4 cannot preclude ancillary development that cannot practicably be located elsewhere. This follows the appellant's case in the appeal on ground (b), but I have found that the unauthorised development is not the erection of a building for purposes incidental to the use of Mayfield House as a dwellinghouse. The unauthorised development is the erection of a dwellinghouse, and the deemed planning application must be determined accordingly.
62. The only instance in which the erection of a new dwellinghouse might draw support from policy SP4 is if it constitutes the provision of affordable housing in accordance with policy HP4 of the WLP. No such claim is made and no exception by reason of policy HP4 or any other policy of the WLP is suggested.
63. The erection of the dwellinghouse is therefore contrary to the development plan's development strategy and is not appropriate to the countryside location.

The effect on the open and rural character of the countryside

64. The site lies within a flat agricultural landscape in which tree cover is generally concentrated on hamlets and isolated farmsteads. Openness and distant views are therefore the prevailing characteristics of the countryside in this location. The open and rural character of the countryside should be recognised for its intrinsic character and beauty, and any new building of significance may erode the sense of openness and may impinge on significant views.
65. In this instance the dwellinghouse appears as part of a loose group with Mayfield House, an adjacent barn, and a house beyond. This group is like a farmstead in form and scale and the dwellinghouse is located discreetly within it and utilises facing materials appropriate to a farmstead setting. These factors limit the erosion of openness and the effect on distant views and allow the building to integrate with the wider built environment. The dwellinghouse therefore respects and does not adversely impact on the open and rural character of the countryside and it accords with policies SP4 and CDMP3 of the WLP in this regard.

Access

66. The site is some 2.9 miles from Pilling, the nearest defined settlement. The roads in the vicinity leading toward Pilling or, in the other direction, toward the Key Service Centre of Garstang are single track, unlit, without footways and subject to the national speed limit. In places they have very uneven surfaces.

67. Safe and adequate vehicular and cycle access to and from the site is therefore not provided. Furthermore, there is no available public transport, so the development cannot minimise the need to travel by car. The dwellinghouse is therefore unsustainably located in terms of its accessibility.

Other Matters

68. The appellant states that her parents are unable to maintain their daily routine without her help and that, following recent surgery, they currently require medication 4 times a day. The appellant considers that, if she had to move away, the time required for her to travel to and from the site to provide support would be prohibitive. In her oral evidence she estimated this could amount to 4 hours each day. She therefore considers that upholding the notice would require her parents to move out of Mayfield House, so she could continue to provide care for them.
69. Noting that the current medication regime is linked to recent surgery, it is not clear how long it is expected to continue. No report from a GP or consultant has been produced and while the appellant works for the NHS and has given her views on these matters, her qualifications have not been identified.

Conclusion on ground (a)

70. The effect of the dwellinghouse on the open and rural character of the countryside is acceptable. However, that is neutral in the balance and does not mitigate the harm identified through it being inappropriate to the countryside location and being unsustainably located in terms of its accessibility. Its erection is therefore contrary to policies SP1, SP2, SP4 and CDMP6 of the WLP in those respects.
71. On the other side of the scales, the dwellinghouse is currently facilitating the provision of care to the appellant's parents and there is a prospect that they would have to move if it were demolished. As noted, it is unclear how long the current medication regime is anticipated to last, particularly whether it might continue beyond the 6-month period for compliance with the notice. No appeal has been made on ground (g)⁵ and a time limited permission has not been sought. It would not be reasonable or in the public interest to grant planning permission for permanent development in conflict with the development plan without evidence that it is justified by a need that is expected to continue.
72. While it is not part of the appellant's case, a refusal of planning permission would lead to her and her daughter losing their home. This would interfere with their rights to respect for their home and family life and property under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as set out in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
73. The rights set out under Article 8 are qualified rights, which may be interfered with in accordance with the law and in the interests of public safety in a democratic society. In this instance, no information about potential access to or unavailability of other housing options has been provided. Taking all matters into consideration, the harm arising from the erection of a dwellinghouse in this countryside location with inadequate access options is such that it is proportionate to dismiss the appeal on ground (a). The protection of the public interest cannot be achieved by means that interfere less with the rights of the occupiers under Article 8.

⁵ That any period specified in the notice in accordance with s173(9) falls short of what should reasonably be allowed.

74. Consequently, a compelling reason to determine the deemed planning application other than in accordance with the development plan has not been identified.
75. As noted, I have found the evidence of a continuing future need for the appellant to visit Mayfield House daily to be insufficient. While further evidence might be presented in the context of discussion regarding use of powers under section 173A(1)(b) of the 1990 Act, that would be entirely for the Council's discretion.

Conclusion

76. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the appeal should not succeed. I shall uphold the notice with a correction and variation and refuse to grant planning permission on the application deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act.

Formal Decision

77. It is directed that the notice is corrected in section 3 by the deletion of the words "Without planning permission, the material change of use of land from a use for agriculture to a residential use and."
78. It is further directed that the notice is varied in section 5 by the deletion of the words "Cease the use of the land for residential purposes (shown edged red on the attached plan)."
79. Subject to the correction and variation, the appeal is dismissed, the notice is upheld and planning permission is refused on the application deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act.

Mark Harbottle

INSPECTOR

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Jake Salisbury

He called

Michell Woodburn, the appellant

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Millie Critchlow

She called

Robert Clewes BSc (Hons) MCD MSc, Principal Planning Officer, Wyre Borough Council