
Appeal Decision

Site visit made on 6 October 2026

by **D Boffin BSc (Hons), DipTP, MRTPI, DipBldg Cons (RICS), IHBC**

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 26 October 2026

Appeal Ref: APP/C3105/X/25/3362773

Greenhill Leisure Park, Greenhill Farm, Station Road, Bletchington OX5 3BQ

- The appeal is made under section 195 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) (the 1990 Act) against a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development (LDC).
 - The appeal is made by Greenhill Leisure Park against the decision of Cherwell District Council.
 - The application ref: 24/01646/CLUP, dated 19 June 2024, was refused by a notice dated 7 February 2025.
 - The application was made under section 192(1)(a) of the 1990 Act.
 - The proposed use for which a LDC is sought is use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation.
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Decision

1. The appeal is allowed and attached to this decision is a certificate of lawful use or development describing the proposed use which is found to be lawful.

Preliminary Matters and Background

2. The description of the proposed use that an LDC is sought for is normally taken from the application form. However, in this case the relevant section of that form states “*see planning supporting statement*”. The planning supporting statement indicates that the LDC application relates to “*Use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation*”, at a small section called ‘Top Field’ within the Greenhill Leisure Park, Station Road, Bletchington, Kidlington, OX5 3BQ”. Therefore, I have used that description in the banner heading above.
3. For clarity’s sake, the appellant seeks an LDC certifying the proposed use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation as lawful. Those caravans would be stationed within the appeal site, but I am not being asked as to whether a specific number or a specific siting or layout of those caravans would be lawful. The planning merits of the development are not relevant in this appeal which relates to an application for an LDC. My decision rest on the facts of the case, on relevant planning law and judicial authority.
4. The appellant has referred to several appeal decisions¹ to support their case. The Inspectors in each of these cases were interpreting the planning permissions that had been granted on each of those sites. These appeal decisions are fact sensitive. Whilst the findings of the Inspectors are relevant and there is a need for consistency in the planning process, I am not bound to reach the same conclusions. As far as material to my decision, the principles applied by those

¹ APP/C/93/P1615/627553, APP/G1630/X/11/2156048, APP/B1225/X/15/3002181, APP/Q3305/X/16/3155196, APP/U1240/X/17/3179428, APP/B6855/X/18/3213425 and APP/D3505/X/19/3227644

Inspectors in each case will be applied to this appeal having regard to the evidence presented.

5. Both parties have referred to numerous legal authorities². As I have said elsewhere, the relevant principles will be applied to this case, but I do not make express reference to all judgments in the interests of brevity.
6. The appellant has submitted a copy of a site licence, dated 14 January 2026, under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (the CSCDA60) for Greenhill Leisure Park which includes the appeal site. I have taken the site licence into account with regard to how the appeal site could be laid out and the number of caravans that could be sited within it. The layout plan within the site licence shows 64 caravans served off hardsurfaced road/s within the appeal site. That road/s are laid out in a different configuration to that which currently exists within the site.
7. In 2004 planning permission³ (the 2004 permission) was granted for the “*change of use of existing barns to indoor menage, stables, shop and toilet facilities. Change of use of land to form Campsite and recreation area, construction of new small log cabin, lake, outdoor menage, parking areas, and new access roads. Re-arrangement of barn (storage) for Bagnalls (as amended by plans received 15/08/03, 28/08/03 and 03.10.03 and as amplified by additional plans/info received 29.07.03, 13.08.03 and 22.10.03)*”. The appeal site formed part of the application site for that permission.
8. In 2010 planning permission⁴ (the 2010 permission) was granted for “*Non compliance with condition reference application 03/00655/F to change from camping pitches (20) to seasonal pitches from 1st March to 31 October then 20 pitches for winter storage from 1st November to 28 February (as amplified by drawing entitled Master Design Seasonal Pitches received 15.04.10 with applicant's letter dated 14.04.10)*”. The application site for that permission relates to the appeal site. The Council has stated that the drawing entitled Master Design Seasonal Pitches is not on the file.
9. In 2022 an LDC⁵ (the 2022 LDC) was issued for “*Use of Land for caravan and camping purposes in non-compliance with condition 6 of planning permission reference 10/00201/F as part of the camping and caravanning site known as Greenhill Leisure Park*”. In 2024 an LDC⁶ (the 2024 LDC) was issued for “*Siting of static caravans for 12-month holiday occupation*”.

² Wyre Forest BC v SSE & Allen's Caravans [1990] 2 WLR 517; [1990] JPL 724; R (oao Shepway DC) v Ashford BC [1998] EWHC Admin 488; JPL 1073; I'm Your Man Ltd v SSE & North Somerset DC [1999] 4 PLR 107; Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v SSETR (No. 1) [2000] EWCA Civ 60; [2000] JPL 789; Hulme v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] EWCA Civ 638; R. (on the application of Midcounties Co-operative Ltd) v Wyre Forest [2010] EWCA Civ 841; [2011] J.P.L. 173; [2010] 7 WLUK 891 (CA (Civ Div)); Telford and Wrekin Council v SSCLG & Growing Enterprises Ltd [2013] EWHC 79 (Admin); Cotswold Grange Country Park LLP v SSCLG & Tewkesbury DC [2014] EWHC 1138 (Admin); [2014] JPL 981; Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd & Another v the Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74; Lambeth LBC v SSCLG & Aberdeen Asset Management, Nottinghamshire CC & HHGL Ltd [2019] UKSC 33; DB Symmetry Ltd v Swindon BC & SSHCLG [2020] EWCA Civ 1331; Breckland DC v SSHLG & Plum Tree Country Park [2020] EWHC 292 (Admin); Barnett v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] EWCA Civ 476; Hillside Parks Ltd v Snowdonia National Park Authority [2022] UKSC 30; Barton Park Estates Limited v SSHCLG [2022] EWCA Civ 833; St Anne's Court Dorset Limited v SSHCLG [2021] EWHC 2954; Norfolk Caravan Park v SSHCLG [2021] EWHC 2114 (Admin); Hertfordshire County Council v SSCLG and Metal and Waste Recycling Limited [2012] EWHC 277 (Admin); Reed v SSCLG & Another [2014] EWCA Civ 241; Broxbourne Borough Council v SSE (1980) QB; R v Thanet DC, ex p Tapp [2002] 1 PLCR

³ Application: 03/00655/F

⁴ Application: 10/00201/F

⁵ Application: 21/04169/CLUE

⁶ Application: 23/02495/CLUP

Main Issue

10. The main issue is whether the Council's decision to refuse to grant an LDC is well-founded.

Reasons

11. In order for an LDC to be granted under section 192 of the 1990 Act, the burden of proof is with the appellant, and the appropriate test of the evidence is the balance of probabilities. The onus is firmly on the appellant to show that the proposal would be lawful at the time the application was made.
12. The appellant contends that the stationing of static caravans for permanent residential occupation falls within the parameters of the site's governing planning permissions and/or LDCs. They go onto argue that even if I find their conclusions are incorrect in that respect the proposed development would not constitute a material change of use.
13. The Council on the other hand maintains that the site plan and application form referring to the "*holiday site*" should be read as part of the 2004 permission, and together with the 28-day occupation limit imposed by condition 15, would lead a reasonable reader to conclude that the 2004 permission was restricted to a holiday use. It goes onto state that "*the permanent residential occupation of the static caravans would materially alter the character and appearance of the site, through the introduction of defined plots and visual clutter, and an increase in vehicular movements, noise and disturbance, and pressure upon local services. The proposed permanent residential occupation of the static caravans would therefore constitute a material change of use of the site from holiday use and would require planning permission.*"
14. The *Breckland* judgment⁷ at paragraphs 46 and 47 and the *Broxbourne* judgment⁸ found that the lawfulness of the use as set out in an established use certificate (as it was cited in Broxbourne) or an LDC is conclusively presumed by section 191(6) of the 1990 Act. That section states "*The lawfulness of any use, operations or other matter for which a certificate is in force under this section shall be conclusively presumed.*"
15. Therefore, I will firstly consider the detail of the 2022 and 2024 LDCs, then the interpretation of those LDCs and then consider the detail and interpretation of the 2004 and 2010 permissions. I will then consider whether or not the proposed '*use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation*' would fall within the extant planning permissions/LDCs. If it does not, it will then be necessary to consider whether the proposed use would constitute a material change of use.
16. The judgment in the Court of Appeal case of *Barton Park*⁹ considered, in paragraph 21, the approach to be taken to the interpretation of planning permissions and other public documents. That paragraph states:

“(1) The proper interpretation of a planning permission is ultimately a matter of law for the court (see the judgment of Lord Justice Keene in *Barnett v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2009] EWCA Civ 476; [2009] J.P.L. 1597, at paragraph 28). It follows that the question of

⁷*Breckland DC v SSHLG & Plum Tree Country Park* [2020] EWHC 292 (Admin)

⁸*Broxbourne Borough Council v SSE*(1980) QB

⁹*Barton Park Estates Limited v SSHCLG* [2022] EWCA Civ 833

whether a particular use is capable of coming within the scope of a planning permission is also a matter of law for the court. But the question of whether that use is truly within the scope of the permission will be a matter of fact and judgment for the decision-maker.

(2) A planning permission must be interpreted as a whole, consisting not only of the grant but also the conditions imposed and the reasons for their imposition (see the judgment of Mr Justice Keene, as he then was, in *R. v Ashford Borough Council, ex parte Shepway District Council* [1999] P.L.C.R. 12, at p.19C, citing *Slough Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment* (1995) J.P.L. 1128 and *Miller-Mead v Minister for Housing and Local Government* [1963] 2 Q.B. 196, and the judgment of Lord Carnwath in *Lambeth London Borough Council*, at paragraph 35).

(3) As Lord Hodge said in *Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd. v Scottish Ministers* [2015] UKSC 74; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 85 (at paragraph 34), if the court is interpreting planning conditions it “asks itself what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole”. This, said Lord Hodge, is “an objective exercise”, in which the court will “have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense”. More recently, the Supreme Court has held that “the starting-point and usually the end-point is to find “the natural and ordinary meaning” of the words ... used, viewed in their particular context (statutory or otherwise) and in the light of common sense” (see the judgment of Lord Carnwath in *Lambeth London Borough Council*, at paragraph 19, citing his own observations to similar effect in *Trump*, at paragraphs 53 and 66). The court will have in mind that under the statutory scheme a condition may be imposed “for regulating the development or use of any land under the control of the applicant ... so far as appears to the local planning authority to be expedient for the purposes of or in connection with the development authorised by the permission ...” (section 72(1)(a) of the 1990 Act, and its predecessor, section 30(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971). Conditions must “fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development” (see the judgment of Lord Hodge in *Aberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority v Elsick Development Co. Ltd.* [2017] P.T.S.R. 1413, at paragraph 30, approving the observations of Lord Scarman in *Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment* [1981] A.C. 578, at p.619).”

17. In the *Cotswold Grange* judgment¹⁰, the judge said:

“...the grant identifies what can be done – what is permitted – so far as use of land is concerned; whereas conditions identify what cannot be done – what is forbidden. Simply because something is expressly permitted in the grant does not mean that everything else is prohibited. Unless what is proposed is a material change of use – for which planning permission is required, because such a change is caught in the definition of development – generally, the only things which are effectively prohibited by a grant of planning permission are those things that are the subject of a condition, a breach of condition being an enforceable breach of planning control.”

¹⁰ *Cotswold Grange County Park v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2014] JPL 981

The LDCs

18. The 2022 LDC certifies that the existing use of the appeal site for caravan and camping purposes in non-compliance with condition 6 of the 2010 permission as part of the camping and caravanning site known as Greenhill Leisure Park was lawful on 14 April 2022. That description of the existing use is precise and unambiguous once the wording of condition 6 of the 2010 permission is known. Condition 6 of the 2010 permission states: *“That the 20 pitches to which this application relates shall be used as seasonal or standard pitches from 01 March to the 31 October and shall be used only as winter storage for a maximum of 20 unoccupied caravans (one caravan per pitch) for the remainder of each year and winter storage shall not take place on any other part of the site other than as indicated on the approved drawings.”* My interpretation of that condition is that it restricts the accommodation use of 20 pitches on the appeal site to a set time in the year and the time and location of winter storage of unoccupied caravans.
19. It is not known where the 20 pitches are/were located given the plan is not on the Council’s file. However, the application site for the 2010 application and the 2022 LDC are the same. Therefore, in my judgement the 2022 LDC conclusively presumes that the existing use (at the date of the 2022 LDC application) of the appeal site for caravan and camping purposes in breach of condition 6 of the 2010 permission is lawful. Moreover, the 2024 LDC states that the proposed use *“siting of static caravans for 12-month holiday occupation”* would be lawful. As such, it is conclusively presumed through the 2024 LDC that the use of the appeal site for the stationing of static caravans for 12-month holiday occupation is lawful.

The planning permissions

20. The 2004 permission granted planning permission for, amongst other things, a “change of use of land to form campsite and recreation area”. The 2004 permission decision notice includes the wording *‘grants planning permission for the development described in the above-mentioned application, the accompanying plans and drawings and any clarifying or amended information’*. Therefore, that wording is sufficient to inform a reasonable reader that the application and its plans form part of the planning permission. An amended plan received on 3 October 2003 (the amended plan) is cited within the decision notice. The key on that plan includes the wording ‘land for a holiday site’, ‘proposed leisure use’ and ‘proposed holiday site’. The Council has stated that the application form submitted with the application refers to a *“new log cabin building for WC/s within holiday site”*.
21. I acknowledge that there are no conditions on that permission restricting the occupation of the pitches and that condition 15 refers to the number of consecutive nights that caravans, motor caravans or tents can be stationed on the land. There is no dispute that the ‘campsite’ cited within the 2004 permission can reasonably be treated as a caravan and campsite. The *Breckland* judgment found that *“The Claimant submitted that use as a “camping site” necessarily denoted temporary stays for holiday purposes and therefore the meaning of the term “caravan” was qualified by the reference to a camping site and was limited to the same type of temporary use. I do not consider that is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used. Where two alternatives are separated by the word “and”, the natural and ordinary meaning is one can do both or either. One alternative does not restrict the scope of the other”*.

22. Within the *Wyre Forest*¹¹ judgment Lord Lowry stated that “*If Parliament in a statutory enactment defines its terms (whether by enlarging or by restricting the ordinary meaning of a word or expression), it must intend that, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, those terms as defined shall govern what is proposed, authorised or done under or by reference to that enactment.*” Consequently, unless there is a clear indication to the contrary the statutory definition of ‘caravan’ at section 29(1) of the CSCDA60 applies to a planning document.
23. Section 29(1) of the CSCDA60 states that ‘Caravan’ means any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor vehicle so designed or adapted, but does not include - (a) any railway rolling stock which is for the time being on rails forming part of a railway system, or (b) any tent ...”. The *Wyre Forest* judgment pre-dates that of *Trump* and *Ashford* but the judgments in *Breckland* and *Barton Park* both apply the principle outlined in *Wyre Forest*.
24. Both main parties evidence indicates that the 2010 permission related to a section 73 application to develop land without compliance with conditions previously attached and I have no reason to dispute that. Even though the description on the decision notice only relates to the removal of a condition, section 73 of the 1990 Act only confers power to amend or remove conditions and not to amend any other part of the permission including the description of development. Therefore the 2010 permission relates to the same description of development as the 2003 permission. Condition 15 from the 2003 permission was removed and a new standalone planning permission was granted with its own conditions. Given that the 2022 LDC conclusively presumes that condition 6 of the 2010 permission has not been complied with for 10 years or more it is reasonable to consider that the Council accept that the 2010 permission was implemented/begun.
25. Condition 4 of the 2010 permission states “*That all touring caravans/motor homes/tents using the 20 seasonal pitches hereby approved shall be occupied for holiday purposes only and shall not be occupied as a person's sole or main residence.*” The reason given for that condition is “*To prevent permanent occupation that would be contrary to countryside policies as set out in PPS7.*” I agree with the appellant that a reasonable reader would interpret that condition as only restricting the occupation of touring caravans/motor homes/tents on the 20 seasonal pitches. The evidence before me does not indicate where on the site those 20 seasonal pitches were located and neither does it indicate how many other pitches were available at that time.
26. Overall, when the condition is read together with the description of the development approved by the 2004 permission, the amended plan and the application form for that permission it is reasonable to consider that the camping and caravan site and the seasonal pitches formed part of a holiday/leisure site. Moreover, the site is called Greenhill Leisure Park on the decision notices for the 2004 and 2010 permissions. In my judgement, the 2004 and 2010 permissions, granted planning permission for a caravan and camping site for recreational/holiday use and that the Council was approving what had been applied for. Nevertheless, there is no condition preventing the stationing of static caravans on the site for permanent

¹¹ *Wyre Forest BC v SSE & Allen's Caravans* [1990] 2 WLR 517; [1990] JPL 724

residential occupation therefore that use is not prohibited by the planning permissions. Moreover, as stated above, it is conclusively presumed through the 2024 LDC that the use of the appeal site for the stationing of static caravans for 12-month holiday occupation is lawful. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the proposed use of the site would constitute a material change of use.

Material change of use

27. Whether they would be occupied for holiday use or a permanent residential use the static caravans would be used for general domestic activities such as cooking food, eating meals, sleeping, relaxing, showering and watching television. Vehicles would be parked near to the caravans whether those caravans were occupied by holiday makers or residents. The land between the caravans would on the balance of probability be used for relaxing, eating meals, using a barbecue for cooking, socialising and hanging out washing. Those activities would be similar with both types of occupation. Therefore, both types of occupation would be of a similar domestic character in these respects.
28. The static caravans could be occupied all year round by holiday makers. Generally, the peak periods for such occupation would be during the school holidays and the summer months. However, where the caravans are purchased as a holiday home it is more likely than not that the owners would occupy the caravan on a more frequent basis throughout the year, in my experience. I accept that holidaymakers that occupy the caravans on a short-term let are likely to bring only the basic essential items with them – such as clothes, bedding and towels. It is also likely that where caravans are let regularly on that basis that domestic paraphernalia in the spaces between the caravans would be limited.
29. Nonetheless, it is more likely than not, that some of the caravans would be owned as a second home and in those instances, it is highly likely that the outside spaces would be individualised by the addition of decking, outdoor seating, sheds, fencing and ornamental planting. I observed at the site visit that those types of features currently exist between several of the caravan pitches. There would be no difference in the number or layout of the actual caravans. As such, in visual terms, within the appeal site, both types of occupation would be likely to have a similar character.
30. The vehicular trips associated with both of the uses could be generated by trips to restaurants, public houses, visitor attractions, supermarkets and by trades maintaining the caravans/grounds/services. The permanent residential occupation of the caravans could also generate vehicular trips associated with work and school and those trips are likely to be during peak periods. There are likely to be visits from friends and family with that use as well but where the caravans are used as a second home visits from family and friends could also be generated by the holiday occupation.
31. The Clanna, Cotswold Manor Country Park; Organford and the Matchams Drive appeals¹² all considered vehicular trips made by holiday makers for recreational and shopping purposes and trips by permanent residents to and from places of work and visits from friends to them. The Inspectors in those cases took the view that on balance whilst there would be some increase in the overall number of vehicle movements associated with any given residential unit and some changes in

¹² Appeal Refs: APP/C/93/P1615/627553; APP/G1630/X/11/2156048; APP/B1225/X/15/3002181 and APP/U1240/X/17/3179428

the purpose of the trips it was considered that the basic scale and character of the trip generation would not materially change. Those decisions date from some years ago and I acknowledge that additional vehicular trips may now be generated by supermarket and online retail and meal deliveries. Nevertheless, whilst short-term let holiday makers are unlikely to generate supermarket and online retail deliveries, they could generate online meal deliveries. Moreover, second home occupiers could generate similar supermarket and online retail deliveries as permanent residential occupiers. Consequently, on the balance of probabilities, I have no reason to dispute the findings of those Inspectors.


32. In relation to pets being brought to the site I consider that second homeowners, and short term let holiday makers are as likely to bring them to the site as permanent residential occupiers. I have found that the general domestic activities associated with both uses would be similar. Therefore, there is little to indicate how the permanent residential occupation would materially increase the amount of refuse generated by holidaymakers. The use by permanent residential occupation could increase the demand on local services for education and healthcare when compared to short-term let holiday makers. Yet second homeowners could generate a similar demand for services such as healthcare. In my judgement, it is more likely than not that there would not be significant additional demand on local services generated by a permanent residential use when compared to a holiday use.
33. The Council anticipates that permanent residents of the static caravans would take a more relaxed approach to the generation of noise and disturbance that may impact upon their neighbours, such as playing music or undertaking home and vehicle maintenance. It is unknown why it anticipates that given that permanent residential occupiers would be living next to and building relationships with their neighbours for a prolonged period of time. As a result, in my judgement, permanent residential occupiers would be more likely to be considerate to their neighbours' amenity in respect of noise and disturbance. Whereas holiday makers who are only occupying caravans for a short term are more likely to not be considerate to their neighbours given that they do not have a relationship with them.
34. Taking into account all of the above, I conclude that a change of use of static caravans stationed on the appeal site for permanent residential use would not, on the evidence before me, constitute the making of a material change in the use of the land that would require planning permission.

Conclusion

35. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the Council's refusal to grant a certificate of lawful use or development for use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation is not well-founded and that the appeal should succeed. I will exercise accordingly the powers transferred to me in section 195(2) of the 1990 Act.

D Boffin

INSPECTOR



Lawful Development Certificate

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990: SECTION 192
(as amended by Section 10 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991)

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE) (ENGLAND)
ORDER 2015: ARTICLE 39

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that on 19 June 2024 the use described in the First Schedule hereto in respect of the land specified in the Second Schedule hereto and edged in red and hatched in black on the plan attached to this certificate, would have been lawful within the meaning of section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended), for the following reasons:

1. The planning permissions granted in 2004 and 2010, 03/00655/F and 10/00201/F, granted planning permission for a caravan and camping site for recreational/holiday use and that the Council approved what had been applied for. Nevertheless, there is no condition preventing the stationing of static caravans on the site for permanent residential occupation therefore that use is not prohibited by the planning permissions.
2. It is conclusively presumed through the Lawful Development Certificate issued in 2024, 23/02495/CLUP, that the use of the appeal site for the stationing of static caravans for 12-month holiday occupation is lawful.
3. A change of use of static caravans stationed on the appeal site for permanent residential occupation would not, on the evidence before me, constitute the making of a material change in the use of the land that would require planning permission.

Signed

D Boffin

Inspector

Date: 26 October 2026

Reference: APP/C3105/X/25/3362773

First Schedule

Use of static caravans for permanent residential occupation

Second Schedule

Land at Greenhill Leisure Park, Greenhill Farm, Station Road, Bletchington OX5 3BQ

IMPORTANT NOTES – SEE OVER

NOTES

This certificate is issued solely for the purpose of Section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended).

It certifies that the use described in the First Schedule taking place on the land specified in the Second Schedule would have been lawful, on the certified date and, thus, was not liable to enforcement action, under section 172 of the 1990 Act, on that date.

This certificate applies only to the extent of the use described in the First Schedule and to the land specified in the Second Schedule and identified on the attached plan. Any use which is materially different from that described, or which relates to any other land, may result in a breach of planning control which is liable to enforcement action by the local planning authority.

The effect of the certificate is subject to the provisions in section 192(4) of the 1990 Act, as amended, which state that the lawfulness of a specified use or operation is only conclusively presumed where there has been no material change, before the use is instituted or the operations begun, in any of the matters which were relevant to the decision about lawfulness.

Scale: Not to Scale

